


Aristotle  
384 BC - 322 BC


- born in 384/3 B.C. in Stageria (Stagira)
- father: Nicomachus (from where his treatise *Nicomachean Ethics* gets its name) according to Copleston (also his son according to Copleston), although Stumpf says Nicomachus was Aristotle's son by Herpyllis after his wife Pythias died
- a physician of the Macedonian king Amyntas II






Aristotle  
384 BC - 322 BC

- When Plato's nephew Speusippus took over the Academy upon Plato's death, Aristotle went to Assos, under the rule of Hermeias, a former student at the Academy, and founded a branch of the Academy.
- He taught there for three years and married Hermeias' niece and adopted daughter Pythias. They had a daughter.




Aristotle  
384 BC - 322 BC

- They later returned to Athens. Pythias died and Aristotle and entered a relationship (though never married) with Herpyllis. According to Stumpf, they had a son named Nicomachus, after whom the was Nicomahean Ethics named.
- Aristotle moved to the island of Lesbos.



Aristotle  
384 BC - 322 BC


- In 343/2 Phillip of Macedon invited Aristotle to become the tutor of his son Alexander, who was 13 years old.
- Upon return to Athens in 335/34 B.C., founded the Lyceum
- named after the groves where Socrates was known to have gone to think and which were the sacred precincts of Apollo Lyceus




A marble bust of Aristotle, showing him with a full beard and curly hair, wearing a draped garment. The bust is set against a light background.



**Aristotle**  
384 BC - 322 BC

- He and his students would go for walks to discuss philosophy, hence the school became known as peripatetic (περιπατέω = to walk around)
- most productive time



# ***Bekker Numbers in the Works of Aristotle***





700 METAPHYSICS [Bk. I: Ch. 5]

987<sup>a</sup> ciples, calling them hot and cold, i. e. fire and earth; and of these he ranges the hot with the existent, and the other with the non-existent.

From what has been said, then, and from what the wise men who have now sat in council with us, we have got thus much—on the one hand from the earliest philosophers, who regard the first principle as corporeal (for water and fire and such things are bodies), and of whom some suppose that there is one corporeal principle, others that there are more than one, but both put these under the head of matter; and on the other hand from some who posit both this cause

987<sup>a</sup> After the systems we have named came the philosophy of Plato, which in most respects followed these thinkers, but had peculiarities that distinguished it from the philosophy of the Italians. For, having in his youth first become familiar with Cratylus and with the Heraclitean doctrines (that all sensible things are ever in a state of flux and there is no knowledge about them), these views he held even in later years. Socrates, however, was busying himself about ethical

17 i. e. 2 will be each of several things whose definition is predicable of it.  
18 e. g. 2 was identified both with opinion and with daring.

Bk. I: Ch. 6] METAPHYSICS 701

matters and neglecting the world of nature as a whole but seeking the universal in these ethical matters, and fixed thought for the first time on definitions; Plato accepted his teaching, but held that the problem applied not to sensible things but to entities of another kind—for this reason, that the common definition could not be a definition of any sensible thing, as they were always changing. Things of this other sort, then, he called Ideas, and sensible things, he said, were all named after these, and in virtue of a relation to these; for the many existed by participation in the Ideas that have the same name as they. Only the name 'participation' was new; for the Pythagoreans say that things exist by 'imitation' of numbers, and Plato says they exist by participation, changing the name. But what the participation or the imitation of the Forms could be they left an open question.

Further, besides sensible things and Forms he says there are the objects of mathematics, which occupy an intermediate position, differing from sensible things in being eternal and unchangeable, from Forms in that there are many alike, while the Form itself is in each case unique.

Since the Forms were the causes of all other things, he thought their elements were the elements of all things. As matter, the great and the small were principles; as essential reality, the One; for from the great and the small, by participation in the One, come the Numbers.

But he agreed with the Pythagoreans in saying that the One is substance and not a predicate of something else; and in saying that the Numbers are the causes of the reality of other things he agreed with them; but positing a dyad and constructing the infinite out of great and small, instead of treating the infinite as one, is peculiar to him; and so is his view that the Numbers exist apart from sensible things, while they say that the things themselves are Numbers, and do not place the objects of mathematics between Forms and sensible things. His divergence from the Pythagoreans in making the One and the Numbers separate from things, and his introduction of the Forms, were due to his inquiries in the region of definitions (for the earlier thinkers had no tincture of dialectic), and his making the other entity besides the One a dyad was due to the belief that the numbers, except those which were prime, could be neatly produced out of the dyad as out of some plastic material.

Yet what happens is the contrary; the theory is not a reasonable one. For they make many things out of the matter, and the form generates only once, but what we observe is that one table is made



**Act and potency are sometimes referred to as actuality and potentiality.**

**This is how Aristotle and Aquinas account for change.**




# ∞Potency∞

= the power or capacity to be actual or real

*There are both logical and metaphysical senses of the terms "potency" or "possible."*

***Logically, something may  
be possible in as much as  
it is not a contradiction.***




**Aristotle**  
384 BC - 322 BC

**"The possible,  
then, in once  
sense, as has been  
said, means that  
which is not of  
necessity false."**

[*Metaphysics D (V)*, 12, 1019<sup>a</sup>30, trans. W. D. Ross, in Richard McKeon, ed. *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (New York: Random House, 1941), 765]

***Metaphysically, a potency  
is a real capacity in a real  
thing.***



**Aristotle**  
384 BC - 322 BC

**"'Potency' then means  
the source, in general, of  
change or movement in  
another thing or in the  
same thing *qua* other."**

[*Metaphysics* D (V), 12, 1019<sup>a</sup>15- 1019<sup>a</sup>20, trans. W. D. Ross, in Richard McKeon, ed. *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (New York: Random House, 1941), 765]

**Act**

(or Actuality)

**= to be real**

**A potency is actualized  
by a cause.**


**A person who is actually  
sitting but not actually  
standing, nevertheless has  
the potential or power or  
capacity to stand.**





**Upon standing, the person actualizes his potential to stand, his standing becomes actual and his sitting now becomes potential.**

**While a man who is actually sitting has the potential to stand, or who is actually standing has the potential to sit, a rock lacks the potency to stand or sit.**





Note, therefore, the difference between the non-existence of the standing in a sitting man and the non-existence of the standing in the rock.




***"Howsoever anything acts, it does so inasmuch as it is in act; howsoever anything receives, it does so inasmuch as it is in potency."***

[Bernard J. Wuellner, *Summary of Scholastic Principles* (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1956), 5]

SUMMARY OF SCHOLASTIC PRINCIPLES




BERNARD J. WUELLNER



**Change is impossible  
because:**

**being cannot come out of  
non-being (= out of  
nothing, nothing comes)  
being cannot come out of  
being, for being already is  
(fire cannot come out of  
air, since air is air  
and not fire)**

**Parmenides**



**Aristotle**

**Change is impossible  
because:**

**being cannot come out of  
non-being (= out of  
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being cannot come out of  
being, for being already is  
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
**Parmenides**

**Change is possible  
because:**

**Fire does not come out of  
air as air [air *qua* air], but  
out of air which can be fire  
and is not yet fire (i.e., The  
air has the potentiality to  
become fire.)**

**Aristotle**




<p><b>Change is impossible because: This is would amount to saying that a being comes into being from non-being.</b></p>	
<p><b>Parmenides</b></p>	<p><b>Aristotle</b></p>

<p><b>Change is impossible because: This is would amount to saying that a being comes into being from non-being.</b></p>	<p><b>Change is possible because: It does not come into being from its privation merely [simpliciter], but from its privation in a subject.</b></p>
<p><b>Parmenides</b></p>	<p><b>Aristotle</b></p>

**Change is impossible  
because:**

**This is would amount to  
saying that a thing comes  
into being from being,  
which is a contradiction  
(because a being already  
is, and thus cannot come  
into being).**

**Parmenides**



**Aristotle**

**Change is impossible  
because:**



**This is would amount to  
saying that a thing comes  
into being from being,  
which is a contradiction  
(because a being already  
is, and thus cannot come  
into being).**

**Parmenides**

**Change is possible  
because:**

**It does not come into  
being from being precisely  
as such, but from being  
which is also non-being,  
viz., not the thing which  
comes to be. (= distinction  
of act, potency, and  
privation)**

**Aristotle**



**Parmenides**


**Aristotle**

**"So it is possible that a thing may be capable of being and not be, and capable of not being and yet be.... For of non-existent things some exist potentially; but they do not exist because they do not exist in complete reality."**

[Metaphysics, Q (IX), 3, 1047a20, 35-1047b1 ]


# ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISMS OF PLATO

# *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Notion of Participation*



**Aristotle**  
384 BC - 322 BC


"After the systems we have named came the philosophy of Plato, which in most respects followed these thinkers, but had peculiarities that distinguished it from the philosophy of the Italians. For, having in his youth first become familiar with Cratylus and with the Heraclitean doctrines (that all sensible things are ever in a state of flux and there is no knowledge about them), these views he held even in later years.



**Aristotle**  
384 BC - 322 BC

"Socrates, however, was busying himself about ethical matters and neglecting the world of nature as a whole but seeking the universal in these ethical matters, and fixed thought for the first time on definitions; Plato accepted his teaching, but held that the problem applied not to sensible things but to entities of another kind-for this reason, that the common definition could not be a definition of any sensible thing, as they were always changing. "

[Metaphysics, A (1), 5, 987a29 – 6, 987b7, trans. W. D. Ross in Richard McKeon, ed. *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (New York: Random House, 1941), 700-701]



**Aristotle**  
384 BC - 322 BC

"Things of this other sort, then, he called Ideas, and sensible things, he said, were all named after these, and in virtue of a relation to these; for the many existed by participation in the Ideas that have the same name as they. Only the name 'participation' was new; for the Pythagoreans say that things exist by 'imitation' of numbers, and Plato says they exist by participation, changing the name. But what the participation or the imitation of the Forms could be they left an open question."

[Metaphysics, A (1), 6, 987a29 - 6, 987b8-13, trans. Ross, in McKeon, 701]

Modern Studies in Philosophy is a series of anthologies presenting contemporary interpretations and evaluations of the works of major philosophers. The editors have selected articles designed to show the systematic structure of the thought of these philosophers, and to reveal the relevance of their views to the problems of current interest. These volumes are intended to be contributions to contemporary debates as well as to the history of philosophy; they not only trace the origins of many problems important to modern philosophy, but also introduce major philosophers as interlocutors in current discussions.

Modern Studies in Philosophy is prepared under the general editorship of Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, Livingston College, Rutgers University.

Gregory Vlastos is Stuart Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University. He had previously taught philosophy at Queen's University, in Kingston, Ontario, and at Cornell University.

## MODERN STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, General Editor

# PLATO

A Collection of Critical Essays

I: METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY

EDITED BY GREGORY VLASTOS

UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME PRESS

Notre Dame, Indiana

1978  
(1971)

## 8

### PARTICIPATION AND PREDICATION IN PLATO'S MIDDLE DIALOGUES

R. E. ALLEN

I propose in this paper to examine three closely related issues in the interpretation of Plato's middle dialogues: the nature of Forms, of participation, and of predication. The familiar problem of self-predication will serve as introduction to the inquiry.

#### I. SELF-PREDICATION


The significance—or lack of significance—of Plato's self-predicative statements has recently become a crux of scholarship. Briefly, the problem is this: the dialogues often use language which suggests that the Form is a universal which has itself as an attribute and is thus a member of its own class, and, by implication, that it is the one perfect member of that class. The language suggests that the Form *has* what it is: it is self-referential, self-predicable.



Now such a view is, to say the least, peculiar. Proper universals are not instantiations of themselves, perfect or otherwise. Oddness is not odd; Justice is not just; Equality is equal to nothing at all. No one can cudgel for a nap in the Divine Bedstead; not even God can scratch Doghood behind the Ears.

The view is more than peculiar; it is absurd. As Plato knew, it implies an infinite regress, one which he doubtless regarded as vicious. Indeed, if a recent critic, Professor Gregory Vlastos, has analysed the Third Man correctly,<sup>1</sup> it implies still more. We must suppose that Plato could swallow, without gagging, a flat self-

<sup>1</sup> Gregory Vlastos, 'The Third Man Argument in the *Parmenides*,' *Phil. Rev.* LXIII (1954), 319-49. For further discussion, see: Willard Sellars, *Phil. Rev.* LXIV (1955), 403-37; Vlastos, *ibid.*, 438-48; P. T. Geach, *Phil. Rev.* LXV (1956), 72-82; Vlastos, *ibid.*, 83-94; R. S. Bluck, *Class. Quart.* N. S. VI (1959), 29-37, and *Phronesis II* (1957), 115-21.


# *The Third Man Argument*








# *Aristotle's Two Questions about Plato's Theory of Forms.*



*How can the Forms be the causes of the natures or "whatnesses" of things without being "in" those things?*

*Aristotle says they can't.*




*How do Plato's transcendent and unchanging Forms account for the most evident fact about the things around us, viz., their coming into being and their motion and change?*

*Aristotle says they don't.*

[Miller, pp. 92-97]


# ***Aristotle on Plato's Doctrine of Forms***



**Aristotle**  
384 BC - 322 BC

**"Above all one might discuss the question what on earth the Forms contribute to sensible things, either to those that are eternal or to those that come into being and cease to be. For they cause neither movement nor any change in them."**


[Metaphysics, A (1), 9, 991a9-11, trans. Ross, in McKeon, 707]



**Aristotle**  
384 BC - 322 BC

**"But again they help in no wise either towards the knowledge of the other things (for they are not even the substance of these, else they would have been in them), or towards their being, if they are not in the particulars which share in them."**


[Metaphysics, A (1), 9, 991a12-15, trans. Ross, in McKeon, 707-708]



**Aristotle**  
384 BC - 322 BC

**But, further, all other things cannot come from the Forms in any of the usual senses of 'from'. And to say that they are patterns and the other things share in them is to use empty words and poetical metaphors. . . .**


[*Metaphysics*, A (1), 9, 991a19-22, trans. Ross, in McKeon, 708]



**Aristotle**  
384 BC - 322 BC

**"Again, it would seem impossible that the substance and that of which it is the substance should exist apart; how, therefore, could the Ideas, being the substances of things, exist apart?"**

[*Metaphysics*, A (1), 9, 991b1-3, trans. Ross, in McKeon, 708]



Aristotle  
384 BC - 322 BC

In the *Phaedo*, the case is stated in this way-that the Forms are causes both of being and of becoming; yet when the Forms exist, still the things that share in them do not come into being, unless there is something to originate movement; and many other things come into being (e.g. a house or a ring) of which we say there are no Forms."

[*Metaphysics*, A (1), 9, 991<sup>a</sup>8-991<sup>b</sup>5]



# Aristotle's Doctrine of Form

*Although Aristotle rejected Plato's notion of Form, he did not reject the notion of Form altogether.*

*Instead, Aristotle rejected Plato's transcendent forms and opted instead for immanent forms.*

***The form of the thing is in the thing, not removed or separated from it.***

***In the sensible realm, form cannot exist without matter and matter cannot exist without form.***

***The form of the thing is in the thing, not removed or separated from it.***

***In the sensible realm, form cannot exist without **matter** and **matter** cannot exist without form.***



***What is  
Matter?***



***Hylomorphism***




# hylomorphic composition


*the necessary twofold composition, material and formal, of everything in the sensible world*

hule (ὕλη) = matter

morphe (μορφή) = form




***According to Aristotle, there are four principles or causes which are necessarily involved in the explanation of a sensible object.***




**Aristotle**  
384 BC - 322 BC

**""Cause' means (1) that from which, as immanent material, a thing comes into being, e.g., the bronze is the cause of the statue ...**




Aristotle  
384 BC - 322 BC

**"(2) The form or pattern, i.e., the definition of the essence, and the classes which include this ..., and the parts included in the definition.**




Aristotle  
384 BC - 322 BC

**"(3) That from which the change or the resting from change first begins; e.g., ... the advisor is the cause of the action, and the father a cause of the child ....**



Aristotle  
384 BC - 322 BC

**(4) The end, i.e., that for the sake of which a thing is; e.g., health is the cause of walking.**



Aristotle  
384 BC - 322 BC


**For 'Why does one walk?' we say; 'that one may be healthy'; and in speaking thus we think we have given the cause. These, then, are practically all the senses in which causes are spoken of."**

[Metaphysics, D (5), 2, 1013<sup>a</sup>24-1013<sup>b</sup>3, trans. Ross, in McKeon, ed., 752-753]



Material Cause  
 that *out of which*  
 an effect is  
 = what the chair is  
 made of: wood

Formal Cause  
 that *which*  
 an effect is  
 = form, structure,  
 or nature of the  
 chair: chair-ness








## Efficient Cause

that *by which*  
an effect is

= who produced  
the chair: the  
builder

Final Cause  
that *for which*  
an effect is  
= why the chair  
was built: to sit  
on





**artifact**

The carpenter imposes a "form" from his mind

onto the wood

to "create" a chair

to sit on.

**There is nothing intrinsic to the wood that causes it to become a chair.**

**The "form" is completely accounted for extrinsically by the mind of the carpenter.**

**natural kind**

the form (which is intrinsic to the natural kind)

↓  
directs  
the  
natural  
kind

to its proper end or telos


**There is something intrinsic to the acorn that causes it to become an oak tree.**

**The form is intrinsic to the acorn.**

**However, for the Christian, God accounts for the existence of the form (extrinsically).**


It should be noted that the final cause is not necessarily external to (i.e., from the outside of) the thing, and indeed in Aristotle's thinking, the final cause is often not distinct from the thing itself.






Frederick Copleston  
1907-1994

**"But though [Aristotle] lays great stress on finality, it would be a mistake to suppose that finality, for Aristotle, is equivalent to *external* finality, as though we were to say, for instance, that grass grows in order that sheep may have food.**



Frederick Copleston  
1907-1994

**"On the contrary, he insists much more on internal or immanent finality (thus the apple tree has attained its end or purpose, not when its fruit forms a healthy or pleasant food for man or has been made into cider,**



**Frederick Copleston**  
1907-1994

**"but when the apple tree has reached that perfection of development of which it is capable, i.e., the perfection of its form), for in his view the formal cause of the thing is normally its final cause as well."**


[Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, 9 vols., Vol 1: Greece and Rome (New York: Image Books, 1962-62), 313]

**Using an artifact as an illustration of the four causes can be misleading, particularly in describing the final cause.**

**With a statue, one would understand the final cause to be something in the sculptor in terms of his intention.**


**But for Aristotle, conscious intention is not necessary for final causality.**

**While nature mirrors deliberation  
in that it works to an end, for  
Aristotle all things in nature tend  
toward the full actualization  
because of their forms.**



**Aristotle**  
384 BC - 322 BC


**"Further, where a series has a  
completion, all the preceding  
steps are for the sake of that.  
Now surely as in intelligent  
action, so in nature; and as in  
nature, so it is in each action, if  
nothing interferes.**



**Aristotle**  
384 BC - 322 BC


**"Now intelligent action is for the sake of an end; therefore the nature of things also is so.... And since 'nature' means two things, the matter and the form, of which the latter is the end, and since all the rest is for the sake of the end, the form must be the cause in the sense of 'that for the sake of which.'"**

[Physics, II, 3, 194<sup>a</sup>24-33, , trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, in McKeon, 240-241]




**Aristotle**  
384 BC - 322 BC

**"A difficulty presents itself: why should not nature work, not for the sake of something, nor because it is better so, but just as the sky rains, not in order to make the corn grow, but of necessity?"**




Aristotle  
384 BC - 322 BC

**"What is drawn up must cool, and what has been cooled must become water and descend, the result of this being that the corn grows. Similarly if a man's crop is spoiled on the threshing-floor, the rain did not fall for the sake of this—in order that the crop might be spoiled—but that result just followed.**



Aristotle  
384 BC - 322 BC


**"Why then should it not be the same with the parts in nature, e.g. that our teeth should come up of necessity—the front teeth sharp, fitted for tearing, the molars broad and useful for grinding down the food—since they did not arise for this end, but it was merely a coincident result; and so with all other parts in which we suppose that there is purpose?**



**Aristotle**  
384 BC - 322 BC

**"Wherever then all the parts came about just what they would have been if they had come to be for an end, such things survived, being organized spontaneously in a fitting way; whereas those which grew otherwise perished and continue to perish . . ."**


[Physics, II, 8, 198b17-32, trans. Hardie and Gaye, in McKeon, 249]



***For Aristotle, to be is to be a form.  
As such, there is no philosophical  
notion of existence as such in  
Aristotle's philosophy.***


***Indeed, there does not seem to be a  
distinctive philosophical discussion  
of existence as such in any ancient  
Greek philosophy.***





Joseph Owens  
(1908 - 2005)

**"From the viewpoint of the much later distinction between essence and the act of existing, this treatment [of the nature of being per accidens] must mean that Aristotle is leaving the act of existing, entirely outside the scope of his philosophy.**




Joseph Owens  
(1908 - 2005)

**"The act of existing must be wholly escaping his *scientific* consideration. All necessary and definite connections between things can be reduced to **essence.**"**

[Joseph Owens, *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics: A Study in the Greek Background of Mediaeval Thought*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed (Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies), 309 emphasis in original]



Parviz Morewedge



Charles H. Kahn

Author of "Why Existence Did Not Emerge as a Distinct Concept in Greek Philosophy"



Parviz Morewedge


"The upshot is that, although we can recognize at least three different kinds of existential questions discussed by Aristotle, Aristotle himself neither distinguishes these questions from one another nor brings them together under any common head or topic which might be set in contrast to other themes in his general discussion of Being."

[Charles H. Kahn, "Why Existence Does Not Emerge as a Distinct Concept in Greek Philosophy," in *Philosophies of Existence: Ancient and Medieval*, ed. Parviz Morewedge (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982), 10]



Charles H. Kahn

Author of "Why Existence Did Not Emerge as a Distinct Concept in Greek Philosophy"




☞ **Genus** ☞  
*animal*

☞ **Specific difference** ☞  
*rationality*

☞ **Species** ☞  
*human*


☞ **Proper accident** ☞  
*five fingers*

☞ **Accident** ☞  
*black hair*



**Aristotle**  
(384-322 BC)

☞ **PROPERTIES** ☞



**Aristotle**  
(384-322 BC)



Category	Meaning	Greek	Example
Substance/Essence	What	ousia	man, horse
Quantity	How much	poson	six feet tall
Quality	What sort	poion	white, literate
Relation	in relation to something	pros ti	double, half, greater
Place or Location	Where	pou	in the marketplace
Time	When	pote	yesterday, last year
Position	Being situated	keisthai	lies, sits
State or Habitus	Having, possession	echein	is shod, is armed
Action	Doing	poiein	cuts, burns
Passion	Undergoing	paschein	is cut, is burned

Category	Meaning	Class	Example
Quantity	Quality	Substance	Relation
Position	Place	Time	
State (Habitus)	Action	Passion	

A six-foot tall<sup>Quantity</sup> white<sup>Quality</sup> man<sup>Substance</sup>,  
much taller than his friend<sup>Relation</sup>, was  
standing<sup>Position</sup> in the field<sup>Place</sup> yesterday<sup>Time</sup>  
armed with an ax<sup>State (Habitus)</sup>, cutting down  
a tree<sup>Action</sup>, completely unaware that he  
was being burned<sup>Passion</sup> by the sun.