NOTE TO READER

This paper was delivered at a joint panel session of the Evangelical Philosophical Society and the American Academy of Religion meeting in Denver, CO. Nov. 19, 2018. It is still in progress but I wanted to get something uploaded as soon as possible. Some of the footnote references need to be smoothed out and the appendices and bibliography are pending. As such, it is not yet ready for distribution. Thanks!

Antecedents to Aquinas's Doctrine of Divine Simplicity
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I suspect that discussing Aquinas’s doctrine of simplicity might strike some as impractical or as uninteresting or as irrelevant as exploring the contours of medieval dentistry. On the other hand, things might be changing in certain circles with a renaissance of interest in Aristotle and Aquinas—the philosophers whose metaphysics has informed the bulk of the discussion on simplicity throughout history and even today)—together with an increase of interest in the "classical" attributes of God, the metaphysics of the notion of 'good', and Natural Law Theory,

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1 Consider recent publications such as Edward Feser, ed., Aristotle on Method and Metaphysics (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); David S. Oderberg, Real Essentialism (New York: Routledge, 2007); and Arvin Vos, Aquinas, Calvin, and Contemporary Protestant Thought: A Critique of Protestant Views on the Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Washington: Christian University Press, 1985). It is clear that Feser would celebrate any renewal of Aristotelianism (if, indeed, there is such a renewal) when he says "How significant is Aristotle? Well, I wouldn't want to exaggerate, so let me put it his way: Abandoning Aristotelianism, as the founders of modern philosophy did, was the single greatest mistake ever made in the entire history of Western thought." [Edward Feser, The Last Superstition: A Refutation of the New Atheism (South Bend: St. Augustine's, 2008), 51, emphasis in original.]


especially, respecting the latter, in contemporary Reformed theology. I submit that all of these issues share certain common metaphysical concerns and commitments, some of which bear on the doctrine of divine simplicity.

Aquinas's doctrine of divine simplicity arises out of his maintaining a number of theological and metaphysical doctrines. Some of these doctrines are ideas from previous theologians and philosophers which he incorporated into his own thinking: some with little or no modification, some with important modifications, and some that served as counter-examples that spurred him on to make his own metaphysical innovations. Thus, by the term 'antecedents' do not mean merely those influences that preceded Thomas Aquinas the thinker. I also mean to include those doctrines that "precede" his specific doctrine of simplicity. By this broader notion, I mean to include certain ideas that are Aquinas's own which serve as the context and ingredients of his doctrine of simplicity.

While it is manifest that Aquinas's motivations for his thinking and writing were theological and religious, it is equally manifest that, infused throughout his writings, is his metaphysics. He displayed the consummate example of philosophy, the handmaid, in service of the queen of the sciences, theology whether or not one agrees that his efforts were well placed.

Regarding the notion of metaphysical commitments and their bearing on Aquinas's doctrine of simplicity, Barry D. Smith, no friend of Aquinas's doctrine of simplicity puts it this way:

It is important to recognize the role that presuppositions play in arguments for the simplicity doctrine from the nature of God. Some of the arguments advanced have Greek philosophical presuppositions. Of particular importance is the presupposition that simplicity is ontologically superior to compositeness, which is so foundational and pervasive that no one sees the need to argue for its validity. In some cases, the arguments are more narrowly dependent upon Aristotelian substance metaphysic with its philosophical categories of graduations of being, matter and form, potentiality and actuality, efficient causation, as well as genus and species (differentia).  

In this paper I should like to highlight some of these antecedent metaphysical ideas (including some listed by Smith) to the end of helping to situate Aquinas's doctrine of simplicity. I dare not hope to convince you that Aquinas's doctrine is true, but I do hope that by seeing how his doctrine of simplicity arises out of these commitments, we can attenuate the discussion and the critique (and in some instances) perhaps redirect them. Many have raised objections to the doctrine. We shall perhaps hear some of the more powerful objections here tonight. My aim is to preempt some of those objections by showing that, given the metaphysics that Aquinas holds (together with his theological commitments), the doctrine of simplicity emerges unavoidably.

As I have suggested, antecedents to Aquinas's doctrine of simplicity are both theological and philosophical. Much more deserves to be said about most of the antecedents. Indeed, entire books have been written on a number of these antecedents individually considered (though the influence of these antecedents extends beyond the issue of simplicity). Take as an example the book by Fran O'Rourke, *Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas*.  

**Theological Antecedents**

For my purposes, I can hope to deal only briefly with the more significant of the metaphysical elements of Aquinas's doctrine of simplicity. Before I pick these up, however, I

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should like to list, with little or no comments, other of Aquinas's antecedents. Theological antecedents (bearing in mind that sometimes the line between philosophy and theology can be blurry) would include (in historical order) Philo (30 BC-AD 50); Irenaeus (125-202); Clement of Alexandria (150-215); Origen (185-254); Hilary of Poitiers (310-367); Basil of Caesarea a.k.a. Basil the Great (329-379); John of Damascus (675-749); Peter Abelard (1079-1142); Peter Lombard (1100-1160); and the Fourth Lateran Council, 1215.7

In addition, one might find by way of interest, certain theological subsequences—illustrations, I submit, to the enduring influence of Aquinas and these antecedents, particularly in regard to simplicity. These theological subsequences would include (again, in historical order) John Calvin (1509-1564); the Waldensian Confession, 1560; the Belgic Confession, 1561; the Thirty-Nine Articles, 1562/63; the Irish Articles, 1615; John Owen (1616-1683); Francis Turretin (1623-1687); Stephen Charnock (1628-1680); the Westminster Confession of Faith, 1646; the Savoy Declaration, 1658; the London Baptist Confession, 1677; Charles Hodge (1797-1878); Herman Bavinck (1854-1921); Louis Sperry Chaffer (1871-1952); and Louis Berkhof (1873-1957).8

I am not suggesting that these historical antecedents or subsequences make the doctrine of simplicity true. I am suggesting, however, that they might be flags that, even if the doctrine is false, it is not entirely incoherent as some of its detractors maintain even if it turns out that its coherency is only possible given Aquinas's metaphysical commitments out of which his doctrine of simplicity emerges. A discussion of the coherency of those metaphysical commitments themselves will have to wait for another panel discussion.

7 See APPENDIX 1 "Theological Antecedents to Aquinas's Doctrine of Simplicity"
8 See APPENDIX 2 "Theological Subsequences to Aquinas's Doctrine of Simplicity."
Philosophical Antecedents

The thinking of certain philosophers serves as background to Aquinas's own philosophy in a number of areas, including by example and by counter-example his doctrine of simplicity. A partial list of these would include (also in historical order) Aristotle (384-322 BC); Plotinus (205-270); Proclus (410-485; particularly through the later commentary on his thinking, Liber de Causus); Pseudo-Dionysius (late 5th century to early 6th century On the Divine Names); Augustine (354-430); Boethius (480-524); Al-Farabi (870-950); Avicenna (980-1037); Anselm (1033-1109); Averroes (1126-1198); Maimonides (1135-1204); Phillip the Chancellor (1160-1236); Alexander of Hales (1170 (80?)-1245); William of Auvergne (1190-1249); and Albert the Great (1206-1280).9

Aquinas's philosophy employs many categories and ideas gleaned from these and other antecedents—some more than others. Aquinas gets much of his metaphysics from Aristotle. He was in very many ways an Aristotelian. But while certain of these Aristotelian doctrines are necessary for Aquinas's doctrine of simplicity, they are not sufficient. Doctrines deepened or developed by Aquinas together with additional philosophical doctrines added by him (though not themselves without antecedent influences both by example and by counter-example) will be what turn the pagan philosophy of Aristotle into the Christian philosophy of Aquinas.10 A list of these

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9 See APPENDIX 3 "Philosophical Antecedents to Aquinas's Doctrine of Simplicity."

10 Etienne Gilson deftly summarizes the situation: "Thomism was not the upshot of a better understanding of Aristotle. It did not come out of Aristotelianism by way of evolution, but of revolution. Thomas uses the language of Aristotle everywhere to make the Philosopher say that there is only one God, the pure Act of Being, Creator of the world, infinite and omnipotent, a providence for all that which is, intimately present to every one of his creatures, especially to men, every one of whom is endowed with a personally immortal soul naturally able to survive the death of its body. The best way to make Aristotle say so many things he never said was not to show that, had he understood himself better than he did, he would have said them. For indeed Aristotle seems to have understood himself pretty well. He has said what he had to say, given the meaning which he himself attributed to the principles of his own philosophy. Even the dialectical acumen of Saint Thomas Aquinas could not have extracted from the principles of Aristotle more than what they could possibly yield. The true reason why his conclusions were different from those of Aristotle was that his own principles themselves were different. … In order to metamorphose the doctrine of Aristotle, Thomas has ascribed a new meaning to the principles of Aristotle. As a philosophy,
metaphysical doctrines (only a few about which I will be able to make any comments) include (this time in more or less a logical or metaphysical order): act and potency; efficient, formal, material, and final causality; exemplar causality; form and matter; Aristotle's Five Predicables;\(^\text{11}\) Aristotle's Ten Categories\(^\text{12}\); analogy of being; existence; the essence/existence distinction; and the Transcendental.

**Defining Simplicity**

For Aquinas, to say that God is simple is just to say that God is not composed in any way. For him, there are a number of ways in which a being can be composed.\(^\text{13}\) In his *Summa Theologiae*, he asks whether God is a body; whether God is composed of matter and form; whether God is the same as His essence or nature; whether essence and existence are the same in God; whether God is contained in a genus; whether in God there are any accidents; and whether God is altogether simple. In this last point, Aquinas gives a more global defense of simplicity by examining the notion of composition as such. Regarding the latter, Aquinas seeks to show how no aspect of composition *per se* (my term) is possible with God, including the relationship of parts to whole; the fact that any composition requires a cause for the composition; that any

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\(^\text{11}\) genus; specific difference; species; proper accident; accident

\(^\text{12}\) substance/essence (the only one through itself (*per se*); all others through another (*in alio*); quantity; quality; relation; place or location; time; position; state or habitus; action; and passion; A six-foot tall *quantity* white *quality* man *substance*, much taller than his friend *relation*, was standing *position* in the field *place* yesterday *time* armed with an ax *state (habitus)*, cutting down a tree *action*, completely unaware that he was being burned *passion* by the sun.

\(^\text{13}\) "Now in every composite of whatsoever kind of composition there must needs be a mixture of act and potentiality: because of the things whereof it is composed, either one is in potentiality to the other, as matter to form, subject to accident, genus to difference, or all the parts together are in potentiality to the whole, since parts are reducible to matter, and the whole is reducible to form so that no composite is first act." [On the Power of God Bk. III, Q. VII, art. 1, trans. English Dominican Fathers (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2004), 3.]
composition requires potentiality and actuality (either a part's potentiality to another part or the potentiality of the parts taken together with respect to the whole); and that nothing composite can be predicated of any single one of its parts.14

From Aquinas's On the Power of God, written before the Summa Theologiae, we can add to the discussion "whether 'good', 'just', 'wise' and the like, predicate an accident in God, … whether the afore said terms signify the divine substance … whether these terms are synonymous."15 Aquinas then rounds out the treatment of simplicity here with a robust discussion of relations with respect to God and creatures.

Existence and the Essence/Existence Distinction

Of the different aspects of Aquinas's doctrine of simplicity, I suspect most would regard Aquinas's notions of existence and the essence/existence distinction as the most relevant. Thus, I should like to start with these and then introduce any of the others when necessary and as time

14 "The absolute simplicity of God may be shown in many ways. First, from the previous articles of this question. For there is neither composition of quantitative parts in God, since He is not a body; nor composition of matter and form; nor does His nature differ from His 'suppositum'; nor His essence from His existence; neither is there in Him composition of genus and difference, nor of subject and accident. Therefore, it is clear that God is nowise composite, but is altogether simple. Secondly, because every composite is posterior to its component parts, and is dependent on them; but God is the first being, as shown above (Q[2], A[3]). Thirdly, because every composite has a cause, for things in themselves different cannot unite unless something causes them to unite. But God is uncaused, as shown above (Q[2], A[3]), since He is the first efficient cause. Fourthly, because in every composite there must be potentiality and actuality; but this does not apply to God; for either one of the parts actuates another, or at least all the parts are potential to the whole. Fifthly, because nothing composite can be predicated of any single one of its parts. And this is evident in a whole made up of dissimilar parts; for no part of a man is a man, nor any of the parts of the foot, a foot. But in wholes made up of similar parts, although something which is predicated of the whole may be predicated of a part (as a part of the air is air, and a part of water, water), nevertheless certain things are predicable of the whole which cannot be predicated of any of the parts; for instance, if the whole volume of water is two cubits, no part of it can be two cubits. Thus in every composite there is something which is not it itself. But, even if this could be said of whatever has a form, viz. that it has something which is not it itself, as in a white object there is something which does not belong to the essence of white; nevertheless in the form itself, there is nothing beside itself. And so, since God is absolute form, or rather absolute being. He can be in no way composite. Hilary implies this argument, when he says (De Trin. vii): 'God, Who is strength, is not made up of things that are weak; nor is He Who is light, composed of things that are dim.' [St. Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica: Complete English Edition in Five Volumes, translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, 1981), I, Q3, art.7]

allows to help us appreciate what Aquinas is doing with his doctrine of simplicity and why it emerges as it does in his overall theology and metaphysics.

Aquinas's understanding of existence, though clearly influenced by certain philosophical antecedents, is nevertheless, a profound innovation and serves, according to certain schools of Thomistic thought, as the key to his entire metaphysics—one which makes all the difference between him and Aristotle, despite Aquinas's tremendous indebtedness to him.

Aristotle's highest category in his metaphysics is Form (or, if you will, essence). To be is to be a Form. This is to say, Aristotle does not have a philosophical category of existence. As such, there can be no philosophical distinction in Aristotle's philosophy between essence and existence. Charles Kahn observes, "The upshot is that, although we can recognize at least three different kinds of existential questions discussed by Aristotle, Aristotle himself neither distinguishes these questions from one another nor brings them together under any common head or topic which might be set in contrast to other themes in his general discussion of Being."16 Joseph Owens remarks, "From the viewpoint of the much later distinction between essence and the act of existing, this treatment must mean that Aristotle is leaving the act of existence entirely outside the scope of his philosophy. The act of existing must be wholly escaping his scientific consideration. All necessary and definite connections between things can be reduced to essence."17

Aristotle is not alone here, for there does not seem to be a distinctive philosophical doctrine of existence as such in any Ancient Greek philosophy, and, thus, no notion of an

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essence/existence distinction among the Ancient Greeks. Charles Kahn again, in his aptly titled article "Why Existence Does Not Emerge as a Distinct Concept in Greek Philosophy" says,

In the extended discussion of the concept (or concepts) of Being in Greek philosophy from Parmenides to Aristotle, the theme of existence does not figure as a distinct topic for philosophical reflection. … I must make clear that my thesis about the non-emergence of existence as a distinct topic is not intended as a denial of the obvious fact that the Greek philosophers occasionally discuss questions of existence. My thesis is rather that the concept of existence is never "thematized": it itself does not become a subject for philosophical reflection.18

Kahn then interestingly goes on to observe, "My general view of the historical development is that existence in the modern sense becomes a central concept in philosophy only in the period when Greek ontology is radically revised in the light of a metaphysics of creation: that is to say, under the influence of Biblical religion."19

In addition to his Summa Theologiae and On the Power of God already referenced, Aquinas lays out other key texts in his On Being and Essence and Truth.20 The essence/existence distinction maintains that there is a real distinction in a created thing between its essence and its existence. A thing's essence is what it is. Its existence is that it is. Consider yourself as a human being: Your essence is what makes you a human. Your existence is what makes you a being. That essence and existence are distinct in sensible objects (i.e., objects that are evident to the senses) is evident from the fact that one can understand the essence of a thing without knowing whether it exists. Aquinas argues in On Being and Essence, "Now, every essence ... can be understood without knowing anything about its being. I can know, for instance, what a man or a

18 Kahn, Existence, p. 7, 9, emphasis in original.

19 Kahn, Existence, p. 7.

phoenix is and still be ignorant whether it has being in reality \( esse \) habeat in rerum natura. From this it is clear that being is other than essence ... unless perhaps there is a reality who quiddity [i.e., essence] is its being.\(^{21}\)

For Aquinas, God's simplicity emerges finally from the fact that there is no distinction between God's essence and God's existence. The full import of the essence/existence distinction is easily missed until Aquinas's notion of existence is unpacked. Once one appreciates what Aquinas says about existence, then, when coupled with the real distinction between essence and existence, one can begin to see its profound implications for the existence and attributes of the God of Classical Theism.

Various terms are used in this discussion. The infinitive of the Latin verb to be 'sum' (I am) is 'esse' and is often translated into English as 'being' or 'existence.' This can be misleading for the English reader since the English 'being' can be both a noun and a verb. Further, the English 'existence' is always a noun. What will be important in due course is the emphasis upon the infinitive sense of esse. A literal translation of 'to be', however, tends to be awkward and probably less helpful that the various English renderings. Some Thomists use 'esse' for this philosophical notion (I sometimes do), though Aquinas will also use other Latin words for 'existence'.

\(^{21}\) On Being and Essence, IV, §6, p. 55. Elsewhere Aquinas argues, "Everything that is in the genus of substance is composite with a real composition, because whatever is in the category of substance is subsistent in its own existence, and its own act of existing must be distinct from the thing itself; otherwise it could not be distinct in existence from the other things with which it agrees in the formal character of its quiddity; for such agreement is required in all things that are directly in a category. Consequently everything that is directly in the category of substance is composed at least of the act of being and the subject of being." [Truth, XXVII, 1, ad. 8, trans. Schmidt, v. 3, 311-312]
Aspects of Aquinas's Understanding of Esse

Several aspects of Aquinas's understanding of esse (the Latin word sometimes translated 'existence') should be noted. These observations should be taken primarily in terms of how Aquinas understands created realities. First, for Aquinas, existence or esse is an act. In thinking about sensible objects, existence is something that essences "do" or, more to the point, something that essences have done to them.

This relationship between the act of existence (or, if you will, the act of exist-ing) and the essence of a thing is the relationship of act and potency that Aquinas gets from Aristotle. Definitionally, act (or actuality) is to be real whereas potency is the power or capacity to be actual or real. As a capacity, it is said to be in a substance or thing. As such, a potency cannot exist on its own, but can only "exist" as a potency that is possessed by an existing thing, i.e., a thing that is in act. To be in act (or to be actual) is to be real. Joseph Owens summarizes, "When existence is considered in relation to the thing it makes exist, it may be regarded as actualizing the thing and, accordingly, it appears as the actuality that gives the thing existence." Aquinas puts it this way: "Wherefore it is clear that being as we understand it here is the actuality of all acts, and therefore the perfection of all perfections."

22 Joseph Owens, An Interpretation of Existence (Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1968), 51. But with Aquinas, there is another aspect of actualizing that is completely apart from any metaphysical aspect of potency, viz., creation. In his discussions of the various kinds of potencies or possible, Aristotle observes, "The possible, then, in one sense, as has been said, means that which is not of necessity false." [Metaphysics Δ (V), 12, 1019b30, trans. W. D. Ross in Richard McKeon, ed. The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: Random House, 1941).] Aquinas employs this distinction in his discussion of creation ex nihilo. "Before the world was it was possible for the world to be: but it does not follow that there was need of matter as the base of that possibility. For it is stated in Metaphysics v, 12, that sometimes a thing is said to be possible, not in respect of some potentiality, but because it involves no contradiction of terms, in which sense the possible is opposed to the impossible. Accordingly, it is said that before the world was it was possible for the world to be made, because the statement involved no contradiction between subject and predicate. We man also reply that it was possible by reason of the active power of the agent, but not on account of any passive power of matter." [Thomas Aquinas, On the Power of God, I, Q3, art. 1. ad. 2, trans. English Dominican Fathers, 84.]

Second, Aquinas's notion of existence entails that the existing of a created thing is continuously being caused. By way of illustration, suppose you saw a giant glass ball in front of you. You might ask "how did the ball come to be?" If someone answered that the giant glass ball was manufactured in a nearby factory and moved here as a promotional gimmick for a local retail service, you would likely be satisfied with that answer. What is more, your satisfaction would have nothing to do with knowing much more about the factory that made the glass ball beyond the fact that it manufactured it. Indeed, while it might be interesting for other reasons, whether the factory still exists would, for the most part, be irrelevant to your satisfaction with the explanation of the glass ball in front of you.

In contrast, suppose you were hearing music. In this case, you would not ask "where did the music come from" or "how did the music come to be?" Rather, you would ask "what is causing the music to be right now?" This so because, unlike the glass ball (as far as this illustration goes) you realize that music is music only as it is being caused to be music at every instance that it is music. As soon as the cause of the music stops causing the music, the music goes out of existence. Music as music must continually be caused to be music if it is to be music at all.

In a parallel way, this is how Aquinas regards existence in creatures. As that which actualizes an essence, that essence exists only as it is being caused to exist at every moment of its existence, which is to say, that essence exists only as it is being continuously actualized. If the cause of the existence of the essence stops causing the existence of the essence, the essence goes out of existence. Thus, for Aquinas, if the existence of a thing is not due to what it is, which is to say, if the existence of a thing is not due to its essence—one should note that this is referring to anything where its existence is distinct from its essence—then that thing can only be existing because it is continually being caused to exist by something for which there is no
essence/existence distinction. That thing must be substantial existence itself—*ipsum esse subsistens*. That thing needs nothing to give it existence. It, instead, gives existence to everything else. The creation *has* existence. The Creator *is* existence.

Third, for Aquinas, existence as such contains all perfections. Note that 'perfection' here is not exclusively a moral one. While moral perfection can be (indeed, *must be* according to Aquinas) parsed out within this category, here 'perfection' is a broader notion.24

For the most part, to perfect something is to actualize the potencies in a thing, sending it towards fully becoming what it is. Aristotle used these terms interchangeably (ἐνεργάζομαι, ἐνεργεῖα: actualize, actuality; ἐντελέχεια: perfection).25 That 'perfection' is an apt word to use in this context is argued by Joseph Owens. "An alternate word for actuality in this respect is "perfection" (entelecheia). It was used by Aristotle along with actuality to designate the formal

24 That moral perfection (but not the moral virtues as attributed to God) must be parsed out in the category of the actualization of potencies is the essence of Natural Law Theory. For a very helpful summary of this, especially regarding God's relationship to the matter, see Edward Feser, "Does Morality Depend on God? (Updated)" at http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2011/07/does-morality-depend-on-god.html (accessed Nov. 11, 2016). See also my "God and Morality" at http://richardghowe.com/index_htm_files/GodandMoralityPaper.pdf (accessed 11/22/18) where I summarize Feser's article and nest the discussion in a summary of Natural Law Theory. For more in-depth discussions, see J. Budziszewski, *Written on the Heart: The Case for Natural Law* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1997); J. Daryl, Charles, *Retrieving the Natural Law: A Return to Moral First Things* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008); R. S. Clark, "Calvin on the *Lex Naturalis*," *Studios Theological Journal* 6, no. 1 and 2 (1998): 1-22; Jesse Covington, Bryan McGraw, and Micah Watson, *Natural Law and Evangelical Political Thought* (Lanham: Lexington, 2013); Austin Fagothy, *Right Reason: Ethics in Theory and Practice Based on the Teachings of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas*, 2nd ed. (Charlotte: Tan, 1959); Stephen J. Grabill, *Rediscovering the Natural Law in Reformed Theological Ethics* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006); John T. McNeill, "Natural Law in the Teaching of the Reformers," *The Journal of Religion* 26, no. 3 (July 1946): 168-182; and David VanDrunen, *Divine Covenants and Moral Order: A Biblical Theology of Natural Law* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014); David VanDrunen, "Medieval Natural Law and the Reformation: A Comparison of Aquinas and Calvin," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 80 (Winter 2006): 77-98. Much of the above is against the backdrop of Aristotle and Aquinas. For them, see Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae* I-II, Q 1-114, especially his *Treatise on Law* (Q 90-144, sometimes published separately). Finally, it should be noted (without at this point much supporting argument) that the reason the actualization of a potential is a perfection, or, more to the point, an actualization of a thing's good, is because in Aquinas's thinking, the terms 'being' and 'good' are convertible. For a discussion of this, see Jan A. Aertsen, "The Convertibility of Being and Good in St. Thomas Aquinas." *New Scholasticism* 59 (1985): 449-470.

25 It is interesting to note that the word ἐντελέχεια arises from the root words ἐν (in) + τέλος (end, goal) and ἔχειν (to have).
elements in the things. These perfected the material element in the sense of filling its potentiality and completing the thing. Since existence is required to complete the thing and all the formal elements and activities, it may be aptly called the perfection of all perfections.\textsuperscript{26}

These notions of continuing (or current) causality (i.e., existence as an act) and existence as possessing all perfections are crucial to understanding the whole of Aquinas's metaphysics.\textsuperscript{27} Their value is how they philosophically deliver for Aquinas both the existence of God and all of the classical attributes of God (except those attributes contained exclusively in revealed truth like, for example, the Trinity).

Exactly how they are employed in an argument for God's existence is a topic that will have to wait for another occasion. (I have already touched upon the kernel of such a demonstration earlier when making the comment that any being whose essence is distinct from its existence needs to be caused to exist by a being whose essence is existence). How they are employed as a demonstration of the classical attributes of God, however, is more germane to the topic of simplicity. In the \textit{Summa Theologiae}, the order of argument (after a few preliminary considerations) is the demonstration of God's existence (the famous "Five Ways") in Q2, then the demonstration of God's simplicity in Q3, and then the demonstrations of the remaining classical attributes of God in QQ 4-25. It is no accident that simplicity stands as a fountain head for the

\textsuperscript{26} Owens, \textit{Interpretation}, 52-53.

rest of God's attributes. For Aquinas, such attributes are tethered together like so many buoys on a ship—if one is thrown overboard, the rest will inevitably follow. They all stand or fall together.

How, then, should one understand the relationship between existence and perfections? Consider this illustration (which I borrowed from the philosopher Max Herrera). When one blows up a balloon, the air expands to fill the balloon up to the extent of and according to the shape of the balloon. By parallel, the *esse* (the act of existing) of a creature "fills up" the Form or essence of the creature to the extent of and according to the "shape" of the Form or essence of that creature. Thus, a horse contains all the perfections of *esse* (existence) up to the extent of and according to the limitations of the essence of horse. A human contains all the perfections of existence and up to the extent of and according to the limitations of the essence of human. Since in God there is no essence/existence distinction, then all the perfections of existence are in God because God's being is not conjoined with (and, thus, not limited by) Form. He is his own form or his own being. As Aquinas points out, "God is absolute form, or rather absolute being." He argues that a being whose essence is *esse* possesses all perfections in superabundance. As he says it, "All perfections existing in creatures divided and multiplied, pre-exist in God unitedly."

Is Being a Genus?

Not to venture into the broader issue of dealing with specific objections, I would like to address one objection that will give me occasion to say something about existence vis-à-vis certain other philosophical antecedents. Some have argued that if God is His own existence, if

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28 *ST* I, 3, 2 and I, 3, 7.

29 *ST* I, 13, 5.
there is no essence/existence distinction in God, then this makes God completely empty of content, likened unto a Buddhist abyss or a Hindu absolute.30

This objection seems to be taking Aquinas's notion of existence as if existence was a genus or a universal. The thinking would go like this. Take the individual Socrates. Consider the fact that Socrates is human. Note the differences between an individual human and the category 'human'. Here, I am not implying anything regarding the metaphysics of 'human' as, for example, in the realism/nominalism debate. Regardless of how one might regard the status of the category 'human' here in contradistinction to an individual human, it remains that Socrates is a member, if you will, of the category (or however one would designate the different layers) 'human'.

Now consider that 'human' is animal. Last, add to the layers by noting that 'animal' is 'living thing'. With each step through the layers from Socrates, to human, to animal, to living thing, as the category becomes more inclusive, which is to say, as a category expands to a greater extent over its members, the property commitments of the category become fewer.

The fact that Socrates lived in ancient Greece is irrelevant to his being a human. He would be no less human if he was living in the United States today instead. To be sure, that Socrates was a real human (as opposed to a fictional character) entails that he lived at some time and at some place. But the specific time and space are not entailed by his being human. Thus, the category 'human' has to be free from the particular (or individuating) constraints of specific times and places that obtain with being an individual human.

What is more, the fact that Socrates is rational distinguishes him as a certain kind of animal. Thus, the category of animal cannot contain the specific difference of rational, otherwise

30 In his dialogue on simplicity with William Lane Craig at a symposium at Claremont McKenna College in 2018, Bishop Robert Barron raises this objection in order to answer it. Craig revisits the objection in his response to Bishop Barron. The audio of this dialogue has been uploaded to YouTube in a number of places.
slugs (for example) would not be animals—either that or, more likely, every animal would be human if the category of 'animal' contained the attribute of 'rational'. We can see a similar way of thinking regarding 'living thing'. To be an animal is to be a living thing, but the category of 'living thing' is free from the constraints of being animal so as to include, for example, plants.

What this shows us is that, as one ascends up the scale of the layers, the categories become more encompassing as to which members it includes while at the same time, they become emptier of specifying content. The significance of this for our purposes is what this might say about existence. Existence, it would seem, is the broadest category of all. Everything that is real, exists. Given that this makes it the broadest category possible within reality, it must be (so the reasoning goes) the emptiest of all categories so as to include everything in it—if you will, to include all ten of Aristotle's categories of substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, habitus (or state), action, passion. George Klubertanz summarizes: "Genus is always abstract; and the wider and more universal the genus, the more abstract and potential it is. For example, material substance is a predicate that can be applied to every thing in our material universe: it is also a very abstract concept and is in potency to all the specific determinations—living, sensitive, rational."32

But why does this not make the objector's point? If being is "indifferent" to any of the Ten Catégories, does this not mean that it is "missing" these characteristics? Is this not exactly

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what a genus is? Does it not, then, need to be delimited somehow in order to give it content? Not at all. Aristotle explains: "But it is not possible that … being should be a single genus of things; for the differentiae of any genus must … have being … but it is not possible for the genus taken apart from its species … to be predicated of its proper differentiae; so that if … being is a genus, no differentia will … have being …."

Aquinas concurs. "Since the existence of God is His essence, if God were in any genus, He would be the genus "being," because, since genus is predicated as an essential it refers to the essence of a thing. But the Philosopher has shown (Metaph. iii) that being cannot be a genus, for every genus has differences distinct from its generic essence. Now no difference can exist distinct from being; for non-being cannot be a difference. It follows then that God is not in a genus."

It is not possible for being to be delimited such that it is given content that it somehow does not already have. For, whatever one might postulate as a delimiter (e.g., Form), it itself must have some modicum of existence or being in order to be a delimiter in the first place. But if it has being, then being is ontologically prior to the delimiter and its delimiting. This becomes either self-refuting or involves an infinite regress such that nothing is ever delimited. Gavin Kerr comments: "When it comes to pure esse, it is not the case that esse indeterminately signifies all of the things that could possibly be, and therefore stands to be determined by something distinct from itself. Pure esse is precisely what it is to be. Accordingly, anything not envisaged by pure esse is precisely an impossibility of being and beyond the scope of being."

Consider, then, the rest of Klubertanz's point from before.

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33 Metaphysics B (III), 3, 998b 21-26, McKeon, ed., 723.

34 ST 1, Q3, art. 5, p. 18

But *being* as it is understood in its first and proper metaphysical sense is named from that which is most actual and concrete, namely, the act of existing. Being is not the "widest in extension and the least in comprehension," because the logical rule of the inverse variation of extension and comprehension holds only for universals. Being is at once the widest in extension—for *is* can be said of all things—and the fullest in (implicit) comprehension—for any real act or perfection *is*.\(^{36}\)

What, then, is the problem here? In my estimation, this is a confusion of genus (and, for that matter, the Five Predicables) with what came to be known in the 13th century as the Transcendentals. The doctrine of the Transcendentals began to congeal through the thinking of Phillip the Chancellor (1160-1236), Alexander of Hales (1170-1245), and Albert the Great (1190-1249). As with many of the points introduced, time will not allow a fair exploration of the doctrine of the Transcendentals. Let it suffice to say this much. The Transcendentals are attributes (for lack of a better word here) that "transcend" the Ten Categories of Aristotle in as much as all ten of the categories "participate" (admittedly a philosophically loaded term) in all the Transcendentals. The Ten Categories are modes, if you will, of being; which is to say, they are way of being real in the sensible world. Since being itself is infused through all Ten Categories, it "transcends" them since it itself it is not confined to any of them specifically. The Transcendentals include Being, One, True, Good, and in some lists Beautiful. They are the attributes of being as such.

Having introduced the doctrine of the Transcendentals in order to somehow give closer to our considerations of all the metaphysical notions out of which Aquinas's doctrine of simplicity emerges, one might think I have created more questions and problems than I have answered and solved. Aquinas's overall consideration is that the Transcendentals are attributes that are infused (my word) through all created being. Does this make the Transcendentals God? His answer is no. Instead, God is substantial being itself—*ipsa esse subsistens*—that is the cause of all other

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reality and who is Himself beyond the constraints of finite being. As such, the Transcendentals, as attributes of all finite beings, find their reality from God who is Existence, Truth, and Goodness itself.

From this and other things that need to be said but will go without being said here, one can come to see in Aquinas how it is that the classical attributes of God—perfection, goodness, infinity, immutability, eternity, unity, omniscience, life, will, love, justice, mercy, providence, omnipotence—cascade inexorably from simplicity. To be sure, some contemporary philosophers of religion have contended for certain of these attributes by means quite different from the classical and medieval metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas. But as is evidenced here tonight, not all of these classical attributes have survived these contemporary means. Whether that is a good or bad thing for Christian theism, I will, for the time being, leave it to you to decide.
APPENDIX 1:

Theological Antecedents to Aquinas's Doctrine of Simplicity

Philo (30 BC - AD 50): "But those who enter into agreements and alliances with the body, being unable to throw off the robes of the flesh, and to behold that nature which alone of all natures has not need of anything but is sufficient for itself, and simple, and unalloyed and incapable of being compared with anything …" [The Unchangeableness of God (Quod Deus Immutabilis Sit), XI, §56, in The Works of Philo, trans. C. D. Yonge (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1993), 162-163]

Irenaeus: "For the Father of all is at a vast distance from those affections and passions which operate among men. He is a simple, uncompounded Being, without diverse members, and altogether like, and equal to himself, since He is wholly understanding, and wholly spirit, and wholly thought, and wholly intelligence, and wholly reason, and wholly hearing, and wholly seeing, and wholly light, and the whole source of all that is good—even as the religious and pious are wont to speak concerning God." [Against Heresies II, 13, Christian Classics Ethereal Library, http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf01.html]

Clement of Alexandria: "God is both invisible and ineffable ... It is therefore particularly hard to describe the first and original cause, which is the source of the existence of everything else which is or has been. For how is one to speak about that which is neither a genus nor a differentia nor a species nor an individuality nor a number—in other words which is neither any kind of accidental property nor the subject of any accidental property? ... Nor can one speak of him as having parts." [Miscellanies 5, xii, 78-82, in Maurice Wiles and Mark Santer, eds. Documents in Early Christian Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 4, 6]

Origen: "God, therefore, is not to be thought of as being either a body or as existing in a body, but as an uncompounded intellectual nature, admitting within Himself no addition of any kind … But God, who is the beginning of all things, is not to be regarded as a composite being, lest perchance there should be found to exist elements prior to the beginning itself, out of which everything is composed, whatever that be which is called composite." [Origen, De Preincipiis 1.1.6, ed. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (Albany, OR: Books for the Ages, Ages Software CD ver. 2: 1997)]

Hilary of Poiters (310-368): "God, Who is Life, is not a Being built up of various and lifeless portions; He is Power, and not compact of feeble elements, Light, intermingled with no shades of darkness, Spirit, that can harmonise with no incongruities." [On the Trinity, VII, §27; http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/330207.htm]

"For that God is not after human fashion of a composite being, so that in Him there is a difference of kind between Possessor and Possessed; but all that He is, is life, a nature, that is, complete, absolute and infinite, not composed of dissimilar elements but with one life permeating the whole." [On the Trinity, VIII, §43; http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/330208.htm]
Basil the Great: "His attributes are various, but his essence is simple." [Letter 234 in Maurice Wiles and Mark Santer, eds. Documents in Early Christian Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 11]

John of Damascus: "We believe, then, in One God, one beginning, having no beginning, uncreate, unbegotten, imperishable and immortal, everlasting, infinite, uncircumscribed, boundless, of infinite power, simple, uncompound, incorporeal, without flux, passionless, unchangeable, unalterable, unseen, the fountain of goodness and justice, …" [An Exposition on the Orthodox Faith, chap. 8; http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/33041.htm]

The Fourth Lateran Council: "We firmly believe and openly confess that there is only one true God, eternal and immense, omnipotent, unchangeable, incomprehensible, and ineffable, … absolutely simple …" [Twelfth Ecumenical Council: Lateran IV, Canon 1, https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/basis/ lateran4.asp, accessed 03/20/17].
APPENDIX 2:

Theological Subsequences to Aquinas's Doctrine of Simplicity

**John Calvin:** "For the essence of God being simple and undivided, and contained in himself entire, in full perfection, without partition or diminution, it is improper, nay, ridiculous, to call it his express image." [Institutes of the Christian Religion, 2 vols., trans. Henry Beveridge (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1975), Bk. 1, XIII, §2), vol. 1, p. 110]

**The Waldensian Confession:** "We believe in one eternal God, of a spiritual, infinite, incomprehensible, and simple essence …" [Reformed Confessions of the 16th and 17th Centuries in English Translation, 4 vols., compiled by James T. Dennison, Jr. (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2010), II, 219]

**The Belgic Confession:** "We all believe with the heart and confess with the mouth that there is one only simple and spiritual Being, which we call God ..." [Reformed Confessions, II, 425]

**The Thirty-Nine Articles:** "There is but one living and true God, everlasting, without body, parts, or passions; of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness; the Maker and Preserver of all things, both visible and invisible." [Reformed Confessions, II, 754]

**The Irish Articles:** "There is but one living and true God, everlasting, without body, parts, or passions, of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, the Maker and Preserver of all things, both visible and invisible." [Reformed Confessions, IV, 92, §8]

**John Owen:** "The attributes of God, which alone seem to be distinct things in the essence of God, are all of them essentially the same with one another, and every one the same with the essence of God itself." [Vindiciae Evangelicae: The Mystery of the Gospel Vindicated and Socinianism Examined: Mr. Biddle's First Chapter Examined in The Ages Digital Library: The John Owen Collection CD (Rio, WI: AGES Software), 94]

**Francis Turretin:** "Is God most simple and free from all composition? We affirm against Socinus and Vorstius. … The orthodox have constantly taught that the essence of God is perfectly simple and free form all composition. … The divine nature is conceived by us not only as free from all composition and division, but also as incapable of composition and divisibility." [Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 3 vols. trans. George Musgrave Giger (Phillipsburg: P&R, 1992), I, 191]

**Stephen Charnock:** "This is signified by the name God gives himself (Ex. iii. 14): 'I am that I am:" as simple, pure, uncompounded being, without any created mixture …"[Discourses upon the Existence and Attributes of God, 2 vols. (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1979), I, 182-183]

**The Westminster Confession of Faith:** "There is but one only living and true God, who is infinite in being and perfection, a most pure spirit, invisible, without body, parts, or

The Savoy Declaration: "There is but one only living and true God who is infinite in being and perfection, a most pure Spirit, invisible, without body, parts, or passions …" [Reformed Confessions, IV, 461]

The London Baptist Confession: "The Lord our God is but one only living and true God whose subsistence is in and of Himself, infinite in being and perfection, whose essence cannot be comprehended by any but Himself; a most pure spirit, invisible, without body, parts, or passions …" [Reformed Confessions, IV, 535]

Charles Hodge: "If God is a spirit, … it follows that God is a simple Being, not only as not composed of different elements, but also as not admitting of the distinction between substance and accidents." [Systematic Theology, 3 vols. (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1975), I, V, §4, p. 379]

Louis Sperry Chaffer: "By this term it is indicated that the divine Being is uncompounded, incomplex, and indivisible. … He being the perfect One, is to be worshiped as the finality and infinity of simplicity." [Systematic Theology, 8 vols. (Dallas: Dallas Theological Seminary Press, 1947), I, 213];

Louis Berkhof: "When we speak of the simplicity of God, we use the term to describe the state or quality of being simple, the condition of being free from division into parts, and therefore from compositeness. It means that God is not composite and is not susceptible of division in any sense of the word." [Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1941), 62].

Antecedents to Aquinas's Doctrine of Simplicity

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APPENDIX 3:
Philosophical Antecedents of Aquinas's Doctrine of Simplicity

Aristotle (384-322 BC): "To investigate all the species of being qua being is the work of a science which is generically one, and to investigate the several species is the work of the specific parts of the science. If, now, being and unity are the same and are one thing in the sense that they are implied in one another as principle and cause are, not in the sense that they are explained by the same definition (though it makes no difference eve if we suppose then to be like that—in fact this would even strengthen our case); for 'one man' and 'man' are the same thing, and so are 'existing man' and 'man' and the doubling of the words in 'one man' and 'one existing man' does not express anything different. ... and similarly 'one existent man' add nothing to 'existent man', so that it is obvious that the addition in these cases means the same thing, and unity is nothing apart from being." [Metaphysics, D (4), 2, 1003b20-32, trans. W. D. Ross in Richard McKeon, ed. The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: Random House, 1941), Ross, in McKeon, 732-733]

Plotinus (205-270):

Proclus (410-485):

Pseudo-Dionysius (early 6th century):

Augustine (354-430): "There is then one sole Good, which is simple, and therefore unchangeable; and that is God." [City of God, XI, 10, trans. Henry Bettenson (New York: Penguin, 1984), 440]; "We read, indeed, that “the Spirit of wisdom is manifold;” but it is as properly termed simple. Manifold it is, indeed, because there are many things which it possesses; but simple, because it is not a different thing from what it possesses, as the Son is said to have life in Himself, and yet He is Himself that life." [Letter to Bishop Euodius, 1.2 ed. Philip Schaff, I, pp. 1084-1085 (Albany, OR: Books for the Ages Ages Software CD ver. 2: 1997)];

Boethius (480-524):

Avicenna ():

Anselm: "There are no parts in thee, Lord, nor art thou more than one. But thou are so truly a unitary being, and so identical with thyself, that in no respect are thou unlike thyself; rather thou are unity itself, indivisible by any conception. Therefore, life and wisdom and the rest are not parts of the, but all are one; and each of these is the whole, which thou art, and which all the rest are." [Proslogium, 18, trans. S. N. Deane (La Salle: Open Court, 1962), 25];

Averroes:

Maimonides:
Phillip the Chancellor:
Alexander of Hales:
William of Auvergne:
Phillip the Chancellor:
Albert the Great:
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