




Thomas Aquinas was a 13th Century Dominican Friar / theologian / philosopher.



He was born 1224/5 in Roccasecca, Italy, near the city of Aquino (from which his family name was derived).








Thomas Aquinas's "Five Ways"

- Argument from motion
- Argument from efficient causality
- Argument from necessary being
- Argument from degrees of perfection
- Argument from final causality


Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)









- Aquinas began writing his Summa Theologiae in 1266.
- Aquinas's Summa Theologiae is his most extensive work.
- It was, however, unfinished.
- It was written as a Teacher's Guide



It was written as an attempt to "set forth whatever is included in this Sacred Science as briefly and clearly as the matter itself may allow ... in such a way as may tend to the instruction of beginners."

[Summa Theologiae, from the Prologue. St. Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica: Complete English Edition in Five Volumes, translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, 1981]





- On Being and Essence
- Writings on the Sentences of Peter Lombard
- Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius
- Exposition on the 'On the Hebdomads' of Boethius
- On the Principles of Nature
- ✤ Truth
- Summa Contra Gentiles
- On the Power of God

Some series of the Summa Theologiae <</p>

First Part: God

Second Part: Man

Third Part: Christ

Some set to the Summa Theologiae <</p> ✓

First Part

Prima Pars; I; Ia

119 questions consisting of 584 articles

existence and nature of God

creation

man

divine government

Some set to the Summa Theologiae <</p> ✓

Some set to the Summa Theologiae <</p> ✓

Second Part of the Second Part Secunda Secundae; II-II; Iia-Iiae 189 questions consisting of 917 articles \$faith \$prudence and justice \$fortitude and temperance \$acts of certain men (prophecy; tongues;

contemplative life, etc.)

She Content of the Summa Theologiae <</p>

Third Part

Tertia Pars; III; IIIa

90 questions consisting of 549 articles

♦ Christ

sacraments (section on penance was unfinished)

This makes a total of 512 questions with 2,669 articles (not counting the supplement).

Some set to the Summa Theologiae <</p> ✓

Supplement (written by Rainaldo da Piperno) Suppl.; Suppl. Illae

- 99 questions consisting of 446 articles
 - completion of section on penance
 - ✤confession
 - *indulgences
 - ✤marriage
 - *eschatology

Some set to the Summa Theologiae <</p> ✓

🎐 The Plan of the Summa Theologiae 🛷

Question (e.g., The Existence of God)

First Article of the Question (e.g., Whether the Existence of God is Self-Evident) Objections

first objection second objection


....


"On the contrary" (usually a quote from an authority) "I answer that" (unpacking of his own arguments pertaining to the article) Replies to each of the objections Next Article of the Question

...


[repeat until all the articles for this question are exhausted] Next Question

[repeat until all 614 questions consisting of 3,125 articles questions are exhausted]





	CONTENTS	
	List of contributors	page vii
	Introduction	I
	I Aquinas's philosophy in its historical setting JAN A. AERTSEN	12
	2 Aristotle and Aquinas JOSEPH OWENS, C.55.R.	38
	3 Aquinas and Islamic and Jewish thinkers DAVID B. BURRELL, C.S.C.	60
	4 Metaphysics JOHN F. WIPPEL	85
	5 Philosophy of mind NORMAN KRETZMANN	128
	6 Theory of knowledge SCOTT MACDONALD	160
	7 Ethics RALPH MCINERNY	196
	8 Law and politics PAUL E. SIGMUND	317
	9 Theology and philosophy MARK D. JORDAN	232
Joseph Owens (1908-2005)	10 Biblical commentary and philosophy Eleonore stump V	252



Both Reason in Terms of:

formal and material logic

actuality and potentiality

material, formal, efficient, and final causes

the division of the sciences into the theoretical, the practical, and the productive

Both Distinguish:

the material from the immaterial

sensation from intellection

the temporal from the eternal

the body from the soul


Both:


regard intellectual contemplation as the supreme goal of human striving

look upon free choice as the source of moral action

ground all naturally attainable human knowledge on external sensible things, instead of on sensations, ideas, or language

look upon cognition as a way of being in which knower and thing known are one and the same in the actuality of the cognition





no metaphysical category of existence as such (only a logical distinction)

highest element in metaphysics is Form

for every being, to be is to be a Form

existence and essence are known through the same intellectual act


no connection between ultimate reality in metaphysics and ultimate reality in religion existence is the actuality of all actualities and the perfection of all perfections


highest element in metaphysics is existence

existence is distinct from essence in sensible creatures

existence and essence are known by different intellectual acts


God is ultimate reality






"The true denotes that towards which the intellect tends."

[Summa Theologiae, I, 16, 1, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Westminster: Christian Classics, 1948), 89]



"Truth is defined by the conformity of the intellect and thing; and hence to know this conformity is to know truth."

[Summa Theologiae, I, 16, 2, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Westminster: Christian Classics, 1948), 90-91]




homas Aquinas

(1225 - 1274)

Other Philosophers Who Hold to the Correspondence Theory of Truth





Aquinas employs the same notions of act and potency as Aristotle.

"By non-existence we understand not simply those things which do not exist, but those which are potential, and not actual."

[Summa Theologiae, I, 5, 2, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Westminster: Christian Classics, 1948), 12]

> Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)

"Observe that some things can exist though they do not exist, while other things do exist. That which can be is said to exist in potency; that which already exists is said to be in act."

[On the Principles of Nature, trans. Vernon J. Bourke in *The Pocket Aquinas* (New York: Washington Square Press, 1960), 61]

"A thing is called absolutely possible, not in relation to any power, but from the sole habitude of the terms which are not repugnant to each other; in which sense possible is opposed to impossible, as appears from the Philosopher [Metaph. v, text. 17]."



homas Aquinas (1225-1274)

[ST, I, Q46, art. 1, ad. 1]

"Now, from the foregoing it is evident that in created intellectual substances there is composition of act and potentiality. For in whatever thing we find two, one of which is the complement of the other, the proportion of one of them to the other is as the proportion of potentiality to act; for nothing is completed except by its proper act."

[Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 53, §1-2, trans. James F. Anderson (University of Notre Dame Press Edition) vol. 2, p. 155. Reprint of *On the Truth of the Catholic Faith* (Garden City, NY: Hanover House)]


The significance of Aquinas' employment of act and potency

Thomas Aquinas

(1225 - 1274)

Sensible things are not able to ultimately account for the actualization of their own potentialities.


The act / potency of sensible things stands in stark contrast to God's nature of being pure actuality.



Not surprisingly, Aquinas follows Aristotle in the notions of form and matter.

"Because the definition telling what a thing is signifies that by which a thing is located in its genus or species, philosophers have substituted the term 'quiddity' for the term 'essence.' The Philosopher [i.e., Aristotle] frequently calls this 'what something was to be' [quod quid erat esse; τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι (to ti ēn einai)]; that is to say, that which makes a thing to be what it is. It is also called 'form.'"


[On Being and Essence, I, §4, trans. Armand Maurer, 2nd revised ed. [Mediaeval Sources in Translation 1] (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1968), 31] Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) The Philosopher [Aristotle] frequently calls this [essence] 'what something was to be' [quod quid erat esse; τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι (to ti ēn einai)]; that is to say, that which makes a thing to be what it is. It is also called 'form.''



[On Being and Essence, I, \$4, trans. Armand Maurer, 2nd revised ed. [Mediaeval Sources in Translation 1] (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1968), 31]

"Form and matter are found in composite substances, as for example the soul and body in man."

[On Being and Essence, II, §1, trans. Maurer, 34]



"What-ness"

with respect to a thing's matter:	Form
with respect to a thing's operations:	Nature
with respect to a thing's accidents:	Substance
with respect to a thing's intellect:	Quiddity
with respect to a thing's existence:	Essence

Matter is not a principle of knowing but is a principle of individuation.

Matter is actualized by Form.


Matter and Form together constitute the essence of the sensible (i.e., physical) object.

"It is evident, therefore, that essence [in sensible objects] embraces both matter and form."


[On Being and Essence, II, §1, trans. Maurer, 35]

Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) "It is evident, therefore, that essence [in sensible creatures] embraces both matter and form."

[On Being and Essence, II, §1, trans. Maurer, 35]



"It is evident, therefore, that essence [in sensible creatures] embraces both matter and form."



[On Being and Essence, II, §1, trans. Maurer, 35]

Matter is not a principle of knowing the sensible object, but is a principle of individuation of it.

In knowing a sensible object, the intellect of the knower grasps the Form of the sensible object. "Therefore, the manner of knowing a thing conforms to the state of the knower, which receives the form in its own way.

"It is not necessary that

the thing known exist in

the manner of the

knower or in the manner

in which the form which

is the principle of

knowing exists in the

knower.

Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)


homas Aquinas (1225-1274) "From this it follows that nothing prevents us from knowing material things through forms which exist immaterially in our minds."


[Truth, QX, A. IV, Reply, trans. James V. McGlynn, vol. 2, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), 19]

Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)


The significance of Aquinas's employment of form and matter Thomas will argue that sensible things, being composed of form and matter, are not ultimately able to account for their own existence and thus will need a First Cause as their grounding.

Thomas will unpack the metaphysical attributes of God demonstrating that the particular aspects of the nature of God stand in stark contrast to the form and matter aspects of sensible things.






* Non-philosophical use
* Realism Regarding the Existence of External Reality
* Realism Regarding the Nature of Universals




A realist in the non-philosophical sense of the term is one who approaches an issue with common sense, usually devoid of sentimentality and naiveté.



Here realism maintains that there is a material reality external to us as knowers and that this material external reality exists whether we are perceiving it or not.

This notion of realism is contrasted with Idealism. Idealism (George Berkeley) maintains that there is no external material reality. Any view of knowing that maintains that there is a reality external to us as knowers is a form of realism.


Thus, John Locke is a realist even though Locke's view on how we know external reality is quite different from Plato's, Aristotle's and Aquinas's views.




Here realism maintains that universals (e.g., human-ness) are real entities that have existence apart from particulars. (Plato) This notion of realism is contrasted with anti-realism like conceptualism (William of Ockham) or nominalism (David Hume).











Teleology: A Shopper's Guide

efficient cause. And the end or goal towards which a thing naturally points is its final cause.

As the last sentence indicates, the notion of a final cause is closely tied to that of a *telos* and thus to the notion of relealogy. But the adverb "natu-ally" is mean it ondicate how the Aristotelian notion of final cause differs from other conceptions of teleology. For Aristotle and for the Scholastics, the end or goal of a material substance is inherent to it, something it has recisely because of the kind of thing it is by *nature*. It is therefore not to be understood on the model of a human artifact like a watch, whose parts have no inherent tendency to perform the function of telling impact, specifi-ally, and must be forced to do so by an outside designer. For example, that any and induce to the data of the data

rested this picture of nature. In particular, they rejected the notions of sub-stantial form, of matter as that which takes on such a form, and of a final tamin torin, or many a sum which takes on such a sum, and or a sum and as as an inherent end or teles of a thing. Of Aristotle's four causes, only there are asses was left in anything like a recognizable form (and even then the notion was significantly altered, since, as we shall see, efficient causes wree regarded by the Scholastics as correlated with final causes).² Material objects were reconceived as comprised entirely of microscopic particles (understood along either atomistic, corpuscularian, or plenum-theoretic lines) decoud of any inherent goal directedness and interacting in terms of "push-pull" contact causation alone. This "mechanical philosophy" underwent var-ours transformations as modern philosophy and modern science developed. the philosophical inadequacy of the contact model of causal interaction you became evident in light of the critiques of occasionalists, Humeans, out others; and in any event, the model could not survive the empirical

For a brief exposition and defense of Aristotellan-Scholastic metaphysics and philosophy of nature, see chapter 2 of my Aquinos (Oxford: Oneworld Publications) 10% International defense, see my File Last Supervition: 18 (initiation of the New Micheim (South Bend St. Augustine's Press, 2008). The out-of-theory file and the outper cent defense of Aristotellan-Scholastic metaphysics is David S. Calesterge, Real Essentialism (I ondow Routledge, 2007). "A section of the transfer theorem, provide the analysis of the analysis of the outper center of the analysis of the an

1 19

REALISM: UNIVERSALS

Realism regarding universals holds that universals are real and irreducible to particulars

Extreme Realism



Universals are the only things that are fully real. Particulars are merely "shadows" of their exemplars.

2 Teleology: A Shopper's Guide

The telos of a thing or process is the end or goal toward which it points. Teleological notions feature protects is the cut of goal toward while it points. Teleological notions feature prominently in current debates in philosophy of biology, philosophy of action, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of re-ligion. Naturalists generally hold that teleological descriptions of natural phenomena are either false or, if true, are reducible to descriptions cast in

non-teleological terms. Non-naturalists generally hold that at least some non-tecological terms. Non-naturalists generally hold that at least some natural phenomena exhibit irreducible tecloolyce. For example, Intelligent Design (ID) theorists hold that certain biological phenomena cannot prop-erly be understood except as the products of an intelligence which designed them to carry out certain functions. Teleology's controversial status in modern philosophy stems from

the mechanistic conception of the natural world, which early modern thinkers like Bacon, Galileo, Descartes, Hobbes, Boyle, and Locke put in place of the Aristotelian philosophy of nature that featured in me-dicval Scholasticism. Following Aristotle, the Scholastics took the view that a semiclastic statement of the scholastics took the view

been constructed in the construction of a material substance required identi-that a complete understanding of a material substance required identi-fying each of its "four causes." Every such substance required identi-irreducible composite of substantial form and prime matter (irreducible because on the Scholastic view, substantial form and prime matter (irreducible because on the Scholastic view, substantial form and prime matter (irreducible matter) and the substances they compose, making the analysis holistic rather than reductionist). The substantial form of a thing is its patter or account discondences.

making use analysis noistic rather than reductionist). The substantial form of a thing is its nature or essence, the underlying metaphysical basis of its properties and causal powers; it constitutes a thing's *formal cause*. Prime matter is the otherwise formless stuff that takes on a sub-stantial form so as to instantiate it in a concrete object, and apart from which the form would be a mere abstraction; it constitutes a thing's *ma*-*terial* aroure *T* but which kineme a thing it is constitutes a thing's *ma*-*terial* aroure *T* but which kineme a thing is the substraction. terial cause. That which brings a thing into existence constitutes its

1.283

I. Introduction

REALISM: TELEOLOGY

Realism regarding talcology (Talcological Realism) holds that teleology is a real and irreducible teature of the natural world,

Platonic Teleological Realism

43


REALISM: UNIVERSALS

Realism regarding universals holds that universals are real and irreducible to particulars

REALISM: TELEOLOGY

Realism regarding taleology (Taleological Realism) holds that taleology is a real and irreducible feature of the natural world.

Extreme Realism



Universals are the only things that are fully real. Particulars are merely "shadows" of their exemplars.


Platonic Teleological Realism

Teleology is irreducible but is entirely derived from an outside (extrinsic) source, as, for example, a divine mind like Plato's demiurge.

REALISM: UNIVERSALS

Realism regarding universals holds that universals are real and irreducible to particulars

Moderate Realism



Universals are real but only exist (as universals) in intellects. They come to exist in the intellect by way of abstraction from something metaphysically real in the particulars (i.e., the Form). Thus, the Form "tree" exists as a universal in the intellect of the knower and as a particular in the tree. The Form is individuated by its Matter.

REALISM: TELEOLOGY

Realism regarding taleology (iteleological Realism) holds that taleology is a real and irreducible teature of the natural world.

Artstotellan Teleological Realism

Teleology is intrinsic to (immanent within) natural substances and does not derive from any divine source. This is not in conflict with Aristotle's Unmoved Mover. While the Unmoved Mover is the telos toward which all motion is directed, it is not the cause of the existence of the natural substances with their teleologies, in as much as the Unmoved Mover (or Movers) is not at all an efficient cause of the universe.

REALISM: UNIVERSALS

Realism regarding universals holds that universals are real and irreducible to particulars

Scholastic Realism



Scholastic Realism is the same as Moderate Realism in that the universals can come to exist in the intellects of humans (by abstraction). Scholastic Realism differs from Moderate Realism in that the universals also exist eternally in the mind of God as their Creator.

REALISM: TELEOLOGY

Realism regarding teleology (Teleological Realism) holds that teleology is a real and irreducible teature of the natural world.

Scholastic Teleological Realism

Teleology is infirinsic to (immanent within) matural substances. In this is it the same as Aristotelian Teleological Realism. However, the existence of final causes (teleology) must ultimately be explained in terms of a divine intellect. In this it differs from both Platonic and Aristotelian Teleological Realism. Like Platonic Teleological realism (but unlike Aristotelian Teleological Realism) it sees the divine mind as relevant to teleology. Like Aristotelian Teleological Realism (but unlike Platonic Teleological Realism) it sees teleology as intrinsic to (fimmenent within) natural substances.





REALISM: UNIVERSALS REALISM: TELEOLOGY



For Feser, the problem with Intelligent Design is that it skips this intermediate step, thus rendering the argument (either explicitly or by implication) non-Thomistic in as much at it fails to factor in that the teleology arises primarily from the Form (i.e., it is metaphysically intrinsic to or immanent within the substance) while arising ultimately from God as the Creator of the Form. The reason that this is a problem is because certain of the main proponents of ID claim to be Thomistic.



ANTI-REALISM: UNIVERSALS

discussion of universals as a philosophical skeptic.

Universals are either reducible to particulars or are unreal altogether.

Conceptualism



Ockham

(1280 - 1349)

intellects and have no real grounding in the particulars. It should be noted that some text books label Ockham as a nominalist and would put Hume (dealt with below) entirely outside the discussion of universals as a philosophical skeptic.

Universals are nothing but

concepts in the minds of


ANTI-REALISM: TELEOLOGY

Teleology is either reducible to non-teleological phenomena or is unreal altogether.

Teleological Reductivism

Admits teleology in some sense, but says it can be reduced to nonteleological phenomena.

ANTI-REALISM: UNIVERSALS Universals are either reducible to particulars or are unreal altogether.	ANTI-REALISM: TELEOLOGY Teleology is either reducible to non-teleological phenomena or is unreal altogether.
Nominalism	Teleological Eliminativism
Hume (1711-1776)	Denies teleology altogether.




As with much of his metaphysics (except, notably, regarding existence) Aquinas tracks Aristotle in his understanding of causality.

Some might suggest that Aristotle did not draw a careful enough distinction between a cause and a principle. Aquinas' care to make such a distinction hints at an important emphasis that characterizes his entire metaphysical system, having directly do with how existence figures in to that system.

"Now it should be noted that, although a principle and a cause are the same in subject, they nevertheless differ in meaning; for the term principle implies an order or sequence, whereas the term cause implies some influence on the being of the thing caused."


[Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics, Book V, Lesson 1, §751, trans. John P. Rowan (Notre Dame: Dumb Ox Press, 1961), 277, emphasis added]

Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)






Suppose you were reading a story about a person named Connie. Though rare, the name 'Connie' might refer to a male instead of a female. As such, you cannot be sure whether Connie is a man or a woman.





With this qualification regarding existence, the implications of causality will be profound with respect to the existence and nature of the Christian God.


Thus, though at one level Aquinas's use of these notions of causality will sound exactly like Aristotle, because of this additional metaphysical consideration, the end result of causal reasoning will take Thomas's conclusions to a place that Aristotle could not have envisioned. This metaphysical consideration will be Aquinas's notion of existence (together with the essence / existence distinction).



Specifically, Aquinas will make much out of the difference between an agent being the cause of the existence of a thing and the agent being the cause of a change in a thing.

> existence of a thing vs. change in a thing

Aquinas makes much out of the difference between an agent being the cause of the existence of a thing and the agent being the cause of a change in a thing.



"Furthermore, effects correspond proportionally to their causes, so that we attribute actual effects to actual causes, potential effects to potential causes, and, similarly, particular effects to particular causes and universal effects to universal causes, as Aristotle teaches in Physics II.


homas Aquinas (1225-1274)


"Now, the act of being is the first effect, and this is evident by reason of the universal presence of this act. It follows that the proper cause of the act of being is the first and universal agent, amely, God. Other agents, indeed, are not the cause of the act of being as such, but of being this of being a man or being white, for example.

[Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 21, trans. Maurer, Vol. 2, p. 61, emphasis in Maurer]


One can see the significance of this distinction for Aquinas' argument for the existence of God in his Second Way (i.e., his second of the famous "Five Ways") which are five arguments for God's existence given in his Summa Theologiae.

While causes as such account for the existence of things being what they are, Aquinas will maintain there is only one cause that can account for that they are.





Analogy of Proportion







Analogy of Improper Proportionality


This is a fox. predication exists intrinsically and formally


Herod is a fox.

predication exists intrinsically but not formally (only metaphorically)











The essence / existence distinction maintains that there is a real difference in a created thing between its essence and its existence.



"What-ness"


with respect to a thing's operations:	Nature
with respect to a thing's matter:	Form
with respect to a thing's accidents:	Substance
with respect to a thing's intellect:	Quiddity
with respect to a thing's existence:	Essence


"Everything that is in the genus of substance is composite with a real composition, because whatever is in the category of substance is subsistent in its own existence, and its own act of existing must be distinct from the thing itself; otherwise it could not be distinct in existence from the other things with which it agrees in the formal character of its quiddity;





"for such agreement is required in all things that are directly in a category. Consequently everything that is directly in the category of substance is composed at least of the act of being and the subject of being."


[On Truth (De Veritate) XXVII, 1, ad. 8, trans. Robert W. Schmidt (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), v. 3, pp. 311-312]


















Aquinas's doctrine of existence together with his doctrine of the distinction of essence and existence serve as the most radical break he has with Aristotle.


For Aristotle, to be is to be a form. As such, there is no philosophical notion of existence as such in Aristotle's philosophy. Joseph Owens (1908-2005)


"For Aristotle, to be actualized meant to acquire form. For Aquinas, it meant to be brought into existence, since for him existence is the actuality of every form or nature."


["Aquinas and the Five Ways," Monist 58 (January 1974): 21]




"From the viewpoint of the much later distinction between essence and the act of existing, this treatment must mean that Aristotle is leaving the act of existing entirely outside the scope of his philosophy.







"In a philosophy conditioned by this fundamental doctrine of Being [in Aristotle], the absence of any treatment of existence is inevitable. But this deficiency becomes apparent only when Aristotelian thought is regarded from a later historical viewpoint. What can be known and contemplated for the Stagirite is *form*, even though understood as act. Determination and necessity and finitude are requisite. The contingent and the infinite have no place in this contemplation. What is not form, or reducible to form, has no interest for the Primary Philosophy ...



Indeed, there does not seem to be a distinctive philosophical discussion of existence as such in any ancient Greek philosophy.

PHILOSOPHIES OF EXISTENCE

Ancient and Medieval

Edited by Parviz Morewedge

Parviz Morewedge





"The upshot is that, although we can recognize at least three different kinds of existential questions discussed by Aristotle, Aristotle himself neither distinguishes these questions from one another nor brings them together under any common head or topic which might be set in contrast to other themes in his general discussion of Being."

[Charles H. Kahn, "Why Existence Does Not Emerge as a Distinct Concept in Greek Philosophy," in *Philosophies of Existence: Ancient and Medieval*, ed. Pariz Morewedge (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982), 10]




Author of "Why Existence Did Not Emerge as a Distinct Concept in Greek Philosophy"




Thomas was certainly not the first philosopher to make a specific mention of the essence/existence distinction.

There is an earlier mention of it is by the tenth century Arabic philosopher Al-Farabi.




"We admit that essence and existence are distinct in existing things. The essence is not the existence, and it does not come under its comprehension. ... If Thus existence is not a constitutive character, it is only an accessory accident."


[This is a tertiary quote. Djemil Saliba quotes Alfarabi in his *Etude sur la métaphysique*, pp. 84-85. Saliba is quoted by Etienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1955, reprinted 1972), 186]




"We admit that essence and existence are distinct in existing things. The essence is not the existence, and it does not come under its comprehension.




"If the essence of man implied his existence, to conceive his essence would also be to conceive his existence, and it would be enough to know what a man is, in order to know that man exists, so that every representation would entail an affirmation.




"But the same token, existence is not included in the essence of things; otherwise it could become one of their constitutive characters,




"and the representation of what essence is would remain incomplete without the representation of its existence. And what is more, it would be impossible for us to separate them by the imagination.



"If man's existence coincided with his corporeal and animal nature, there would be nobody who, having an exact idea of what man is, and knowing is corporeal and animal nature,




"could question man's existence. But that is not the way it is, and we doubt the existence of things until we have direct perception of them through the senses, or mediate perception through a proof.




"If Thus existence is not a constitutive character, it is only an accessory accident."

[This is a tertiary quote. Djemil Saliba quotes Alfarabi in his *Etude sur la métaphysique*, pp. 84-85. Saliba is quoted by Etienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1955, reprinted 1972), 186]




"In order not to confuse this important metaphysical move [in Alfarabi] with later ones, it should be noted that the primacy of essence dominates the whole argumentation. Not for an instant is there any doubt that existence is a predicate of essence, and because it is not essentially included in it, it is considered an 'accident.'




"We are still far away from the Thomistic position, which will deny both that existence is included in essence and that it is accidental to it. With Thomas Aquinas, existence will become the 'act' of essence, and therefore the act of being; we are not there, but we are on the way to it."

[Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, (London: Sheed and Ward, 1972),186]

Etienne Gilson (1884-1978)




Further, certain aspects of Aquinas's developed notion of existence was inspired by the earlier thinker Pseudo-Dionysius.






Probably the biggest influence that suggested the essence/existence distinction was Avicenna, though Aquinas will significantly change the meanings of the terms.




The language of the distinction between form and being (essence and existence) is also found in the Liber de Causis (Book of Causes, dated late 1000s to early 1100s) and was accommodated by Aquinas for his own purposes.




"According to the truth of the matter, the first cause is above being inasmuch as it is itself infinite 'to be' [esse]. 'Being' [ens], however, is called that which finitely participates 'to be,' and it is this which is proportioned to our intellect, whose object is some 'that which is,' [quod quid est]. ... Hence our intellect can grasp only that which has a quiddity participating 'to be.' But the quiddity of God is 'to be' itself."

[Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the* Book of Causes, trans. Vincent A. Guagliardo, Charles R. Hess, and Richard C. Taylor (Washington, The Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 51-52]




Aquinas is the first for whom his notion of existence and the essence / existence distinction will figure so prominently in his own philosophy.

His thinking will go on to play a significant role in subsequent Christian philosophical theology.



Controversy over the nature of and place of existence in Aquinas' philosophy (with implications for the essence/existence distinction) erupted as early as the sixteenth century.





10 THE IDEA OF GOD

JEAN-LUC MARION

I. POSING THE QUESTION


<text><text><text>

265

Translated by Thomas Carlson and Daniel Garber




"Ironically, even though the revival of Thomism was important to sixteenth- and seventeenth-century thought, Thomas's theses were often revived in a weakened form, or even in a form that reversed the original meaning altogether.





" That was the case with the Disputationes metaphysicae. In the Disputationes, Suárez filled the analogical gap between the finite and the infinite by a univocal concept of being (conceptus univocus entis), sufficient to represent to the human mind any being whatsoever in a confused and indeterminate way."


[Jean-Luc Mation, "The Idea of God" in Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers, eds., The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 266-267]



The 16th Century Thomist philosopher Dominic Báñez (in his The Primacy of Existence in Thomas Aquinas) defended the notion that in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, existence is the primary metaphysical notion.








Aquinas lays out his understanding of the essence / existence distinction in his On Being and Essence. Thomas Aquinas On being and essence

Translated by Armand Maurer That essence and existence are distinct in sensible objects is evident from the fact that one can understand the essence of a thing without knowing whether it exists.








"Now, every essence ... can be understood without knowing anything about its being. I can know, for instance, what a man or a phoenix is and still be ignorant whether it has being in reality.


Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)

"From this it is clear that being is other than essence ... unless perhaps there is a reality whose quiddity [essence] is its being."


[On Being and Essence, IV, §6, trans. Armand Maurer, (Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of Midiaeval Studies, 1968), 55]



"Everything that is in the genus of substance is composite with a real composition, because whatever is in the category of substance is subsistent in its own existence, and its own act of existing must be distinct from the thing itself; otherwise it could not be distinct in existence from the other things with which it agrees in the formal character of its guiddity; for such agreement is required in all things that are directly in a category. Consequently everything that is directly in the category of substance is composed at least of the act of being and the subject of being." [On Truth (De Veritate) XXVII, 1, ad. 8, trans. Robert W. Schmidt (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), v. 3, pp. 311-312]




Aquinas's doctrines of existence together with the essence / existence distinction constitute a metaphysical innovation whose significance is virtually inestimable.




"The real distinction between essence and existence could be regarded in neothomistic circles as the fundamental truth of Christian philosophy, which pervaded the whole of Thomistic metaphysics."

[Joseph Owens, "Aristotle and Aquinas," in Norman Kretzman and Eleonore Stump, eds., *The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993): 39]


These doctrines are what enable Aquinas to turn the pagan philosophy of Aristotle into the Christian philosophy that Thomism is, particularly regarding the existence and attributes of God and the doctrine of creation.






God's essence is, one must suppose, of the nature of universals, while His existence is not. It is not easy to state this difficulty satisfactorily, since it occurs within a logic that can no longer be accepted. But it points clearly to some kind of syntactical confusion, without which much of the argumentation about God would lose its plausibility."

[Bertrand Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), 462]





A CRITIQUE OF THE QUANTIFICATIONAL ACCOUNT OF EXISTENCE

William F. Vallicella

University of Dayton

Dayton, Ohio

A CRITICISM OFTEN brought against philosophers who raise questions about Being or existence charges that these philosophers have simply been misled by the surface grammar of existence statements into thinking that " exists " and its cognates are logical¹ predicates, and thus into thinking that there must be some mysterious property or quasi-property called " Being "² to which this putative predicate refers, and into which it would make sense to inquire. According to Bertrand Russell,


. . . there is a vast amount of philosophy that rests upon the notion that existence, is, so to speak, a property that you can attribute to things, and that the things that exist have the property of existence and the things that do not exist do not. That is rubbish ... ³

In a somewhat more restrained tone, Rudolf Carnap agrees that " Most metaphysicians since antiquity have allowed themselves to be seduced into pseudostatements by the verbal, and therewith the predicative form of the word ' to be,' e.g., ' I am,'

¹ " Logical " as opposed to " grammatical." Note that Kant uses " logical " in the sense of " grammatical ". For Kant it is self-evident that " exists " is a logical predicate; the only question is whether it is a " real" or " determining " predicate. (See Critique of Pure Reason AS68 B626.) In recent discussions, it is taken as self-evident that " exists " is a grammatical predicate; the only question is whether it is also a logical predicate.

² I capitalize the initial letter of "Being," not out of misplaced piety, but in order to mark the distinction between Being and being. Lower case " being " can be used to refer collectively or distributively to the totality of beings. Upper case " Being " refers, however, not to beings collectively or distributively, but to that which constitutes beings as beings, the " property " which they all have " in common."





The infinitive of the Latin verb sum (I am) is 'esse' and is often translated into English as 'being' or 'existence.'


While it was not uncommon in the Middle Ages for philosophers to use the term 'esse' as a synonym for 'essence,' Aquinas explicitly distinguished the two, describing the latter as that which receives esse. In Aquinas's metaphysical schema, form and matter in sensible things together constitute an essence.


Essence and esse together constitute a being (ens, the participle of the Latin verb "to be").

As matter is in potency to form, matter and form together (i.e., an essence) is in potency to existence (esse). Form actualizes matter; existence (esse) actualizes essence.


Joseph Owens (1908-2005) "When existence is considered in relation to the thing it makes exist, it may be regarded as actualizing the thing and, accordingly, it appears as the actuality that gives the thing existence."

[Joseph Owens, *An Interpretation of Existence* (Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1968), 51]












"God causes this effect [existence] in things not only when they first begin to be, but as long as they are preserved in being..."


[Summa Theologiae 1, Q, 46, ii, ad 7







"Whatever belongs to a thing is either caused by the principles of its nature ... or comes to it from an extrinsic principle."




Is the reason you are where you are because you are human?


Is it part of your essence as human to be where you are?


Are you where you are by virtue of being human?


Is being where you are caused by the principles of your essence? Why, then, are you able to be where you are even though it is not part of the principles of your essence to be where you are?


You are where you are because of something external to the principles of your essence. In other words, you are where you are because you caused yourself to be where you are.




















"Now being itself cannot be caused by the form ... of a thing (by 'caused' I mean by an efficient cause), because that thing would then be its own cause and it would bring itself into being, which is impossible.




"It follows that everything whose being is distinct from its nature must have being from another."


[On Being and Essence, IV, §7, trans. Maurer, 56-57]












"Thomas Aquinas's Proofs: The Uncaused Cause. Nothing is caused by itself. Every effect has a prior cause, and again we are pushed back into regress. This has to be terminated by a first cause, which we call God."



"All three of these arguments [by Aquinas] rely upon the idea of a regress and invoke God to terminate it. They make the entirely unwarranted assumption that God himself is immune to the regress."


[Dawkins, The God Delusion, 77]

Richard Dawkins


While it is true that Aquinas uses the expression "this cannot go on to infinity" in his famous arguments for God's existence ...

🗞 First Way 🛩

"If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover ..."




Second Way "Now in efficient causes, it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause."





🗞 Third Way 🛷

"But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes."



... Dawkins is mistaken in assuming that Aquinas is making an infinite regress argument like the Kalam Cosmological Argument.





Note carefully the logic of the argument. Aquinas is not arguing:

"Since there cannot be a infinite regress, there must be a first cause."

Rather, he is arguing:

Since there must be first cause, there cannot be an infinite regress." Not: If (since) there cannot be an infinite regress, there must be a first cause. There cannot be an infinite regress. Therefore, there is a first cause.


1. ~IR \supset F

2. ~IR / ∴ F

Rather: If (since) there is a first cause, there cannot be an infinite regress. There is a first cause. Therefore, there cannot be an infinite regress.

IR ⊃ ~F F / ∴ ~IR

Dawkins is not alone in his mistaken assumption that Aquinas is arguing for the impossibility of an infinite regress in the Kalam sense.






William F. Lawhead

"Critics have had the most problems with the third premise of Aquinas's [second way] argument. Why can't there be an infinite series of causes? Isn't the series of whole numbers an infinite series?"


[William F. Lawhead, *The Philosophical Journey: An Interactive Approach*, 2 ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003): 321.]




"The question, however, is whether such an infinite series of motions (or causes) is conceivable. Thomas, of course, denied that it is. In reply, the series of positive integers—1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and so on—could be cited. It is clear that this series does not have a last term Similarly, it could be said that before any time t, however remote in the past, there was an earlier time t – 1, in which motion was occurring. If there is no greatest positive integer, why need there be any first motion?"

[W. T. Jones, A History of Western Philosophy: The Medieval Mind (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers, 1969): 219]








"Philosophers have raised two key objections to this [Thomistic] cosmological argument. The first concerns its contention that there can be no infinite regress in the causal sequences of the universe. But why not? Isn't it possible that the universe has simply existed forever and that things in it have simply been moving forever?"


[Manuel Velasquez, Philosophy: A Text with Readings, 8 ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2002): 286, emphasis added]



Douglas E. Krueger


"In order to establish the conclusion of the argument (if the argument were valid), the theist would have to support the premise which asserts that the chain cannot go back infinitely far. Philosophers such as Aquinas have simply assumed that everyone would agree that such a regress is impossible."

[Douglas E. Krueger, *What is Atheism? A Short Introduction* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1998): 149]



"In order to establish the conclusion of the argument (if the argument were valid), the theist would have to support the premise which asserts that the chain cannot go back infinitely far. Philosophers such as Aquinas have simply assumed that everyone would agree that such a regress is impossible."


[Douglas E. Krueger, *What is Atheism? A Short Introduction* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1998): 149]



"Aquinas believed that one could argue back from the things that we observe in the world to a prime mover, a first cause or a great designer behind it. In each case the drift of the argument follows the same basic pattern. Every event must have a cause. Nothing causes (or, for that matter, moves or designs) itself. If we press far enough back, we must acknowledge some first cause, prime mover or great designer of all things."

[Colin Brown, *Philosophy and the Christian Faith* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1968): 26-27, emphasis added]








Trinity Holy Love Grace World Atheism New Human Greation Anthony C. Thiselton


"Other thinkers in theistic religions have held this position. The Islamic philosophers al-Kindi (c. 813-c. 871) and al-Ghazali (c. 1058-1111) believed that the infinite chain of caused causes is impossible, as Aristotle and Aquinas did. This is sometimes called the kalam tradition of Islam."

[Anthony C. Thiselton, *Systematic Theology* (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1985), 64-65, emphasis in original]











[Aquinas"] second proof, known as the first cause argument is presented as follows: everything that happens has a cause, and this cause in turn has a cause and so on in a series which must either be infinite or have its starting point in a first cause. Aquinas excludes the possibility of an infinite regress of causes, and so concludes that there must be a first cause, which we call God.


[John Hick, *Philosophy of Religion*, Prentice-Hall Foundations of Philosophy Series, eds. Elzabeth and Monroe Beardsley (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963), 20]



"The weakness of the [Second Way] argument as Aquinas states it lies in the difficulty (which he himself elsewhere acknowledges) of excluding as impossible an endless regress of events requiring no beginning."


[Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 21]






"In the Summa Theologiae, five proofs of God's existence are given. ... The Argument of the First Cause ... depends upon the impossibility of an infinite regress."

[Bertrand Russel], A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972): 455. See also his Why I Am Not a Christian and Other Essays on Religion and Related Subjects (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957): 6-7.]



"Take again the arguments professing to prove the existence of God. All of these, except the one from teleology in lifeless things, depend upon the supposed impossibility of a series having no first term. Every mathematician know that there is no such impossibility; the series of negative integers ending with minus one is an instance to the contrary."

[Bertrand Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972); 4:62]



It is my contention that all of these are misunderstanding Aquinas and that Aquinas is not making a Kalam type of argument.


To understand Aquinas's argument here, it is necessary to understand the distinction between two types of infinite series.



Christian Apologetics Journal, 8:1 (Spring 2009) © 2009 Southern Evangelical Seminary	
TWO NOTIONS OF THE INFINITE IN	
THOMAS AQUINAS' <i>SUMMA THEOLOGIAE</i> I, QUESTIONS 2 AND 46	
Richard G. Howe, Ph.D. Near the beginning of his Summa Theologiae, the thireenth century Dominican monk, Thomas Aquinas, elims that "the existence of God can be proved in five ways." These arguments are regularly referred to as his Five Ways and are for many perhaps the most familiar reading from Thomas. Of particular interest for my purposes are the first three of these Five Ways in which Thomas clearly denies the possibility of "going on to infinity." ² I have discovered that a number of -1. Deam esse quingee will probari potert. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (1, 2, 3, 4) English transitions are from Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by father of the English Dominism Prevince (Westminster, ND, Christin Chassis, 1991). Thomas achowedges that certain of these granuests are not completely original with lim. They are found for way are Dhoma's most famous argumester (1, 2, 1, 2), procedure (are provided) and famous and theory of the sum of the sum of the rate of the sum	
ok nada ya trowy is tropisou ya ponojynes u soumeru zvongenya Seminary in Charlotte NC	

"In efficient causes it is impossible to proceed to infinity per se — thus, there cannot be an infinite number of causes that are per se required for a certain effect. ... But it is not impossible to proceed to infinity accidentally as regards efficient causes ..."

[Summa Theologiae 1, Q, 46, ii, ad 7]









"It is accidental to this particular man as generator to be generated by another man; for he generates as a man, and not as the son of another man."


[Summa Theologiae 1, Q, 46, ii, ad 7]

















"The proof in no way considers movement as a present reality the existence of which requires an efficient cause in the past, which is God.




"It aims simply at establishing that in the universe as actually given, movement, as actually given, would be unintelligible without a first Mover communicating it to all things. Etienne Gilson (1884-1978) "In other words the impossibility of an infinite regress must not be taken as an infinite regress in time, but as applying to the present consideration of the universe."

[The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. Edward Bullough (New York: Dorset Press, n.d.), p. 76]




Anything that exists that does not exist by virtue of its essence must be continuously caused to exist by something whose essence IS existence itself. "Now since God is very being by His own essence, created being must be His proper effect ... Now God causes this effect in things not only when they first begin to be, but as long as they are preserved in being..."

[Summa Theologiae 1, Q, 46, ii, ad 7]



"As the production of a thing into existence depends on the will of God, so likewise it depends on His will that things should be preserved; for He does not preserve them otherwise than by ever giving them existence; hence if He took away His action from them, all things would be reduced to nothing."




[Summa Theologiae 1, Q, 9, ii]


"Now there is a being that is its own being: and this follows from the fact that there must needs be a being that is pure act and wherein there is no composition. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)

"Hence from that one being all other beings that are not their own being, but have being by participation, must needs proceed."

[On the Power of God, quæstiones disputatæ de potential dei, Bk. I, Q. 3, art. 5, c, trans. English Dominican Fathers (Eugene: Wipf & Stock2004), 110.]




This cause is something for which there is no essence/existence distinction.




"To God alone does it belong to be His own subsistent being. ... for no creature is its own existence, forasmuch as its existence is participated."

[Summa Theologiae 1, Q 12, art. iv]



"Everything that is not pure being has a cause of its being It is evident, then, ... that it holds its being from the first being, which is being in all its purity; and this is the first cause, God.

[On Being and Essence, IV, §7, trans. Maurer, 56-57]



Existence as such is unlimited and contains all perfections.
Existence is limited, if you will, only when conjoined with form or with form and matter.


The Balloon Illustration

The air expands to fill the balloon up to the extent of and according to the shape of the balloon.

The Balloon Illustration


By parallel, the act of existing of a creature "fills up" to the extent of and according to the "shape" of the essence of that creature.

A horse contains all the perfections of existence up to the extent of and according to the limitations of the essence of horse.




A human contains all the perfections of existence up to the extent of and according to the limitations of the essence of human.






"An alternate word for actuality in this respect is "perfection" (entelecheia). It was used by Aristotle along with actuality to designate the formal elements in the things.




"These perfected the material element in the sense of filling its potentiality and completing the thing.



"Since existence is required to complete the thing and all the formal elements and activities, it may be aptly called the perfection of all perfections."

[An Interpretation of Existence (Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1968), 52-53]



perfection

(entelecheia, ἐντελέχεια)


to have the end or goal in

A being whose essence is its existence will have, indeed, will BE, all the perfections of existence without limit.

Since in God there is no essence/existence distinction, then all the perfections of being exist in God because God's being is not conjoined with (and, thus, not limited by) form.


"God is absolute form, or rather absolute being"

(Deus sit ipsa forma, vel potius ipsum esse). Summa Theologiae, I, 3, 2 and I, 3, 7.



"God is supremely being, inasmuch as His being is not determined by any nature to which it is adjoined; since He is being itself, subsistent, absolutely undetermined."

[Summa Theologiae 1, Q 11, art. iv]




An infinite being (i.e., a being whose essence is esse) possesses all perfections in superabundance.

"... the perfections following from God to creatures ... pre-exist in God unitedly and simply, whereas in creatures they are received, divided and multiplied."

[Summa Theologiae, I, 13, 4]


Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) "Wherefore it is clear that being as we understand it here is the actuality of all acts, and therefore the perfection of all perfections."


[On the Power of God, VII, 2, ad. 9, trans. English Dominican Fathers (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2004), v. III, p. 12]



"All perfections existing in creatures divided and multiplied, pre-exist in God unitedly."

[Summa Theologiae, I, 13, 5]






"Being is conceptualized technically as an act or perfection of a subject. ... It expresses the act or perfection that makes a thing be."

[An Elementary Christian Metaphysics, (Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1985), 59]


"Nothing of the perfection of being can be wanting to Him who is subsisting being itself."


[Summa Theologiae, I, 4, 2, ad. 3]





This is the philosophical grounding for all the classical attributes of God.


Marrying the metaphysics of Aristotle with the innovations of esse and the essence / existence distinction, Aquinas was able to demonstrate the existence and attributes of a God that Aristotle's philosophy could never foresee. "Thomism was not the upshot of a better understanding of Aristotle. It did not come out of Aristotelianism by way of evolution, but of revolution.






















Etienne Gilson (1884-1978)

"The best way to make Aristotle say so many things he never said was not to show that, had he understood himself better than he did, he would have said them. For indeed Aristotle seems to have understood himself pretty well.


Etienne Gilson (1884-1978) "He has said what he had to say, given the meaning which he himself attributed to the principles of his own philosophy. Even the dialectical acumen of Saint Thomas Aquinas could not have extracted from the principles of Aristotle more than what they could possibly yield.



"The true reason why his conclusions were different from those of Aristotle was that his own principles themselves were different. ...




"In order to metamorphose the doctrine of Aristotle, Thomas has ascribed a new meaning to the principles of Aristotle. As a philosophy, Thomism is essentially a metaphysics. It is a revolution in the history of the metaphysical interpretation of the first principle, which is "being."



"Though Aquinas is talking Aristotle, he is thinking his own metaphysics of esse."


[John F. X. Knasas, "Thomistic Existentialism and the Stlence of the Quinque Viae." Modern Schoolman 63 (March 1986): 157-171 (p. 159)]






"The argument, then, remained the same in structure and procedure when used by Aristotle to reach a multiplicity of celestial souls and finite separate substances, and when used by Aquinas to prove the existence of the unique and infinite God. But the respective assessments of actuality cause radical difference in the result of the demonstration."

[Joseph Owens, "Aquinas and the Five Ways," *The Monist* 58 (January 1974): 22]







And God said to Moses, "I AM WHO I AM." And He said, "Thus you shall say to the children of Israel, 'I AM bas sent me to you."