



In my experience, many if not most contemporary Christian apologetic arguments for God's existence utilize scientific evidence.

As such, these arguments generally take the form of an abductive argument, commonly known as argument to the best explanation or best hypothesis.


Undoubtedly these arguments carry greater weight not only because of the status that science has achieved in our day, but also because the categories of the natural sciences are more or less familiar with the general population.

In contrast, the arguments utilizing the relatively unfamiliar categories of philosophy in general and Classical Philosophy in particular very nearly render such arguments inaccessible to a general audience.

Their value remains, however, in as much as such arguments show how the existence of God (together with the classical attributes of God) follow inescapably from the basic tenets of classical metaphysics.




It remains to be seen the degree to which contemporary atheist philosophers engage any of the classical philosophical arguments for God's existence and attributes.



"miracle"

"an event that is not explainable by the laws of nature known or unknown"

[Michael Martin, "Glossary," in *The Cambridge Companion to Atheism*, ed. Michael Martin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), xvii]]



Michael Martin
(1932-2015)


"miracle"

"an event that is not explainable by the laws of nature known or unknown"

[Martin, "Glossary," in *Cambridge Companion*, xvii]

Classical Apologetics defines a miracle as:

"an intervention of God into the natural world that interrupts the natural course of events for the purpose of vindicating His messenger and confirming the message."



"argument from miracles"

"an argument that purports to show that the existence of God is the most plausible explanation of miracles."

[Martin, "Glossary," in *Cambridge Companion*, xv]]

Michael Martin
(1932-2015)


"argument from miracles"



"an argument that purports to show that the existence of God is the most plausible explanation of miracles."

[Martin, "Glossary," in *Cambridge Companion*, xv]

In the Classical Apologetics tradition of SES co-founder Norman L. Geisler, there is no "argument from miracles."

- ❖ Miracles by definition presuppose the existence of God.
- ❖ As such, they themselves cannot be evidence for God.





"empiricism"

"the theory that all knowledge is based on experience."

[Martin, "Glossary," in *Cambridge Companion*, xv]

As we shall see, often terms and concepts differ in important ways between how they are used in contemporary analytic philosophy and the classical tradition of Aristotle and Aquinas.

"empiricism"

"the theory that all knowledge is based on experience."

[Martin, "Glossary," in *Cambridge Companion*, xv]



Before one seeks to argue that one usage over the other is better or correct, it is critical at least that the differences are recognized.

"empiricism"

"the theory that all knowledge is based on experience."

[Martin, "Glossary," in *Cambridge Companion*, xv]]


Borrowing from the text *Questions that Matter* by the philosopher Ed Miller, I use the terms 'Classical Empiricism' (Aristotle / Aquinas) vs. 'Modern Empiricism' and 'Contemporary Empiricism'.



***"Our knowledge, taking
its start from things,
proceeds in this order.***

***First, it **begins in
sense**; second, it is
completed in the
intellect."***

[Thomas Aquinas, *Truth*, I, 11, trans. Mulligan, 48, in *Truth* (3 vols), vol. 1 trans. Robert W. Mulligan (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952); vol. 2 trans. James V. McGlynn (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1953); vol. 3, trans. Robert W. Schmidt (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1954). The three volumes were reprinted as *Truth* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994)]



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

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One should also note that Classical Empiricism sees knowledge arising from our encounter with sensible things (i.e., things evident to the senses).

"Our knowledge, taking its start from things, proceeds in this order.

First, it begins in sense; second, it is completed in the intellect."

[Thomas Aquinas, *Truth*, I, 11, trans. Mulligan, 48, in *Truth* (3 vols), vol. 1 trans. Robert W. Mulligan (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952); vol. 2 trans. James V. McGlynn (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1953); vol. 3, trans. Robert W. Schmidt (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1954). The three volumes were reprinted as *Truth* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994)]

But, for Aquinas, knowledge does not end in the senses (as it might with some contemporary scientists and atheists).

"Our knowledge, taking its start from things, proceeds in this order.

First, it begins in sense; second, it is completed in the intellect."

[Thomas Aquinas, *Truth*, I, 11, trans. Mulligan, 48, in *Truth* (3 vols), vol. 1 trans. Robert W. Mulligan (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952); vol. 2 trans. James V. McGlynn (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1953); vol. 3, trans. Robert W. Schmidt (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1954). The three volumes were reprinted as *Truth* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994)]

Rather, the intellect of the knower completes the knowledge with what the intellect can gather from the data that senses bring to it.

"Our knowledge, taking its start from things, proceeds in this order. First, it **begins in sense**; second, it is **completed in the intellect**."

[Thomas Aquinas, *Truth*, I, 11, trans. Mulligan, 48, in *Truth* (3 vols), vol. 1 trans. Robert W. Mulligan (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952); vol. 2 trans. James V. McGlynn (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1953); vol. 3, trans. Robert W. Schmidt (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1954). The three volumes were reprinted as *Truth* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994)]

Further, a proper account of knowledge will be a function of the metaphysics of what it is to be a knower and what it is to be a known.

"Our knowledge, taking its start from things, proceeds in this order. First, it **begins in sense**; second, it is **completed in the intellect**."


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All this stands in contrast to Modern Empiricism's concern with knowledge of:



- "qualities" or "properties" (Locke), or
- "ideas" and "perceiving" (Berkeley), or
- "sensations" or "phenomena" (Hume).

"In **classical foundationalism**, knowledge begins with propositions about subjective experience. Only these propositions, and propositions they support, are justifiably believed; only to these do we have cognitive **access**."

[Evan Fales, "Naturalism and Physicalism," in *Cambridge Companion*, p. 125]




Evan Fales



Alvin Plantinga

"[Both] Aquinas and the evidentialist objector [to theism] concur in holding that belief in God is rationally acceptable only if there is evidence for it. ...


We get a better understanding ... if we see them as accepting some version of **classical foundationalism**. ...



Alvin Plantinga

"According to the foundationalist some propositions are properly basic and some are not; those that are not are rationally accepted only on the basis of *evidence*, where the evidence must trace back, *ultimately*, to what is properly basic."

[Alvin Plantinga, "Religious Belief without Evidence," in Louis P. Pojman *Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology* (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1987), 457]



Alvin Plantinga

"According to the foundationalist some propositions are properly basic and some are not; those that are not are rationally accepted only on the basis of *evidence*, where the evidence must trace back, *ultimately*, to what *is* properly basic."

[Alvin Plantinga, "Religious Belief without Evidence," in Louis P. Pojman *Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology* (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1987), 457]

For the most part, Plantinga will opt out of what he calls "classical foundationalism" for a more nuanced epistemology which he calls "warrant."

"According to the foundationalist some propositions are properly basic and some are not; those that are not are rationally accepted only on the basis of *evidence*, where the evidence must trace back, *ultimately*, to what *is* properly basic."

[Alvin Plantinga, "Religious Belief without Evidence," in Louis P. Pojman *Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology* (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1987), 457]

Setting aside any critique of "warrant," one should notice the difference between the "classical foundationalism" Plantinga ascribes to Aquinas and Aquinas's own accounting of knowledge.

"Our knowledge, taking its start from things, proceeds in this order. First, it begins in sense; second, it is completed in the intellect."


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
Having moved on from the modern empiricism of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, contemporary philosophers (empiricist or not) often seek to account for human knowledge as fundamentally a function of "beliefs" and their "justification."


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While certain contemporary philosophers are not shy about engaging the metaphysics regarding knowledge questions, such metaphysics will be far removed from the classical metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas.



<p>"knowledge by acquaintance"</p> <p><i>"knowledge based on direct experience."</i></p> <p><small>[Martin, "Glossary," in <i>Cambridge Companion</i>, xvii]]</small></p> <p>"procedural knowledge"</p> <p><i>"knowing how to do something."</i></p> <p><small>[Martin, "Glossary," in <i>Cambridge Companion</i>, xviii]]</small></p> <p>"propositional knowledge"</p> <p><i>"factual knowledge that something is, was, or will be the case."</i></p> <p><small>[Martin, "Glossary," in <i>Cambridge Companion</i>, xviii]]</small></p>	 <p>Michael Martin (1932-2015)</p>
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The diagram explains Martin's definitions of knowledge. On the left, a blue vertical panel lists the definitions. On the right, a large purple rounded rectangle contains a summary statement.

- "knowledge by acquaintance"**
"knowledge based on direct experience."
[Martin, "Glossary," in *Cambridge Companion*, xvii]]
- "procedural knowledge"**
"knowing how to do something."
[Martin, "Glossary," in *Cambridge Companion*, xviii]]
- "propositional knowledge"**
"factual knowledge that something is, was, or will be the case."
[Martin, "Glossary," in *Cambridge Companion*, xviii]]

Here Martin is giving the three standard ways that the term 'knowledge' is defined by contemporary analytic philosophers (though they may go by different labels in different sources).

For the most part, I do not quarrel with these as far as they go.

"knowledge by acquaintance"

"knowledge based on direct experience."

[Martin, "Glossary," in *Cambridge Companion*, xvii]]

"procedural knowledge"

"knowing how to do something."

[Martin, "Glossary," in *Cambridge Companion*, xviii]]

"propositional knowledge"

"factual knowledge that something is, was, or will be the case."

[Martin, "Glossary," in *Cambridge Companion*, xviii]]

The problem lies in the fact that these are regarded as exhausting the options of how the term 'knowledge' is used.

Further, "propositional knowledge" is regarded as the sole concern of the philosopher.

"knowledge by acquaintance"

"knowledge based on direct experience."

[Martin, "Glossary," in *Cambridge Companion*, xvii]]

"procedural knowledge"

"knowing how to do something."

[Martin, "Glossary," in *Cambridge Companion*, xviii]]

"propositional knowledge"

"factual knowledge that something is, was, or will be the case."

[Martin, "Glossary," in *Cambridge Companion*, xviii]]

Thus, the understanding of what knowledge is in the classical tradition of Aristotle and Aquinas is excluded by definition at the outset.

"knowledge by
acquaintance"

*"knowledge based on direct
experience."*

[Martin, "Glossary," in *Cambridge Companion*, xvii]]

"procedural knowledge"

"knowing how to do something."

[Martin, "Glossary," in *Cambridge Companion*, xviii]]


"propositional knowledge"



*"factual knowledge that something is,
was, or will be the case."*

[Martin, "Glossary," in *Cambridge Companion*, xviii]]

Taking knowledge to be "of
propositions" rather than "of
sensible objects" (at least at
the start), gives rise to
analytic philosophy's placing
the priority on "justification"
or "warrant."

It is very common today to
say that one does not have
knowledge until certain
other criteria are met.






"teleological argument"

"an argument for the existence of God based on the apparent design and order in the universe. Also called the argument from design."

[Martin, "Glossary," in *Cambridge Companion*, xviii]



Michael Martin
(1932-2015)

"teleological argument"

"an argument for the existence of God based on the apparent design and order in the universe. Also called the argument from design."

[Martin, "Glossary," in *Cambridge Companion*, xviii]

The terms 'teleological argument' and 'design argument' are often used interchangeably (as in Martin's definition here; cf. s.v. "fine-tuning argument").

"fine-tuning
argument"

*"a teleological
argument based on the
alleged improbability
that the fundamental
physical constants in
the universe are
compatible with life."*

[Martin, "Glossary," in *Cambridge Companion*, xvi]]

The terms 'teleological
argument' and 'design
argument' are often used
interchangeably (as in
Martin's definition here; cf.
s.v. "fine-tuning argument").

"teleological
argument"

*"an argument for the
existence of God
based on the apparent
design and order in the
universe. Also called
the argument from
design."*

[Martin, "Glossary," in *Cambridge Companion*, xviii]]

However, keeping the
terms separate provides
the opportunity to carefully
distinguish the classical
teleological argument from
contemporary design
arguments.

"teleological argument"

"an argument for the existence of God based on the apparent design and order in the universe. Also called the argument from design."


[Martin, "Glossary," in *Cambridge Companion*, xviii]

The classical teleological argument employs the metaphysical categories of act/potency and teleology whereas the contemporary design arguments do not.

THE DESIGN ARGUMENT: AQUINAS VS. PALEY

Richard G. Howe, Ph.D.

**Emeritus Professor of Philosophy and Apologetics, Southern Evangelical Seminary
Past President, International Society of Christian Apologetics**





"In Greek, 'a' means
'without' or 'not,' and
'theos' means 'god.'

Given this (correct) accounting of the Greek meaning 'without' or 'not' qualifying 'god', one would expect Martin to have the definition of 'atheism' to be something along the lines of "without God."

"In Greek, 'a' means
'without' or 'not,' and
'theos' means 'god.'
From this standpoint,
an atheist is someone
without **a belief in** God;
he or she need not be
someone who believes
that God does not
exist." (emphasis
added)

[Martin, "General Introduction," in *Cambridge Companion*, 1]

Notice the additional qualifier
inserted which is completely
unwarranted by the Greek.



"I have elsewhere provisionally characterized the modern as a 'desire for an all-encompassing mastery of reality by rational and/or scientific means.'"

[Gavin Hyman, "Atheism in Modern History," in *Cambridge Companion*, 28]



Gavin Hyman

"The Cartesian revolution was in effect, the rejection of a theological methodology. Such a methodology, as most comprehensively expressed by Thomas Aquinas, certainly accorded an indispensable role to human reason, but it was a rule that was always to be exercised in the context of, and subject to the authority of divine revelation. ..."



Gavin Hyman

"Only with the supplement of divine revelation could human reason hope to grasp something of divine truth. Descartes rejected this centuries-old methodology in favor of the development of an epistemology and theology on the basis of reason alone."

[Gavin Hyman, "Atheism in Modern History," in *Cambridge Companion*, 33]



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[Gavin Hyman, "Atheism in Modern History," in *Cambridge Companion*, 33]

There could be a problem of ambiguity here. If by "divine truth, Hyman means "those truths knowable only by divine (special) revelation, then the statement is a tautology.

"Only with the supplement of divine revelation could human reason hope to grasp something of divine truth. Descartes rejected this centuries-old methodology in favor of the development of an epistemology and theology on the basis of reason alone."

[Gavin Hyman, "Atheism in Modern History," in *Cambridge Companion*, 33]

If, however, by "divine truth" he means truths about God, then he is misunderstanding Aquinas.


Hyman's characterization is wrong on several points.

First, he mischaracterizes the "centuries-old methodology."

- Aquinas held that some (though not all) divine truths could be demonstrated by reason.

"There are some intelligible truths to which the efficacy of the agent intellect extends, like the principles we naturally know and the conclusions we deduce from them. In order to know them we do not need a new intellectual light; the light endowed by nature suffices. There are some truths, however, which do not come within the range of these principles, like the truths of faith, which transcend the faculty of reason, also future contingents and other matters of this sort. The human mind cannot know these without being divinely illumined by a new light supplementing the natural light."

[Faith, Reason and Theology: Questions I-IV of His Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius, trans. Armand Maurer (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1987), 17]



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)


Hyman's characterization is wrong on several points.

First, he mischaracterizes the "centuries-old methodology."

- Aquinas held that some (though not all) divine truths could be demonstrated by reason.
- For Aquinas, divine revelation is necessary for us to be able to attain those truths that could lead us to eternal life

"Since man can only know the things that he does not see himself by taking them from another who does see them, and since faith is among the things we do not see, the knowledge of the objects of faith must be handed on by one who sees them himself. Now, this one is God, Who perfectly comprehends Himself, and naturally sees His essence."

[*Summa Contra Gentiles*, 3, 154 [1], trans. Vernon J. Bourke, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press), 239]



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)


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- Aquinas held that some (though not all) divine truths could be demonstrated by reason.
- For Aquinas, divine revelation is necessary for us to be able to attain those truths that could lead us to eternal life
- For him, there is nothing in us as humans, which is to say there was nothing in human nature, which could, of itself, lead us to eternal communion with God.

"Since the last end of rational creatures exceeds the capacity of their nature and since whatever conduces to the end must be proportionate to the end according to the right order of Providence, rational creatures are given divine aids that are not merely proportionate to nature but that transcend the capacity of nature."

[Compendium of Theology, published as *Light of Nature: The Compendium*, trans. Cyril Vollert (Manchester: Sophia Institute Press, 1993), 162]




Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

Hyman's characterization is wrong on several points.

Second, he oversimplifies (to the point of being misleading) Descartes's position.

- Descartes view very closely tracked the same template of Aquinas.
- He departed from Aquinas in that he rejected sensory experience as the starting point of human knowledge.




René Descartes
(1596-1650)

The Philosophical Writings of Descartes

VOLUME I



Translated by
JOHN COTTINGHAM
ROBERT STOOHOFF
DUGALD MURDOCH



René Descartes
(1596-1650)


*"I now know that even
bodies are not strictly
perceived by the senses
or the faculty of
imagination but by the
intellect alone, and that
this perception derives
not from their being
touched or seen but
from their being
understood."*

[René Descartes. *Meditations on First Philosophy: Second Meditation* in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vol. 2, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), §34, p. 22]


Hyman's characterization is wrong on several points.

Second, he oversimplifies (to the point of being misleading) Descartes's position.

- Descartes view very closely tracked the same template of Aquinas.
- He departed from Aquinas in that he rejected sensory experience as the starting point of human knowledge.
- Nevertheless, Descartes held that some truths are obtained through divine revelation.




René Descartes
(1596-1650)



René Descartes
(1596-1650)

"In many passages in Holy Scripture, however, it is revealed that the mind is nothing but a substance or entity which is really distinct from the body, is actually separable from it, and is capable of existing on its own apart from the body. So this fact, which some people may find doubtful by nature (if we are seeking exact, as distinct from merely probable, truth and knowledge) is for us, through its divine revelation in Scripture, now beyond doubt."


[René Descartes. "Comments on a Certain Broadsheet," in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vol. 1, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 295]



René Descartes
(1596-1650)

"First, some things are believed through faith alone—such as the mystery of the Incarnation, the Trinity, and the like. Secondly, other questions, while having to do with faith, can also be investigated by natural reason: among the latter, orthodox theologians usually count the questions of the existence of God, and the distinction between the human soul and the body. Thirdly, there are questions which have nothing whatever to do with faith, and which are the concern solely of human reasoning, such as the problem of squaring the circle, or of making gold by the techniques of alchemy, and the like."

[René Descartes. "Comments on a Certain Broadsheet," 295]



Gavin Hyman

*"The brilliance of Hume lay in the fact that he was willing to confront, unflinchingly, the implications of a thoroughgoing empirical epistemology. He saw that if empiricism were adopted consistently, this would mean reasoning 'merely from the known phenomena, and [dropping] every arbitrary supposition or conjecture' with the result that one could have **knowledge** of nothing that was not derived from senses experience."*



Gavin Hyman


*"As that branch of knowledge called metaphysics consisted, by definition, of that which was not empirical, this meant, for Hume, that one could have no knowledge of metaphysics whatsoever. This prohibition extended to, but was not restricted to, theism. Hume saw what Locke had not: that theism was fundamentally incompatible with **empiricism**."*

[Gavin Hyman, "Atheism in Modern History," in *Cambridge Companion*, 35, emphasis]




Gavin Hyman






Causality,
"Old MacDonald,"
and "Knock, knock"

"The undeniable character of the
rolling indicates that it is at least
dependent upon the chalk [or cue
ball in my illustration] as something
to be in and of."



"Reflection upon experience
definitely leads us to an
acknowledgement of
'material' causality."

[John Knasas, *Being and Some 20th Century Thomists* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), 220]



"The rolling cannot be totally
depend upon the chalk, since as
having the motion in and of it, the
chalk is in potency to the motion
and so cannot completely
explain it."

"A complete explanation demands something else, and this is the cause. The cause is responsible for the **accident** being in and of some thing."

[John Knasas, *Being and Some 20th Century Thomists* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), 220]

"But allow me to tell you that I never asserted so absurd a proposition as that anything might arise without a cause: I only maintained that our certainty of the falsehood of that proposition proceeded **neither from intuition nor demonstration; but from another source.**"

[David Hume to John Stewart, Feb. 1754, in *The Letters of David Hume*, 2 vols., ed. by J. Y. T. Greig (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932), I: 187]




David Hume
(1711-1776)

*Note that Hume is saying
that the way we know that
the proposition*

***"Something might arise
without a cause"***

*is false is not by intuition
(Rationalists) nor
demonstration
(Empiricists) but from
another source.*


This other source is habit.



David Hume
(1711-1776)

*"Even though we examine
all the sources of our
knowledge, and conclude
them unfit for such a
subject, there may still
remain a suspicion, that the
enumeration is not
complete, or the
examination not accurate."*

[David Hume, *Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and
Concerning the Principles of Morals*, ed. L. A. Selby Bigge, 3rd ed.
revised by P. H. Niddich, Oxford, 1975, § IV, pt. II, pp. 38-39]



David Hume
(1711-1776)




∞ Empiricism ∞


sense experience is either:

*the beginning of our
knowledge
about the world*

or


*the sole basis of our
knowledge
about the world*





Aristotle
(384-322 BC)

Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)






John Locke
(1623-1704)

George Berkeley
(1685-1753)


David Hume
(1711-1776)

Modern empiricism concerned itself largely with the knowing of:



- ***"qualities" or "properties" (Locke), or***
- ***"ideas" and "perceiving" (Berkeley), or***
- ***"sensations" or "phenomena" (Hume).***


A blurred background image showing three people, likely in a historical or academic setting, with one person in the center and two on the sides.



Early on, modern empiricism was committed to the notion that such sensations were "caused" by external objects or by "substances," though such objects or substances were themselves ultimately inexplicable or unaccounted for by the wider philosophy of these Modern Empiricists.

A blurred background image showing three people, likely in a historical or academic setting, with one person in the center and two on the sides.

Later, Modern Empiricists such as Hume began to realize the implications of such a divorce between knowing sensations (also called "phenomena") on the one hand and knowing reality antecedent to (and supposedly the "cause of") these sensations on the other.









Thomas Howe
Southern Evangelical Seminary


Hume's challenge gave rise to his formidable skepticism about making philosophical conclusions about this external reality that supposedly causes our sensations.

This in turn led to a profound but failed attempt by Immanuel Kant to rebuild the bridge between empirical experience and certainty.






*Modern Empiricism has continued to influence Western philosophy and has developed into what can be called **Contemporary Empiricism.***




With the transition from Modern Empiricism to Contemporary Empiricism, philosophers have less and less sought to understand human knowing along the categories of Classical metaphysics.



Contemporary empiricism became absorbed into epistemology more broadly considered.

It concerned itself with issues related to the strict definition of terms and the rigors of formal logic (Analytic philosophy).




*It attempted to eliminate the philosophical challenge of accounting for any antecedent realities like substances by restricting itself as a **second-order discipline** which should only be concerned with aiding the endeavors of the natural sciences.*



A. J. Ayer
(1910-1989)

**LANGUAGE
TRUTH &
LOGIC**


Alfred Jules Ayer



A. J. Ayer
(1910-1989)

**"We mean also to
rule out the
supposition that
philosophy can be
ranged alongside the
existing sciences, as
a special department
of speculative
knowledge."**


[A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic* (New York: Dover Publications, 1952), p. 48]



A. J. Ayer
(1910-1989)

"There is no field of experience which cannot, in principle, be brought under some form of scientific law, and no type of speculative knowledge about the world which it is, in principle, beyond the power of science to give."


[Ayer, *Language*, p. 48]



A. J. Ayer
(1910-1989)

"But, actually, the validity of the analytic method is not dependent on any empirical, much less any metaphysical, presupposition about the nature of things. For the philosopher, as an analyst, is not directly concerned with the physical properties of things. He is concerned only with the way in which we speak about them. In other words, the propositions of philosophy are not factual, but linguistic in character."


[Ayer, *Language*, p. 57]





A. J. Ayer
(1910-1989)


"But, actually, the validity of the analytic method is not dependent on any empirical, much less any metaphysical, presupposition about the nature of things. For the philosopher, as an analyst, is not directly concerned with the physical properties of things. **He is concerned only with the way in which we speak about them.** In other words, the propositions of philosophy are not factual, but linguistic in character."

[Ayer, *Language*, p. 57]







Most recently, certain aspects of contemporary epistemology have challenged the assumptions of the justification discussion and have sought instead to talk in terms of "warrant." (Alvin Plantinga)




Antony Flew
(1923-2010)

Bertrand Russell
(1872-1970)

Richard Dawkins








Aristotle
384 BC - 322 BC

"From experience again . . . originate the skill of the craftsman and the knowledge of the man of science, skill in the sphere of coming to be and science in the sphere of beings. We conclude that these states of knowledge are neither innate in a determinate form, nor developed from other higher states of knowledge, but from sense-perception."

[Posterior Analytics II, 19, 100a7-11, trans. G. R. G. Mure in Richard McKeon, ed. The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: Random House, 1941), 185]

***"Our knowledge, taking
its start from things,
proceeds in this order.
First, it begins in
sense; second, it is
completed in the
intellect."***


[Thomas Aquinas, *Truth*, I, 11, trans. Mulligan, 48, in *Truth* (3 vols), vol. 1 trans. Robert W. Mulligan (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952); vol. 2 trans. James V. McGlynn (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1953); vol. 3, trans. Robert W. Schmidt (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1954). The three volumes were reprinted as *Truth* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994)]



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

***"Sensible things [are
that] from which
human reason takes
the origin of its
knowledge."***


[Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, I, 9, §2. Trans. Anton C. Pegis. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), I, 77]



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

"According to its manner of knowing in the present life, the intellect depends on the sense for the origin of knowledge; and so those things that do not fall under the senses cannot be grasp by the human intellect except in so far as the knowledge of them is gathered from sensible things."


[Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, I, 3, §3. Trans. Anton C. Pegis. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), I, 64]



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

"Our senses give rise to memories, and from these we obtain experiential knowledge of things, which in turn is the means through which we come to an understanding of the universal principles of sciences and art."


[Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, II, 83, §26. Trans. James F. Anderson (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975): II, p. 279]



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

"Our knowledge of principles themselves is derived from sensible things."


[Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, II, 83, §32. Trans. James F. Anderson (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), II, 282]



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

"Our soul, as long as we live in this life, has its being in corporeal matter; hence naturally it knows only what has a form in matter, or what can be known by such a form."


[Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, Q. 12, art. 11, trans. Father of the English Dominican Province (Westminster: Christian Classics), p. 57]



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

"Our natural knowledge begins from sense. Hence our natural knowledge can go as far as it can be led by sensible things."


[Thomas Aquinas, ST, I, Q. 12, art. 12, p. 58]



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

"The knowledge which we have by natural reason contains two things: images derived from the sensible object; and the natural intelligible light, enabling us to abstract from them intelligible conceptions."


[Thomas Aquinas, ST, I, Q. 12, art. 13, p. 59]



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

***"Truth is defined by
the conformity of
intellect and thing;
and hence to know
this conformity is to
know truth."***

Summa Theologiae I, Q. 16, art. 2.




Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)


**Surrendering the
Epistemological Turf
to the Modernists and
Postmodernists**

Too many Christians have more or less surrendered the territory of empirical knowledge to the Logical Positivists and to "scientism" (e.g., Richard Dawkins).

They have erroneously let contemporary scientists set the agenda when these scientists claim that all knowledge is constrained to the boundaries of the physical world.



*These Christians have lost sight of
the fact that, while all knowledge
begins in experience, that is not the
end of the matter.*




*These Christians have lost sight of
the fact that, while all knowledge
begins in experience, that is not the
end of the matter.*

*According to classical empiricism,
all knowledge **begins in experience**
and is **completed in the intellect**.*

***"The senses are
only the bearers of
a message which
they are incapable
of reading, for only
the intellect can
decipher it."***

[Etienne Gilson, *Thomist Realism and the Critique of Knowledge* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1983), 199. While in context Gilson was referring to the act of existing, I believe this point can be extended to other metaphysical aspects of things.]




Etienne Gilson
(1884-1978)

∞ The Methodology of Realism ∞

Our knowledge of external, sensible objects is the first apprehension of the intellect.

The existence of the external, sensible world is the starting point for a realist methodology.


"After passing twenty centuries of the very model of those self-evident facts that only a madman would ever dream of doubting, the existence of the external world finally received its metaphysical demonstration from Descartes.



Etienne Gilson
(1884-1978)

"Yet no sooner had he demonstrated the existence of the external world than his disciples realized that, not only was his proof worthless, but the very principles which made such a demonstration necessary at the same time rendered the attempted proof impossible."


[Etienne Gilson, *Thomist Realism and the Critique of Knowledge*, trans. by Mark A. Wauck, San Francisco, Ignatius Press, 1986, p. 27]




Etienne Gilson
(1884-1978)

"The realist, therefore, when invited to take part in discussions on what is not his own ground, should first of all accustom himself to saying No, and not imagine himself in difficulties because he is unable to answer questions which are in fact insoluble, but which for him do not arise."

[Etienne Gilson, *Methodical Realism*, p. 128]



Etienne Gilson
(1884-1978)



William Lane Craig

Chap. 4: "Theistic Critiques of Atheism"

*"For thinkers in the Judeo-Christian tradition, the Anselmian conception of **God as the greatest conceivable being** or **most perfect being** has guided philosophical speculation on the raw data of scripture, so that God's biblical attributes are to be conceived in ways that would serve to exalt God's greatness. Since the concept of God is underdetermined by the biblical data and since what constitutes a 'great-making' property is to some degree debatable, philosophers working within the Judeo-Christian tradition enjoy considerable latitude in formulating a philosophically coherent and biblically faithful doctrine of God."*



William Lane Craig

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"Perfect Being Theology"

William Lane Craig

ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY APPROACH

By the use of the tools, methods, and categories of analytic philosophy:

1. Carefully define the term 'perfect'.
2. On the basis of this definition, identify what "perfect making properties" must constitute a "perfect being."
3. Since God by definition is a "perfect being," then conclude that God must possess these "perfect making properties."
4. Any property that does not "clearly" appear in the Bible and/or is clearly not "perfect making" must be denied of God.

CLASSICAL PHILOSOPHY APPROACH

By the use of the tools, methods and categories of classical philosophy:

1. Carefully discover what the nature of God must be like as the First Cause.
2. On the basis of this discovery identify what attributes must be true of God.
3. Identify those attributes as the definition of what it means to be ultimately and infinitely perfect.

"For thinkers in the Judeo-Christian tradition, the Anselmian conception of God as the greatest conceivable being or most perfect being has guided philosophical speculation on the raw data of scripture, so that God's biblical attributes are to be conceived in ways that would serve to exalt God's greatness. Since the concept of God is underdetermined by the biblical data and since what constitutes a 'great-making' property is to some degree debatable, philosophers working within the Judeo-Christian tradition enjoy considerable latitude in formulating a philosophically coherent and biblically faithful doctrine of God."

Understandably, Craig is using his prior notions of "greatest conceivable being" and "most perfect being" to set boundaries on what the text of Scripture can mean.


Further, Craig (correctly, in my view) acknowledges that the text of Scripture "underdetermines" (i.e., says less than) what God is like.

"For thinkers in the Judeo-Christian tradition, the Anselmian conception of God as the greatest conceivable being or most perfect being has guided philosophical speculation on the raw data of scripture, so that God's biblical attributes are to be conceived in ways that would serve to exalt God's greatness. Since the concept of God is underdetermined by the biblical data and since what constitutes a 'great-making' property is to some degree debatable, philosophers working within the Judeo-Christian tradition enjoy considerable latitude in formulating a philosophically coherent and biblically faithful doctrine of God."

To be sure, Craig is certainly free to incorporate the philosophical methods and ideas from any philosopher / theologian he desires.

In many respects, I have no issues with Craig naming Anselm as a representative of the "Judeo-Christian tradition."

It should be noted, however, (and as we have seen), the same Anselm who gave him the method of "perfect being theology" also himself affirmed the doctrine of Divine simplicity!



Anselm
(1033-1109)

"There are no parts in thee, Lord, nor art thou more than one. But thou are so truly a unitary being, and so identical with thyself, that in no respect are thou unlike thyself; rather thou are unity itself, indivisible by any conception. Therefore, life and wisdom and the rest are not parts of the, but all are one; and each of these is the whole, which thou art, and which all the rest are."

[*Proslogium*, 18, trans. S. N. Deane (La Salle: Open Court, 1962), 25]

"Theists thus find that antitheistic critiques of certain conceptions of God can actually be quite helpful in formulating a more adequate conception. For example, most Christian philosophers today deny that God is simple or impassible or immutable in any unrestricted sense, even though medieval theologians affirmed such divine attributes, since these attributes are not ascribed to God in the Bible and are not clearly great making."

[William Lane Craig, "Theistic Critiques of Atheism," in *The Cambridge Companion to Atheism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 72]



William Lane Craig

"Theists thus find that antitheistic critiques of certain conceptions of God can actually be quite helpful in formulating a more adequate conception. For example, most Christian philosophers **today** deny that God is simple or impassible or immutable in any unrestricted sense, even though **medieval** theologians affirmed such divine attributes, since these attributes are not ascribed to God in the Bible and are not clearly great making."

[William Lane Craig, "Theistic Critiques of Atheism, *Cambridge Companion*, 72]

Note Craig's first juxtaposition.

Simplicity, impassibility, and immutability are denied today though they were affirmed in the middle ages.

"Theists thus find that antitheistic critiques of certain conceptions of God can actually be quite helpful in formulating a more adequate conception. For example, most Christian **philosophers** **today** deny that God is simple or impassible or immutable in any unrestricted sense, even though **medieval** theologians affirmed such divine attributes, since these attributes are not ascribed to God in the Bible and are not clearly great making."

[William Lane Craig, "Theistic Critiques of Atheism, *Cambridge Companion*, 72]

Notice Craig's second juxtaposition.

It is philosophers who deny simplicity, impassibility, and immutability while it is theologians who affirmed them.

*"Theists thus find that antitheistic critiques of certain conceptions of God can actually be quite helpful in formulating a more adequate conception. For example, **most Christian philosophers today** deny that God is simple or impassible or immutable in any unrestricted sense, even though medieval theologians affirmed such divine attributes, since these attributes are not ascribed to God in the Bible and are not clearly great making."*

[William Lane Craig, "Theistic Critiques of Atheism, *Cambridge Companion*, 72]

Consider Craig's comment that most Christian philosophers today deny simplicity, impassibility, and immutability.

I wonder how many Catholic Christians philosophers there are today in comparison to the number of non-Catholic Christian philosophers.

Catholics are required by Canon 1 of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) to hold to simplicity.

"We firmly believe and openly confess that there is only one true God, eternal and immense, omnipotent, unchangeable, incomprehensible, and ineffable, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; three Persons indeed but one essence, substance, or nature absolutely simple; ..."

Canon 1

*"Theists thus find that antitheistic critiques of certain conceptions of God can actually be quite helpful in formulating a more adequate conception. For example, **most Christian philosophers today** deny that God is simple or impassible or immutable in any unrestricted sense, even though medieval theologians affirmed such divine attributes, since these attributes are not ascribed to God in the Bible and are not clearly great making."*

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Consider Craig's comment that most Christian philosophers today deny simplicity, impassibility, and immutability.

I wonder how many Catholic Christians philosophers there are today in comparison to the number of non-Catholic Christian philosophers.

Catholics are required by Canon 1 of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) to hold to simplicity.

Is it true, therefore that "most Christian philosophers today deny that God is simple"?

*"Theists thus find that antitheistic critiques of certain conceptions of God can actually be quite helpful in formulating a more adequate conception. For example, **most Christian philosophers today** deny that God is simple or impassible or immutable in any unrestricted sense, even though medieval theologians affirmed such divine attributes, since these attributes are not ascribed to God in the Bible and are not clearly great making."*

[William Lane Craig, "Theistic Critiques of Atheism, *Cambridge Companion*, 72]

Granting, for the sake of argument, that most Christian philosophers today deny God is simple, is this an argument that the doctrine of simplicity is false?

Or could it be that having so many contemporary Christian philosophers denying simplicity is a commentary on the regrettable state of contemporary Christian philosophy?

"Theists thus find that antitheistic critiques of certain conceptions of God can actually be quite helpful in formulating a more adequate conception. For example, most Christian philosophers today deny that God is simple or impassible or immutable in any unrestricted sense, even though medieval theologians affirmed such divine attributes, since these attributes are not ascribed to God in the Bible and are not clearly great making."

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Last, note the two "arguments" Craig offers as to why today's Christian philosophers today deny simplicity, impassibility, and immutability.

"Theists thus find that antitheistic critiques of certain conceptions of God can actually be quite helpful in formulating a more adequate conception. For example, most Christian philosophers today deny that God is simple or impassible or immutable in any unrestricted sense, even though medieval theologians affirmed such divine attributes, since these attributes are not ascribed to God in the Bible and are not clearly great making."

[William Lane Craig, "Theistic Critiques of Atheism, *Cambridge Companion*, 72]

Last, note the two "arguments" Craig offers as to why today's Christian philosophers today deny simplicity, impassibility, and immutability.

1. These attributes are not ascribed to God in the Bible.
2. These attributes are not clearly great making.

"Theists thus find that antitheistic critiques of certain conceptions of God can actually be quite helpful in formulating a more adequate conception. For example, most Christian philosophers today deny that God is simple or impassible or immutable in any unrestricted sense, even though medieval theologians affirmed such divine attributes, since these attributes are not ascribed to God in the Bible and are not clearly great making."

[William Lane Craig, "Theistic Critiques of Atheism, *Cambridge Companion*, 72]

Regarding the first argument, did not Craig earlier acknowledge that "the concept of God is underdetermined by the biblical data"?

Why, then, should we necessarily conclude anything about simplicity if indeed the Bible does not ascribe simplicity to God?

Could it not be (granting for the sake of argument) that this is one of those instances where the biblical data "underdetermine" the concept of God?

1. These attributes are not ascribed to God in the Bible.

"Theists thus find that antitheistic critiques of certain conceptions of God can actually be quite helpful in formulating a more adequate conception. For example, most Christian philosophers today deny that God is simple or impassible or immutable in any unrestricted sense, even though medieval theologians affirmed such divine attributes, since these attributes are not ascribed to God in the Bible and are not clearly great making."

[William Lane Craig, "Theistic Critiques of Atheism, *Cambridge Companion*, 72]

Regarding the second argument, the truth of simplicity does not rise or fall on the basis of philosophically discovering what "great making properties are" on the basis of a prior determination of what "perfect" means.

Rather, one should discover what God must be like as the First Cause, and then ascribe the characterization of 'perfect' to that.

God determines what 'perfect' means rather than the meaning of 'perfect' disclosing what God must be like.

2. These attributes are not clearly great making.



God Fading Away: Contending for the Classical Attributes of God

Richard G. Howe, Ph.D.


Provost

Norman L. Geisler Professor of Christian Apologetics
Southern Evangelical Seminary • Charlotte, NC
Past President, International Society of Christian Apologetics



Richard M. Gale

Chap. 5: "The Failure of Classical Theistic Arguments"



Richard M. Gale
(1932-2015)

*"Thomas then identifies this first mover or cause with God on the basis of our common ways of speaking about God—
"and this is what everyone understands by God"—*

"... and this everyone understands to be God."

et hoc omnes intelligunt Deum

"... to which everyone gives the name of God."

quam omnis Deum nominant

"This all men speak of as God."

quod omnes dicunt Deum

"... and this we call God."

et hoc dicimus Deum


"... and this being we call God."

et hoc dicimus Deum

[*Summa Theologiae* I, 2, 3. Translation, Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Westminster, MD: Christian Classics), 13-14]




Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)



Richard M. Gale
(1932-2015)

*"Thomas then identifies this first mover or cause with God on the basis of our common ways of speaking about God—
"and this is what everyone understands by God"—**thereby papering over a serious gap problem, since his arguments do not establish that these beings have all the essential divine attributes.**"*

[Richard M. Gale, "The Failure of Classical Theistic Arguments," in *Cambridge Companion*, 90]



Richard M. Gale
(1932-2015)

*"This completes our brief survey of traditional cosmological arguments. It is now time to evaluate them critically. It was seen that each faced an **unresolved gap problem** consisting in its failure to show that the first cause, unmoved mover, or necessary being has all the essential divine attributes."*

[Richard M. Gale, "The Failure of Classical Theistic Arguments," in *Cambridge Companion*, 94]

The GOD Delusion

Richard Dawkins




Richard Dawkins

"Even if we allow the dubious luxury of arbitrarily conjuring up a terminator to an infinite regress and giving it a name, simply because we need one, there is absolutely no reason to endow that terminator with any of the properties normally ascribed to God."

[Richard Dawkins, *The God Delusion* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2006), 77]



Richard Dawkins



Joseph Owens
(1908-2005)

AQUINAS AND THE FIVE WAYS

I

Do the well-known "five ways" in the *Summa of Theology* represent satisfactorily the attitude of Thomas Aquinas towards the demonstration of God's existence? ¹ There are reasons for doubt. In their mode of expression, the "five ways" are puzzling. They are of conflicting historical provenance. They do not make clear whether they are more than one or just one proof, whether they are entirely metaphysical in character, or whether they need to be prolonged or completed to reach the Christian God.² Nowhere else in Aquinas is

1. ST, I, 2, 3, c. The impression that the five ways are the only ones recognized by Aquinas, and that all other variations have to be reduced in one way or another to their forms, stems from the Neoscholastic manuals. More than twenty-five years ago this attitude was characterized as "la fidélité opiniâtre des milieux thomistes à la formule des *quinque vias*" by Fernand Van Steenberghe, "Le problème philosophique de l'existence de Dieu," *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, 45 (1947), 5. It was accentuated when a writer who had a new proof of his own to advance felt compelled to designate it as a "sixth way," e.g., Josef Grell, *Elementa philosophiae aristotelico-thomisticae*, 7th ed. (Freiburg i. Breisgau: Herder, 1937), Vol. II, pp. 199-201 (nos. 790-92); and Jacques Maritain, *Approaches to God*, trans. Peter O'Reilly (New York: Harper & Row, 1954), pp. 72-83. However, a comprehensive investigation of Aquinas's writings brings to light a number of other "ways" or arguments. These are grouped under eleven headings by Jules A. Bassée, "St. Thomas Aquinas's Proofs of the Existence of God Presented in their Chronological Order," in *Philosophical Studies in Honor of the Very Reverend Ignatius Smith, O. P.*, ed. John K. Ryan (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1952), pp. 65-64, listing frequency of occurrence. Accordingly "other independent proofs which he offers elsewhere" are recognized in Aquinas by Anthony Kenny, *The Five Ways* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), p. 1, and other recent writers. Thirteen "proofs" expressly rejected by Aquinas are listed by Robert Teet Patterson, *The Conception of God in the Philosophy of Aquinas* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1933), pp. 21-39.


2. See discussion on "The Enigma of the Five Ways," in Edward A. Sillem, *Ways of Thinking about God: Thomas Aquinas and Some Recent Problems* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1961), pp. 55-78. On the notion of one proof though expressed in five different ways, see Michel

Owens, Joseph. "Aquinas and the Five Ways." In *The Monist* (Jan. 1974): 16-35.

Having demonstrated the existence of God, Aquinas goes on to show how all the classical attributes of God cascade seamlessly and necessarily from the basic commitments of his metaphysics.



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)




Richard M. Gale
(1932-2015)


"One reason that might be given for the impossibility of an actual infinite regress of simultaneous causes or movers is that if there were such a regress, there would be no member of the regress that could be held morally responsible ... for the initial event or object in the regress."

[Richard M. Gale, "The Failure of Classical Theistic Arguments," in *Cambridge Companion*, 90]

In Thomism, human moral responsibility requires rationality and free will in relation to the teleology of human nature.



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)



Richard M. Gale
(1932-2015)

"The argument seems to commit the same howler as is committed by inferring from the fact that for every woman there is a man that there is a man who is for every woman ... In logical terms that fallacy is $(x)(\exists y)xRy \supset (\exists y)(x)xRy$."


[Richard M. Gale, "The Failure of Classical Theistic Arguments," in *Cambridge Companion*, 92]




Does the Second Way Commit the Quantifier Shift Fallacy?

"This fallacy is committed more than once in the Five Ways. For instance, since 'secondary movers do not move unless they are moved by a first mover,' the conclusion is drawn that there must therefore be one single First Mover that moves all, 'and this all men call God.'

[Antony Flew, *A Dictionary of Philosophy*, rev. 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press 1979), s.v., "Quantifier Shift Fallacy, 296-297]



Antony Flew
(1923-2010)




Neil Tennant

"The Cosmological Argument ... was first presented by Aquinas as his 'Second Way' of proving that God exists. ... Aquinas commits the quantifier-switch [shift] fallacy. [His] central inference has the form

Every event has a (distinct) cause;


therefore, Some event caused all (other) events. ...



Neil Tennant

"Aquinas can be squarely criticized for not having said more to secure the conclusion that there is first cause. ... Every event could be caused by a strictly earlier event, while yet no event is initial within the temporal ordering. "

[Neil Tennant, *Introducing Philosophy: God, Mind, World, and Logic* (New York: Routledge, 2015), 228-229, emphasis in original]



Neil Tennant

Everyone has a mother.

For every person, there is a woman who is the mother of that person.

$$\forall x \exists y (Px \supset (Wy \cdot M(yx)))$$

There is a mother that everyone has.

There is a woman who is the mother of every person.

$$\exists y \forall x (Px \supset (Wy \cdot M(yx)))$$

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Everyone has a mother.

For every person, there is a woman who is the mother of that person.

$$\forall x \exists y (Px \supset (Wy \cdot Myx))$$

There is a mother that everyone has.

There is a woman who is the mother of every person.

$$\exists y \forall x (Px \supset (Wy \cdot Myx))$$

Every physical thing in the universe has a cause.

Every physical thing in the universe has a cause.

There is cause for every physical thing in the universe.

Every physical thing in the universe has a cause.

For every physical thing in the universe, there is an object that is the
cause of that physical thing.

There is cause for every physical thing in the universe.

Every physical thing in the universe has a cause.

For every physical thing in the universe, there is an object that is the cause of that physical thing.

$$\forall x \exists y (Px \supset (Oy \cdot Cyx))$$

There is cause for every physical thing in the universe.

Every physical thing in the universe has a cause.

For every physical thing in the universe, there is an object that is the cause of that physical thing.

$$\forall x \exists y (Px \supset (Oy \cdot Cyx))$$

There is cause for every physical thing in the universe.

There is an object that is the cause of every physical thing in the universe.

Every physical thing in the universe has a cause.


For every physical thing in the universe, there is an object that is the cause of that physical thing.

$$\forall x \exists y (Px \supset (Oy \cdot Cyx))$$


There is cause for every physical thing in the universe.


There is an object that is the cause of every physical thing in the universe.

$$\exists y \forall x (Px \supset (Oy \cdot Cyx))$$



Henry Babcock Veatch
(1911-1999)





Richard M. Gale
(1932-2015)

*"David Hume ... claimed that for any aggregate, whether finite or infinite, if there is for each of its constituents an explanation, then there thereby is an explanation for the entire aggregate. Thus, if there were to be an infinite past succession of contingent beings, **each of which causally explains the existence of its immediate successor**, there would be an explanation for the entire infinite aggregate, and thus no need to go outside it and invoke a necessary being as its cause."*

[Richard M. Gale, "The Failure of Classical Theistic Arguments," in *Cambridge Companion*, 94]

In Aquinas's metaphysics, it is precisely by being contingent that makes it impossible for any contingent being to causally explain the existence of anything else in the primary sense of the expression 'causally explain'.

*"David Hume ... claimed that for any aggregate, whether finite or infinite, if there is for each of its constituents an explanation, then there thereby is an explanation for the entire aggregate. Thus, if there were to be an infinite past succession of contingent beings, **each of which causally explains the existence of its immediate successor**, there would be an explanation for the entire infinite aggregate. and thus no need to go outside it and invoke a necessary being as its cause."*


[Richard M. Gale, "The Failure of Classical Theistic Arguments," in *Cambridge Companion*, 94]

What is more, Hume's "explanation" does not at all explain anything in any way similar to how most people today (including Richard M. Gale) understand the notions of 'explain' or 'explanations'.

"David Hume ... claimed that for any aggregate, whether finite or infinite, if there is for each of its constituents an explanation, then there thereby is an explanation for the entire aggregate.

Thus, if there were to be an infinite past succession of contingent beings, each of which causally explains the existence of its immediate successor, there would be an explanation for the entire infinite aggregate. and thus no need to go outside it and invoke a necessary being as its cause."

[Richard M. Gale, "The Failure of Classical Theistic Arguments," in *Cambridge Companion*, 94]



Richard M. Gale
(1932-2015)

"Nevertheless, Reichenbach's rebuttal is far too facile for it fails to face the fact that our only access to the ontological order is through the epistemic order. The only way that we humans can go about determining what has the possibility of existing is by appeal to what we can conceive to be possible."

[Richard M. Gale, "The Failure of Classical Theistic Arguments," in *Cambridge Companion*, 95]

being

knowing

"Nevertheless, Reichenbach's rebuttal is far too facile for it fails to face the fact that our only access to the **ontological order** is through the **epistemic order**. The only way that we humans can go about determining what has the possibility of existing is by appeal to what we can conceive to be possible."

[Richard M. Gale, "The Failure of Classical Theistic Arguments," in *Cambridge Companion*, 95]

Gale's point here is predicated on a denial of any classical understanding of knowledge.

But nowhere in this context does he give any argument against it, nor even acknowledge it.

"Nevertheless, Reichenbach's rebuttal is far too facile for it fails to face the fact that our only access to the ontological order is through the epistemic order. The only way that we humans can go about determining what has the possibility of existing is by appeal to what we can conceive to be possible."

[Richard M. Gale, "The Failure of Classical Theistic Arguments," in *Cambridge Companion*, 95]

In other words, it would seem that nowhere in Gale's philosophy of human knowing does he allow for the formal identity of knower and known.

This confines him to an epistemological dualism.

"Nevertheless, Reichenbach's rebuttal is far too facile for it fails to face the fact that our only access to the ontological order is through the epistemic order. The only way that we humans can go about determining what has the possibility of existing is by appeal to what we can conceive to be possible."

[Richard M. Gale, "The Failure of Classical Theistic Arguments," in *Cambridge Companion*, 95]

Further, there is a difference between what is logically possible

*"Nevertheless, Reichenbach's rebuttal is far too facile for it fails to face the fact that our only access to the ontological order is through the epistemic order. The only way that we humans can go about determining what has the possibility of existing is by appeal to what we can **conceive** to be possible."*

[Richard M. Gale, "The Failure of Classical Theistic Arguments," in *Cambridge Companion*, 95]

Further, there is a difference between what is logically possible and what is actually possible physically or metaphysically.

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Last, this standard commits Gale to only being able to access this statement "through the epistemic order."


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


Last, this standard commits Gale to only being able to access this statement "through the epistemic order."

This amounts to an infinite regress.

"Nevertheless, Reichenbach's rebuttal is far too facile for it fails to face the fact that our only access to the ontological order is through the epistemic order. The only way that we humans can go about determining what has the possibility of existing is by appeal to what we can conceive to be possible."

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Richard M. Gale
(1932-2015)

*"In one version of the **classical teleological argument**, which is given by Hume's Cleanthes, an analogy is drawn between a machine and the universe as a whole."*

[Richard M. Gale, "The Failure of Classical Theistic Arguments," in *Cambridge Companion*, 97]

The argument Cleanthes gives is not at all the classical teleological argument.

Instead, Cleanthes's argument is more akin to William Paley's "watchmaker" argument.

This is, by and large, what constitutes the contemporary design argument.

*"In one version of the **classical teleological argument**, which is given by Hume's Cleanthes, an analogy is drawn between a machine and the universe as a whole."*

[Richard M. Gale, "The Failure of Classical Theistic Arguments," in *Cambridge Companion*, 97]



THE DESIGN ARGUMENT: AQUINAS VS. PALEY

Richard G. Howe, Ph.D.

**Emeritus Professor of Philosophy and Apologetics, Southern Evangelical Seminary
Past President, International Society of Christian Apologetics**



David O. Brink

Chap. 9: "The Autonomy of Ethics"

"Naturalism accepts the autonomy of ethics. Ethical naturalists, such as Thomas Aquinas (1225-74), claim that the moral properties of persons and situations depend on their nature. If so, moral qualities do not presuppose a God, though a perfectly wise and good God would approve all and only good and right things. ... Naturalism does not itself preclude God from playing an epistemic role in morality But naturalism does deny theism a metaphysical role.

[Brink, "Autonomy," in *Cambridge Companion*, 152]




David O. Brink

*"**Naturalism** accepts the autonomy of ethics. Ethical naturalists, such as Thomas Aquinas (1225-74), claim that the moral properties of persons and situations depend on their nature. If so, moral qualities do not presuppose a God, though a perfectly wise and good God would approve all and only good and right things. ... Naturalism does not itself preclude God from playing an epistemic role in morality But naturalism does deny theism a metaphysical role.*

[Brink, "Autonomy," in *Cambridge Companion*, 152]

The reader should be careful of this term 'naturalism' as it can easily be misunderstood outside of the context of a discussion about ethics.



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[Brink, "Autonomy," in *Cambridge Companion*, 152]

'Natural' can be used in contrast to 'supernatural'.

This usage follows the contours of the atheism vs. theism debate.

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[Brink, "Autonomy," in *Cambridge Companion*, 152]

'Natural' can be used in contrast to 'artificial'.

This usage follows the contours of the evolution vs. intelligent design debate.

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[Brink, "Autonomy," in *Cambridge Companion*, 152]

'Natural' can be used as a reference to the metaphysical nature of a thing.

This usage follows the contours of classical metaphysics, especially Aristotle, who employed such metaphysical categories as form/matter.



Aquinas later augments elements of Aristotle's metaphysics to include (among other things) existence in contrast to essence.

"Naturalism accepts the autonomy of ethics. Ethical naturalists, such as Thomas Aquinas (1225-74), claim that the moral properties of persons and situations depend on their nature. If so, moral qualities do not presuppose a God, though a perfectly wise and good God would approve all and only good and right things. ... Naturalism does not itself preclude God from playing an epistemic role in morality But naturalism does deny theism a metaphysical role.

[Brink, "Autonomy," in *Cambridge Companion*, 152]

In this context of Brink's discussion, ethical naturalism is the idea that moral values "arise from" and can be "reduced to" non-moral facts.

This usage follows the contours of the is/ought discussion, including whether there is a such thing as the is/ought fallacy.



My worry here is that Frankena has in mind empiricism as it is understood today and is not at all considering the important elements within classical empiricism.

What is more, when it comes to any metaphysical considerations, there is a difference between the mere "fact" that something exists, and recognizing that the thing's existence is an "act."


Last, in my experience, this last expression never seemed to have caught on in the philosophical discussion about ethics.

*"On all such views [that Frankena is discussing], ethical judgments are disguised assertions of fact of some kind. Those who say ... that they are disguised assertions of **empirical fact** are called ethical naturalists, and those who regard them as disguised assertions of metaphysical or theological facts are called **metaphysical moralists**."*

[William K. Frankena, *Ethics*, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1973), 98, emphasis in original]



John S. Feinberg



Paul D. Feinberg
(1938-2004)



*"Naturalistic ethical theories claim that **ethical terms** can be defined in terms of **non-ethical ones** and that ethical claims can be translated into factual ones. Thus, naturalistic theories hold that ethical sentences assert some fact (e.g., empirical or metaphysical) and that the terms in them can be defined in non-ethical terms."*

[John S. Feinberg and Paul D. Feinberg, *Ethics for a Brave New World*, 2nd ed. Wheaton: Crossway, 2010), 29]



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Paul D. Feinberg
(1938-2004)

For the Thomist, who holds that 'good' and 'being' are convertible terms, what is he to make of this distinction?



*"Naturalism accepts the **autonomy of ethics**. Ethical naturalists, such as Thomas Aquinas (1225-74), claim that the moral properties of persons and situations depend on their nature. If so, moral qualities do not presuppose a God, though a perfectly wise and good God would approve all and only good and right things. ... Naturalism does not itself preclude God from playing an epistemic role in morality But naturalism does deny theism a metaphysical role.*

[Brink, "Autonomy," in *Cambridge Companion*, 152]

The phrase 'the autonomy of ethics' is no doubt a reference to Kant.

In this tradition, by and large morality is autonomous in as much as it is free from the constraints of Divine law, considered in the "Divine Command Theory" model of ethics.


Kant regarded moral autonomy in terms of one having freedom over one's moral actions.



Immanuel Kant
(1724-1804)

"Reason must look upon itself as the author of its own principles independently of alien influences. Therefore as practical reason, or as the will of a rational being, can be a will of his own only under the Idea of freedom, and such a will must therefore—from a practical view—be attributed to all rational beings.

[Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, trans. H. J. Paton (New York: Harper & Row, 1948),]



Immanuel Kant
(1724-1804)

"Ethical naturalists, such as Thomas Aquinas (1225-74), claim that the moral properties of persons and situations depend on their nature. If so, moral qualities do not presuppose a God,



David O. Brink


"Ethical naturalists, such as Thomas Aquinas (1225-74), claim that the moral properties of persons and situations depend on their nature. If so, moral qualities do not presuppose a God,

Brink gives no argument as to why it follows that if moral properties of persons depend upon their natures then moral qualities do not presuppose God.

"Ethical naturalists, such as Thomas Aquinas (1225-74), claim that the moral properties of persons and situations depend on their nature. If so, moral qualities do not presuppose a God,


The very same Thomas Aquinas, in his argument for the divine governance of the world, makes an explicit connection between human nature and God.

"The natural necessity inherent in those beings which are determined to a particular thing, is a kind of impression from God, directing them to their end;




Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

"as the necessity whereby an arrow is moved so as to fly towards a certain point is an impression from the archer, and not from the arrow.




Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

***"But there is a difference,
inasmuch as that which
creatures receive from
God is their nature, while
that which natural things
receive from man in
addition to their nature is
somewhat violent."***



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

***"Wherefore, as the violent
necessity in the
movement of the arrow
shows the actions of the
archer, so the natural
necessity of things show
the government of Divine
Providence."***




Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

[STI, Q. 103, art. 1, ad. 3, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province
(Westminster: Christian Classics, 1981)]

"Ethical naturalists, such as Thomas Aquinas (1225-74), claim that the moral properties of persons and situations depend on their nature. If so, moral qualities do not presuppose a God,


Interestingly, Aquinas utilizes the same reasoning in his arguments for God's existence and God's knowledge of things other than Himself.

***As an Argument
for God's
Existence***




Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

"We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end."



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)


"Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move toward an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God."



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)


[ST, Q2, art. 3, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Westminster: Christian Classics, 1981)]

***As an Argument
for God's
Knowledge of
Things Other
than Himself***




Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

***"Whatever naturally
tends toward another
must have this tendency
from someone directing
it toward its end;
otherwise, it would tend
toward it merely by
chance."***




Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

"Now, in the things of nature we find a natural appetite by which each and every things tends toward its end."




Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

"Hence, we must affirm the existence of some intellect above natural things, which has ordained natural things to their end and implanted in them a natural appetite or inclination."



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)


"But a thing cannot be ordained to any end unless the thing itself is known, together with the end to which it is ordained."



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

"Hence, there must be a knowledge of natural things in the divine intellect from which the origin and the order of nature come."

[*On Truth (de veritate)*, Q 2, art. 3, trans. Robert W. Mulligan (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), Vol. 1, p. 70]



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

"Ethical naturalists, such as Thomas Aquinas (1225-74), claim that the moral properties of persons and situations depend on their nature. If so, moral qualities do not presuppose a God, though a perfectly wise and good God **would approve all and only good and right things**. Naturalism does not itself preclude God from playing an **epistemic role in morality (telling us reliably what is morally good and bad)** or **a motivational role (providing divine incentives for moral behavior)**. But naturalism does deny theism a metaphysical role.

[Brink, "Autonomy," in *Cambridge Companion*, 152]

Brink goes on to assert (again, without any argument) that a good God "would approve all and only good and right things," that God might play an epistemological role in morality, and perhaps God could play a motivational role.

"Ethical naturalists, such as Thomas Aquinas (1225-74), claim that the moral properties of persons and situations depend on their nature. If so, moral qualities do not presuppose a God, though a perfectly wise and good God would approve all and only good and right things. Naturalism does not itself preclude God from playing an epistemic role in morality (telling us reliably what is morally good and bad) or a motivational role (providing divine incentives for moral behavior). **But naturalism does deny theism a metaphysical role.**

[Brink, "Autonomy," in *Cambridge Companion*, 152]

But it is manifestly false that for Aquinas "naturalism does deny theism a metaphysical role."

Note there that my point is not that Aquinas's view is true (though I think that it is).

Rather, my point is that Brink is wrong in concluding that the ethical naturalism of Aquinas (bearing in mind the meaning of 'naturalism' here) denies theism "a metaphysical role."

"Naturalism accepts the autonomy of ethics. Ethical naturalists, such as Thomas Aquinas (1225-74), claim that the moral properties of persons and situations depend on their nature. If so, moral qualities do not presuppose a God, though a perfectly wise and good God would approve all and only good and right things. ... Naturalism does not itself preclude God from playing an epistemic role in morality But naturalism does deny theism a metaphysical role.

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
Last, Brink's discussion suffers from the anachronistic usage of the notion of "moral properties" coupled with the notion of "good" in as much as he fails (as many other contemporary analytic philosophers do) to distinguish 'moral good' and 'good' in the context of Aquinas's understanding of the convertibility of being and good.



1. 'Good' is first identified with 'desirable' (appetible).
2. 'Desirable' is identified with 'perfect'.

***"Now it is clear
that a thing is
desirable only in
so far as it is
perfect; for all
desire their own
perfection."***

(ST I, Q5, art. 1)




Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)


1. 'Good' is first identified with 'desirable' (appetible).
2. 'Desirable' is identified with 'perfect'.
3. 'Perfect' is identified with 'act' or 'actuality'.

"Everything is perfect so far as it is actual."

(ST1, Q5, art. 1)




Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

A portrait of Joseph Owens, a man with short dark hair, wearing a black clerical shirt with a white collar. He is looking slightly to the right. The background is a blurred outdoor scene with greenery and a white structure.


"An alternate word for actuality in this respect is "perfection" (entelecheia). It was used by Aristotle along with actuality to designate the formal elements in the things.

Joseph Owens
(1908-2005)

A portrait of Joseph Owens, a man with short dark hair, wearing a black clerical shirt with a white collar. He is looking slightly to the right. The background is a blurred outdoor scene with greenery and a white structure.

"These perfected the material element in the sense of filling its potentiality and completing the thing.

Joseph Owens
(1908-2005)



Joseph Owens
(1908-2005)

"Since existence is required to complete the thing and all the formal elements and activities, it may be aptly called the perfection of all perfections."

[An Interpretation of Existence (Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1968), 52-53]

perfection

(entelecheia, ἐντελέχεια)

en, ἐν = in

+

telos, τέλος = end, goal

+

echein, ἔχειν = to have


perfection

(entelecheia, ἐντελέχεια)

to have the end or goal in

1. 'Good' is first identified with 'desirable' (appetible).
2. 'Desirable' is identified with 'perfect'.
3. 'Perfect' is identified with 'act' or 'actuality'.
4. 'Actuality' is identified with 'being'.


"Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only in idea; which is clear from the following argument. The essence of goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable. Hence the Philosopher says [Ethic. i]: 'Goodness is what all desire.'



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

"Now is it clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for all desire their own perfection. But everything is perfect so far as it is actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect so far as it exists; for it is existence that makes all things actual, as is clear from the foregoing [Q. 3, A. 4; Q. 4, A. 1]. Hence it is clear that goodness and being are the same reality."

[ST I, Q5, art. 1]



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

A full exploration of how it is that 'being' and 'good' are convertible, which is to say that 'being' and 'good' are really the same, requires an examination of the Medieval doctrine of the Transcendentals.

New Scholasticism 59 (1985): 449-470

The Convertibility of Being and Good in St. Thomas Aquinas

by Jan A. Aertsen

IN MANY medieval thinkers, e.g. Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, the statement can be found: "being and good are convertible" (*ens et bonum convertuntur*).¹ That is to say, "being" and "good" are interchangeable terms in predication (*converti enim est concernim praedicari*).² Wherever "being" is predicated of something, the predicate "good" is involved as well.

That must imply that "good" is here not a concept that adds a real content or a new quality to "being", as a result of which "being" is restricted. For in that case there would be no question of convertibility.³ "Good" is an attribute which pertains to every being, it is a property of being as such, a "mode that is common, and consequent upon every being."⁴ In other words, "good" is coextensive with "being", it is one of the so-called *transcendentia*⁵ which, since Suarez, are usually referred to as "transcendentals".

¹ Alexander of Hales, *Summa I*, Inq. 1, Tract. 2, q. 2, membrum 1, c. 1, a. 1, "An idem sit bonum et ens"; Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, fundam. 5, "Res et bonum convertuntur, sicut vult Dionysius", d. 34, a. 2, q. 3, fundam. 4; Albert the Great, *De Bonis* q. 1, a. 6; *Summa Theol.* tract. 6, q. 28; Thomas Aquinas, *In I Sent.* 8, 1, 3; *De Ver.* XXI, 2; *In De Hebdomadibus*, lect. 3; *Summa Theol.* 1, 16, 2.

² Thomas Aquinas, *De Ver.* 1, 2 obj. 2.



³ *De Pot.* IX, 7 ad 5: Bonum quod est in genere qualitatis, non est bonum quod convertitur cum ente, quod nullam rem supra ens addit.

⁴ *De Ver.* 1, 1: modus generaliter consequens omne ens.

⁵ Comp. Albert the Great, *Summa Theologiae* tract. 6, q. 27, c. 2: Bonum dicitur intentionem communem et est de transcendentibus omne genus sicut et ens.




Jan Aertsen
1938-2016



1. 'Good' is first identified with 'desirable' (appetible).
2. 'Desirable' is identified with 'perfect'.
3. 'Perfect' is identified with 'act' or 'actuality'.
4. 'Actuality' is identified with 'being'.
5. God is goodness itself in as much as God is being itself.

***"To God alone does
it belong to be His
own subsistent
being."***


[ST 1, Q 12, art. IV]



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

***"God is absolute
form, or rather
absolute being"***


[ST 1, Q3, art. 7.]



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

***"God is supremely
being ... He is being
itself, subsistent,
absolutely
undetermined."***


[ST 1, Q 11, art. iv.]



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

***"Good belongs
pre-eminently
to God."***

(ST I, Q5, art. 1)



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

*"To determine whether morality
requires a religious foundation, we
need to distinguish three different
roles God might play in morality.
God plays a metaphysical role in
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of moral requirements depend on
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[David O. Brink, "The Autonomy of Ethics," in *Cambridge Companion*,
150]



David O. Brink

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Note that Brink moves from the role being metaphysical to the role being attitudinal.

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This allows him to then critique the question along the contours of the Euthyphro Dilemma.

