



According to Bernard Ramm Varieties of Christian Apologetics Systems Stressing Subjective Immediacy Systems Stressing Natural Theology Systems Stressing Revelation






According to Norman Geisler Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics

- Classical
- ✤ Evidential
- Experiential
- * Historical
- Presuppositional





According to Steven B. Cowan Five Views on Apologetics


Classical Method
Evidential Method

Cumulative Case Method

Presuppositional Method

Reformed Epistemological Method






According to Kenneth Boa/Bowman Faith Has Its Reasons


Classical (rationalistic) = Apologetics as Proof


Evidential (empirical) = Apologetics as Defense

- Reformed (authoritarian) = Apologetics as Offense
- Fideism = Apologetics as Persuasion













With the increasing influence of bad philosophy, it has become necessary to add an additional step at the beginning.


















"I really wasn't sure where to turn. Where science offered exciting proofs of its claims, whether it was photos, equations, visible evidence, religion was a lot more demanding. It constantly wanted me to accept everything on faith. As I'm sure you're aware, faith takes a fair amount of effort."



Faith	Reason	
opinion	truth	
values	facts	
inner	outer	
private	public	
emotional	rational	
feelings	thoughts	
subjective	objective	
religion	science	
true for me	true for all	





"Religious faith is the belief in historical and metaphysical propositions without sufficient evidence."


[Sam Harris. The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), 232]





"Faith is the mortar that fills the cracks in the evidence and the gaps in the logic, and thus it is faith that keeps the whole terrible edifice of religious certainty still looming dangerously over our world."


[Harris, The End of Faith, 233]













"As regards the kind of belief: it is thought virtuous to have Faith that is to say, to have a conviction which cannot be shaken by contrary evidence. Or, if contrary evidence might induce doubt, it is held that contrary evidence must be suppressed."

[Bertrand Russell, *Why I Am Not a Christian and Other Essays on Religion and Related Subjects*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957), from the preface, p. vi]






George H. Smith

"Reason and faith are opposite, two mutually exclusive terms: there is no reconciliation or common ground. Faith is belief without, or in spite of reason."


[George H. Smith, *Atheism: The Case Against God* (Buffalo: Prometheus, 1979), 98]






"Cases of faith are instances of pretending to know something you don't know."


[Peter Boghossian, *A Manual for Creating Atheists* (Durham: Pitchstone, 2013), 24]







If one occupies oneself with real theology one can pass by so-called natural theology only as one would pass by an abyss into which it is inadvisable to step if one does not want to fall. All one can do is to turn one's back upon it as upon the great temptation and source or error, by having nothing to do with it ... "

[Karl Barth, "No!" trans. Peter Fraenkel, in *Natural* Theology: Comprising "Nature and Grace" by Professor Dr. Emil Brunner and the Reply "No!" by Dr. Karl Barth (Eugene: Wipf and Stock: 2002), 75]









"Reason and fact cannot be brought into fruitful union with one another except upon the presupposition of the existence of God and his control over the universe."

[Cornelius Van Til, *A Christian Theory of Knowledge* (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, 1975), 18]






Jason Lisle

"We all have the same evidence; but in order to draw conclusions about what the evidence means we use our worldview our most basic beliefs about the nature of reality. ... Ultimately, biblical creationists accept the recorded history of the Bible as their starting point."


[Jason Lisle, "Can Creationists Be 'Real' Scientists?" in Gary Vaterlaus, ed., *War of the Worldviews: Powerful Answers for an* "Evolutionized" Culture (Hebron: Answers in Genesis, 2005), 124, 125]




Jason Lisle


"Faith is a prerequisite for reason. In order to reason about anything we must have faith that there are laws of logic which correctly prescribe the correct chain of reasoning. Since laws of logic cannot be observed with the senses, our confidence in them is a type of faith."


[Jason Lisle, "Faith and Reason," https://answersingenesis.org/apologetics/faith-vs-reason/, accessed 09/22/17]






"In the twentyfirst century world ... the new attitude ... is that the use of reason and science to prove or disprove a fact is questionable....






"In the postmodern world, both believers and nonbelievers are people of faith."

[Robert E. Webber, The Younger Evangelicals: Facing the Challenges of the New World (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2002), 84]







Reason


Believing something on the basis of demonstration. Believing something on the basis of authority.

Faith





Fermat's equation: $X^n + y^n = Z^n$ This equation has no solutions in integers for $n \ge 3$.



Annals of Mathematics, 142 (1995), 443-551

Modular elliptic curves and Fermat's Last Theorem

By ANDREW WILES*

For Nada, Clare, Kate and Olivia

Cubum autem in duos cubos, aut quadratoquadratum in duos quadra-toquadratos, et generaliter nullam in infinitum ultra quadratum potestatem in duos cipustem nominis fas est dividere: cujus rei demonstrationem mirabilem sane detexi. Hanc marginis esiguitas non caperet.

Introduction

An elliptic curve over \mathbf{Q} is said to be modular if it has a finite covering by a modular curve of the form $X_0(N)$. Any such elliptic curve has the property that its Hasse-Well zeta function has an analytic continuation and satisfies a functional equation of the standard type. If an elliptic curve over \mathbf{Q} with a nuccional equation oi tne standard type. If an emptic curve over Q with a given j-invariant is modular then it is easy to see that all elliptic curves with the same j-invariant are modular (in which case we say that the j-invariant is modular). A well-known conjecture which grew out of the work of Shimura and Taniyama in the 1905 same 1960's asserts that every elliptic curves over a modular. However, it only became widely known through its publication in a function is not provide the same widely known through its publication in a paper of Weil in 1967 [We] (as an exercise for the interested reader!), in which paper of them in 150° (we) (as an excretise to the meterset reader), in which, moreover, Weil gave conceptual evidence for the conjecture. Although it had been numerically verified in many cases, prior to the results described in this paper it had only been known that finitely many *j*-invariants were modular.

paper is take only been known that initiaty many j-invariants were modular. In 1985 Frey made the remarkable observation that this conjecture should imply Fermat's Last Theorem. The precise mechanism relating the two was formulated by Serre as the ε -conjecture and this was then proved by Ribet in the summer of 1986. Ribet's result only requires one to prove the conjecture for semistable elliptic curves in order to deduce Fermat's Last Theorem.

"The work on this paper was supported by an NSF grant.


Reason

Faith


Believing something on the basis of demonstration. Believing something on the basis of divine authority.

"For who cannot see that thinking [reason] is prior to believing [faith]? For no one believes anything unless he has first thought that it is to be believed.


[On the Predestination of the Saints, 5, as cited in Norman L. Geisler, ed. What Augustine Says (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1982), 13]



"Those things are said to be present to the understanding which do not exceed its capacity so that the gaze of understanding may be fixed on them. For a person gives assent to such things because of the witness of his own understanding and not because of someone else's testimony.




"Those things, however, which are beyond the power of our understanding are said to be absent from the senses of the mind. Hence, our understanding cannot be fixed on them.




"As a result, we cannot assent to them on our own witness, but on that of someone else. These things are properly called the objects of faith."

[*Truth*, QXIV, Art. 9, reply, trans. James V. McGlynn (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), 249-250]




"One who believes [i.e., has faith] gives assent to things that are proposed to him by another person, and which he himself does not see."


[*Truth*, QXIV, Art. 9, reply, trans. James V. McGlynn (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), 249-250]




"Since man can only know the things that he does not see himself by taking them from another who does see them, and since faith is among the things we do not see, the knowledge of the objects of faith must be handed on by one who sees them himself. Now, this one is God, Who perfectly comprehends Himself, and naturally sees His essence."

[SCG, 3, 154 [1], trans. Vernon J. Bourke, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press), 239]










"Therefore in reading the profane authors, the admirable light of truth displayed in them should remind us, that the human mind, however much fallen and perverted from its original integrity, is still adorned and invested with admirable gifts from its Creator."

[Institutes of the Christian Religion,2.2.15, trans. Henry Beveridge, (Grand Rapids: William B. Erdmans), 236]









[John Owen, "The Reason of Faith," in *The Works of John Owen*, vol. 4, (Edinburgh: The Banner of Truth Trust, 1967), 20]





"Men that will not listen to Scripture ... cannot easily deny natural reason There is a natural as well as a revealed knowledge, and the book of the creatures is legible in declaring the being of a God"

[Stephen Charnock, Discourses upon the Existence and Attributes of God (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1979), 27.]



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
[Stephen Charnock, *Discourses upon the Existence and Attributes of God* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1979), 27.]





"God in regard of his existence is not only the discovery of faith, but of reason. God hath revealed not only his being, but some sparks of his eternal power and godhead in his works, as well as in his works, as well as in his word. ... It is a discovery of our reason ... and an object of our faith ... it is an article of our faith and an article of our reason."

[Stephen Charnock, Discourses upon the Existence and Attributes of God (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1979), 27.]











Sevelation Defined 🛩

That aspect of theology which deals with God making known to mankind His divine person and divine truths that would otherwise be unknown; to unveil



Revelation

God making known to mankind His divine Person and divine truths that would otherwise be unknown

Giving of the truth

Inspiration

God transferring to mankind His divine Person and divine truths through human agency into written language form for mankind to understand

Recording of the truth





God making known to mankind through His creation His existence, attributes, and goodness


The heavens declare the glory of God; and the firmament shows His handiwork. Day unto day utters speech, and night unto night reveals knowledge. There is no speech nor language where their voice is not heard. Their line has gone out through all the earth, and their words to the end of the world.

Psalm 19:1

The heavens declare His righteousness, and all the peoples see His glory.









God making known to mankind through His prophets, apostles, and His Son His nature and will that could not necessarily be known through General Revelation



τοῦτοκρῶτοῦἰγιῦώσκοντες ὅτι»πậσα»προφῆτεἰαυγραφῆς ἰδίας μἐπτλύσεως κοψηγίνεται; οὐογὰρ θελήματι» ἀνθρώπου 止ἠνέχθη/ποτέιπροφητεία !y ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ>Πνεύματος ˁΑγίου»φερόμενοι/ἐλάλησαν ἅγιοι, Θεοῦ/ἄχθρωποι.


All Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness, that the man of God may be complete, thoroughly equipped for every good work.

2 Timothy 3:16-17

θεόπνευστος (theopneustos) = God breathed θεός (theos) - God πνέω, πνεῦμα (pneo, pneuma) - I breathe, breath, spirit

General Revelation	Special Revelation
God making known to mankind through His creation His existence, attributes, and goodness which enable us to distinguish in Scripture proper vs. figurative language of God	God making known to mankind through His prophets, apostles, and His Son His nature and will that could not necessarily be known through General Revelation
See Romans 1:20a See Romans 1:20a See Romans 1:20a See Romans 1:20a See Romans 2:20a See Romans 2:20a Romans 2:20a See Romans	Solution State
"Book" of Nature: non-propositional	Book of Scripture: propositional
Natural Theology	Biblical Theology
Systematic Theology	

General Revelation	Special Revelation
Given through creation (known through simple apprehension of the sensible world)	Given through Prophets and Apostles (read by their writings, a.k.a., the Scriptures)
Reveals God's existence and attributes	Reveals God's gospel and will
Given TO all people	Given FOR all people
All people have it	Not all people have it
Some accept, some reject	Some accept, some reject
Sufficient to condemn if rejected	Sufficient to save if accepted
Acceptance is necessary but not sufficient for eternal life	Acceptance is necessary and sufficient for eternal life







Boa and Bowman on the Strengths of Classical Apologetics

Affirms the universal applicability of reason

Raises awareness of the unavoidable role of worldviews













"Non-Christians are often unaware that they look at life through a specific set of worldview 'glasses.' Making them aware of this can *help non-Christians rethink some of their beliefs.*"

[Boa, Bowman, *Faith Has Its Reasons*, 129, emphasis in original]



Robert M. Bowman







PERSPECTIVISM

The notion that everyone has their own perspective about the world and that nobody's perspective is any more or less legitimate than anyone else's.

PERSPECTIVISM

Solution Solution







Affirms the universal applicability of reason

Raises awareness of the unavoidable role of worldviews

Recognizes common ground with non-Christians












"Logic, though universally necessary, is universally insufficient as a criterion of truth ... because at best deductive logic can only test the *falsity* of a worldview, and cannot actually determine that a worldview is *true*."


[Boa, Bowman, Faith Has Its Reasons, 131]



















ঞ Theory of Truth প্র

how one defines the terms 'true' and 'truth' when saying that a statement is true

ঞ Test for Truth প্র

how one discovers whether a statement is true, regardless of one's theory of truth



"To say of what is, that it is not, or of what is not, that it is, is false, while to say of what is, that it is and of what is not, that it is not, is true."

Metaphysics, IV, 7, 1011^b26-29 Translation by W. D. Ross in Richard McKeon, *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (New York: Random House, 1941).

SOCRATES: But how about truth, then? You would acknowledge that there is in words a true and a false?

HERMOGENES: Certainly.


SOCRATES: And there are true and false propositions?

HERMOGENES: To be sure.

SOCRATES: And a true proposition says that which is, and a false proposition says that which is not?

HERMOGENES: To be sure.

[*Cratylus*, 385b, trans. Benjamin Jowett in Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, eds. *Plato: The Collected Dialogues* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961, 423]



STRANGER: Then what sort of character can we assign to each of these [statements]?

THEAETETUS: One is false, the other true.


STRANGER: And the true one states about you the things that are as they are.

THEAETETUS: Certainly.


STRANGER: Whereas the false statement states about you things different from the things that are.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

[Sophist, 263b, trans. F. M. Cornford in Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, eds. Plato: The Collected Dialogues Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961, 1010]




Other Philosophers Who Hold to the Correspondence Theory of Truth



"Truth is defined by the conformity of intellect and thing; and hence to know this conformity is to know truth."

Summa Theologiae I, Q. 16, art. 2.



Thomas Aquinas

1225-1274






Literally

"And as He walked by the Sea of Galilee, He saw Simon and Andrew his brother casting a net into the sea; for they were fishermen." <u>Mark 1:16</u>








Metaphor


"For you shall go out with joy, and be led out with peace; the mountains and the hills shall break forth into singing before you, and all the trees of the field shall clap their hands." Isa 55:12





Simile

"So his heart and the heart of his people were moved as the trees of the woods are moved with the wind."

Analogically








Symbol


"... the Holy Spirit indicating this, that the way into the Holiest of All was not yet made manifest while the first tabernacle was still standing. It was symbolic for the present time in which both gifts and sacrifices are offered which cannot make him who performed the service perfect in regard to the conscience—" Heb. 9:7-9

παραβολὴ



Hyperbole

"Now the Midianites and Amalekites, all the people of the East, were lying in the valley as numerous as locusts; and their camels were without number, as the sand by the seashore in multitude." Judges 7:12





Phenomenologically

" ... for He makes His sun rise on the evil and on the good, ..."Matt. 5:45

Phenomenologically

"The sun shall be turned into darkness, And the moon into blood, Before the coming of the great and awesome day of the LORD." Joel 2:31











Metonymy

"For it happened, when David was in Edom, and Joab the commander of the army had gone up to bury the slain, after he had killed every male in Edom" 1 Kings 11:15

Metonymy

"After these things Jesus and His disciples came into the land of Judea, and there He remained with them and baptized." John 3:22


"Therefore, when the Lord knew that the Pharisees had heard that Jesus made and baptized more disciples than John (though Jesus Himself did not baptize, but His disciples)," John 4:1-2

Metonymy


"The centurion answered and said, 'Lord, I am not fr worthy that You should Hi come under my roof. ..." Matt. 8:8


"... the centurion sent friends to Him, saying to Him, 'Lord, do not trouble Yourself, for I am not worthy that You should enter under my roof." Luke 7:6







Two things (at least) are common to all tests for truth.













Different aspects of reality require different methods of inquiry and tools of analysis.











"Sensible things [are that] from which human reason takes the origin of its knowledge."

[Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, I, 9, §2. Trans. Anton C. Pegis. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), I, 77]




"Our knowledge, taking its start from things, proceeds in this order. First, it begins in sense; second, it is completed in the intellect."

[Thomas Aquinas, *Truth*, I, 11, trans. Mulligan, 48, in *Truth* (3 vols), vol. 1 trans. Robert W. Mulligan (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952); vol. 2 trans. James V. McGlynn (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1953); vol. 3. trans. Robert W. Schmidt (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1954). The three volumes were reprinted as *Truth* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994)]




"According to its manner of knowing in the present life, the intellect depends on the sense for the origin of knowledge; and so those things that do not fall under the senses cannot be grasp by the human intellect except in so far as the knowledge of them is gathered from sensible things."


[Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, I, 3, §3. Trans. Anton C. Pegis. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), I, 64]




"Our senses give rise to memories, and from these we obtain experiential knowledge of things, which in turn is the means through which we come to an understanding of the universal principles of sciences and art."


[Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 83, §26. Trans. James F. Anderson (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), II, 279]






[Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, II, 83, §32. Trans. James F. Anderson (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), II, 282]





"In Aristotle the role of the received forms as real instruments is to determine the cognitive agent to a particular type of activity, a type in which the agent becomes and is cognitively the thing from which the form was received. The reception of the form is not immediately observable. It is only inferred through philosophical reasoning. What is immediately perceived or known is the thing itself."

["Aristotle—Cognition a Way of Being," in John R. Catan, ed. Aristotle: The Collected Papers of Joseph Owens (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981): 78.





Overestimates the adequacy of reason as a criterion of truth


Depends on theistic arguments of debated validity and value

• There are reasons to question whether the arguments are sound.

Overestimates the adequacy of reason as a criterion of truth

Depends on theistic arguments of debated validity and value

- There are reasons to question whether the arguments are sound.
- The theistic arguments are beyond the grasp of most people.



"Other arguments may vividly suggest the existence of God, press it home eloquently to human consideration, and for most people provide much greater spiritual and religious aid than difficult metaphysical demonstrations.


"But on the philosophical level these arguments are open to rebuttal and refutation, for they are not philosophically cogent."

[Joseph Owens, "Aquinas and the Five Ways," *Monist* 58 (Jan. 1974): 16-35. (p. 33)]

Joseph Owens (1908 - 2005) Overestimates the adequacy of reason as a criterion of truth

Depends on theistic arguments of debated validity and value

- There are reasons to question whether the arguments are sound.
- The theistic arguments are beyond the grasp of most people.
- The theistic arguments do not lead to the personal God of Christian theism.



Overestimates the adequacy of reason as a criterion of truth

Depends on theistic arguments of debated validity and value

Does not address the personal dimensions of belief and knowledge