

Analogy of Attribution

analogous use of 'healthy'

George is healthy.

Health exists
intrinsically in George.
primary analogate

cause of health

sign of health

Food is healthy. George's skin
is healthy.

Term is understood by virtue
of the relationship to the
primary analogate.
secondary analogates

Analogy of Proportion

Analogy of Proper Proportionality

life

- ❖ exists intrinsically in each
- ❖ exists formally in each

plants
animals
humans
angels

Analogy of Improper Proportionality



This is a fox.

predication exists
intrinsically and formally



Herod is a fox.

predication exists
intrinsically but not
formally (only
metaphorically)

Analogy of Proportion

Analogy of Proper Proportionality

life

- ❖ exists intrinsically in each
- ❖ exists formally in each

plants
animals
humans
angels

Analogy of Improper Proportionality

The analogy of
improper
(metaphorical)
proportionality is
generally regarded
as unimportant for
Thomistic
metaphysics.

Analogia Entis: The Analogy of Being

being

God

essence is existence

human

substance; essence and existence are distinct

accidents


exist, but not as substances exist

universals

beings of reason

potencies

"real" capacities



"What-ness"

with respect to a thing's matter:

Form

with respect to a thing's operations:

Nature

with respect to a thing's accidents:


Substance



with respect to a knower's intellect:

Quiddity

with respect to a thing's existence:

Essence








☞ **Genus** ☞
animal

☞ **Specific difference** ☞
rationality

☞ **Species** ☞
human



Aristotle
(384-322 BC)

BISHOP ROBERT BARRON & **WILLIAM LANE CRAIG**

"A CONVERSATION WITH TWO LEADING EVANGELISTS"


SATURDAY, JANUARY 13, 2018
CLAREMONT MCKENNA COLLEGE






William Lane Craig

Robert Barron



"Our first objection voiced by a number of critics, especially in the Protestant world, is that the doctrine of the divine simplicity is unbiblical. Drawing, it seems, far more on pagan philosophical sources than on the scriptural witness, Aquinas has presented, it seems, a deeply distorted and hopelessly abstract notion of God more akin to a Buddhist abyss or a Hindu absolute than the living, personal, and very particular God of the Bible."

Robert Barron



William Lane Craig

*"It seems to me that the question is not whether God is simple but whether divine simplicity is best understood along **Thomistic lines**. ... I must confess that I could not agree more with the objector that, 'drawing far more on pagan philosophical sources than on scriptural witness, Aquinas has presented a deeply distorted and hopelessly abstract notion of God more akin to a Buddhist abyss or a Hindu absolute than to the living, personal, and very particular God of the Bible' end quote."*

I submit that Craig is mistakenly treating Aquinas's doctrine of divine simplicity as if Aquinas is taking existence to be a genus.

The thinking would go like this:

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Socrates

human

animal

living thing

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☞ Genus ☞
animal

☞ Specific difference ☞
rationality


☞ Species ☞
human

Why Being or Existence Cannot Be a Genus

- ❖ The term 'genus' means 'kind' or 'type'.
- ❖ The specific difference is what constitutes a given species with a genus.
- ❖ The genus cannot contain the specific difference, otherwise every member of the genus would be a member of the species, e.g., every animal would be human.
- ❖ Neither can the genus oppose the specific difference, otherwise no human would be an animal.
- ❖ But, if being was a genus, then the specific difference would not exist. Can you see why?

***"But it is not possible that ...
being should be a single genus
of things; for the differentiae of
any genus must ... have being
... but it is not possible for the
genus taken apart from its
species ... to be predicated of
its proper differentiae; so that
if ... being is a genus, no
differentia will ... have being."***

[Aristotle, *Metaphysics* B (III), 3, 998b 21-26, trans. W. D. Ross in Richard McKeon, ed. *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (New York: Random House, 1941), 723]




Aristotle
(384-322 BC)

"Since the existence of God is His essence, if God were in any genus, He would be the genus 'being,' because, since genus is predicated as an essential it refers to the essence of a thing. But the Philosopher has shown [Metaph. iii] that being cannot be a genus, for every genus has differences distinct from its generic essence. Now no difference can exist distinct from being; for non-being cannot be a difference. It follows then that God is not in a genus."

[Summa Theologiae I, 3, 5. trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Westminster: Christian Classics, 1948)]




**Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)**



**George P. Klubertanz
(1925-1993)**


"But being as it is understood in its first and proper metaphysical sense is named from that which is most actual and concrete, namely, the act of existing. Being is not the 'widest in extension and the least in comprehension,' because the logical rule of the inverse variation of extension and comprehension holds only for universals."



George P. Klubertanz
(1925-1993)


"Being is at once the widest in extension—for "is" can be said of all things—and the fullest in (implicit) comprehension—for any real act or perfection IS."

[George Klubertanz, *Introduction to the Philosophy of Being* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1995), 185-186, emphasis in original]




Joseph Owens
(1908-2005)

"This is what actually occasions the trouble about the concept of existence. As seen earlier, this concept has been regarded as totally void of content. The conclusion drawn has been that the term 'being' should be banished from philosophy. If an attempt is made to attain this concept by continuing the process of abstracting grade after grade in the natures of sensible things, the result will inevitably be an empty concept."



Joseph Owens
(1908-2005)


"But if attention is given to the actuality attained in judgment, over and above what is attained through abstraction, the result is very different. The abstract natures of things can be graded in terms of actuality or perfection. Life is more perfect and more actual than mere corporeality, sentience than vegetation, rationality than sentience. But all these formal characteristics require actuation by existence."



Joseph Owens
(1908-2005)


"Existence can accordingly be defined as the actuality of all actualities and the perfection of all perfections. It is thereby defined by use of concepts drawn from sensible things through abstraction, but combined in a way that focuses the mind's attention on what has been attained through a different intellectual act, namely judgment."

[Joseph Owens, *Cognition: An Epistemological Inquiry* (Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1992), 175]



Joseph Owens
(1908-2005)

A full appreciation of the import of Owen's comments requires a careful look at the distinction to be drawn between the acts of the intellect; particularly between abstraction from sensible objects (which give rise to concepts in the intellect) and judgment (which is the apprehension of the existence of the sensible objects of experience).



Joseph Owens
(1908-2005)

COGNITION

An Epistemological Inquiry

Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R.


☞ Genus ☞
animal

☞ Specific difference ☞
rationality

☞ Species ☞
human


☞ Proper accident ☞
five fingers

☞ Accident ☞
black hair



Aristotle
(384-322 BC)

☞ PROPERTIES ☞



Aristotle
(384-322 BC)