


Imagine you  
are out  
camping with  
your dog.



- ❖ *Do you recognize a distinction between the dog and the black/tan color of the dog?*
- ❖ *It would seem that the dog is real in a different way than how the colors of the dog are real.*
- ❖ *While there can be a dog without the black/tan color, there cannot be the black/tan color without some thing that is colored.*
- ❖ *This distinction is what Aristotle called the substance/accident distinction.*
- ❖ *The term 'accident' here is similar to our contemporary terms 'property' or 'characteristic' or 'attribute'.*



- ❖ *Further, do you recognize a distinction between the dog and his sitting?*
- ❖ *It would seem that the dog is real in a different way than the "sitting" of the dog is real.*
- ❖ *While there can be a dog without the sitting, there cannot be the sitting without some thing that is sitting.*
- ❖ *Notice also that not only is there a distinction between the dog and its color and the dog and its sitting, but there also is a distinction between the color and the sitting.*
- ❖ *Thus, these two accidents are not related to the dog in exactly the same way.*



- ❖ *The color and the sitting are two examples of Aristotle's Ten Categories.*
- ❖ *These categories are ten "modes" or "ways" of being in the sensible world.*
- ❖ *The Ten Categories are:*



Category	Meaning	Greek	Example
Substance/Essence	What	ousia	dog, tree
Quantity	How much	poson	small, tall
Quality	What sort	poion	Great Dane, oak
Relation	in relation to something	pros ti	smaller, taller
Place or Location	Where	pou	in my yard
Time	When	pote	right now, last year
Position	Being situated	keisthai	lying, standing
State or Habitus	Having, possession	echein	is leashed, is covered
Action	Doing	poiein	bites, shades
Passion	Undergoing	paschein	is fed, is pruned

A three-foot **Quantity** German Shepherd **Quality** dog **Substance**, much taller than **Relation** her puppy, was lying in my yard **Place** yesterday **Time** on a leash **State (Habitus)**, biting her paw, completely unaware that she was being fed **Passion** by me.





From individual dogs, one can derive the concept of dog.



From individual trees, one can derive the concept of tree.



From individual dogs, one can derive the concept of dog.



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- ❖ *The relationship of the concept of 'dog' or 'tree' to the individual dogs or trees is the relationship of universal to particulars*
- ❖ *One debate that has endured throughout the history of philosophy has been over what exactly is the nature of the universal.*



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- ❖ *Are universals merely names we give to things (nominalism)?*
- ❖ *Or are universals more than names but nothing more than concepts (conceptualism)?*
- ❖ *Or are universals "real" in some sense of the term 'real'? (realism)*
- ❖ *If they are real, exactly what is the nature of their reality?*




From individual dogs, one can derive the concept of dog.



From individual trees, one can derive the concept of tree.

- ❖ *Notice also that the universal is free of any specifying characteristics of the individual.*
- ❖ *The concept 'dog' does not specify German Shepherd or Chihuahua; young or old; brown or black; sitting or lying; eating or being washed ...*
- ❖ *The concept 'tree' is free of such individuating characteristics such as tall or short; deciduous or evergreen; fruit-bearing, flower-bearing or neither; in my backyard or in my neighbor's backyard ...*





❖ Notice that, despite the changes in all the characteristics (accidents), you can know that it is same dog throughout.



❖ Likewise with the tree. From acorn to flourishing oak, despite all the changes, you can know that it is the same tree throughout.



❖ That aspect of the thing that constitutes its "same-ness" is its Form.

❖ That aspect of the thing that constitutes its "changing" is its Matter.

❖ 'Form' and 'Matter' are metaphysical aspects of the thing.


❖ Neither exist apart from the thing itself.







❖ *Note that the Great Dane puppy will inevitably grow into an adult Great Dane and the acorn will inevitably grow into a mature Oak tree unless something interferes (like injury, malnourishment, or disease).*



- ❖ *The trajectories of each is its teleology.*
- ❖ *The term comes for the Greek word 'telos' (τέλος), meaning 'end' or 'goal'.*
- ❖ *A thing's teleology is determined by its nature.*
- ❖ *A thing's nature is that which constitutes "what" it is.*
- ❖ *An acorn will never become a Great Dane.*



❖ *Those characteristics (accidents) of a thing that are not yet realized but eventually will be if nothing interferes (like the limbs of the Oak tree that are yet to become real in the acorn) are known as potencies (or potentialities or capacities).*



❖ *Once they become real, they are actual (or actualities).*

❖ *Aristotle identifies this as the act/potency distinction.*




❖ *The agent that brings a potentiality into actuality is an Efficient Cause.*

❖ *Aristotle identified three additional causes.*

- *Efficient Cause: that by which a thing is*
- *Material Cause: that out of which a thing is*
- *Formal Cause: that which a thing is*
- *Final Cause: That for which a thing is*





*Last, notice that you can think of a dog or tree or any number of sensible objects that used to exist but no longer exist today.*

*The concept of a dog or a tree (i.e., "what" it is/was) does not change.*


*The only thing that has changed is "that" it was and now no longer "is."*

*This is the essence / existence distinction.*

*The essence is what something is.*

*The existence is that something is.*

*This is an philosophical augmentation of Aristotle by Thomas Aquinas.*



Aristotle  
(384-322 BC)

- ✓ *substance/accident*
- ✓ *ten categories*
- ✓ *universal/particular*
- ✓ *form/matter*
- ✓ *teleology*
- ✓ *act/potency*
- ✓ *four causes*
- ✓ *essence/existence*



Aquinas  
(1225-1274)