




*"In Greek, 'a' means 'without' or 'not,' and 'theos' means 'god.' From this standpoint, an atheist is someone without **a belief in God**, he or she need not be someone who believes that God does not exist." (emphasis added)*


[Martin, "General Introduction," in *Cambridge Companion*, 1]

Notice the additional qualifier inserted which is completely unwarranted by the Greek.





Gavin Hyman



*"I have elsewhere provisionally characterized the modern as a 'desire for an all-encompassing mastery of reality by rational and/or scientific means.'"*

[Gavin Hyman, "Atheism in Modern History," in *Cambridge Companion*, 28]



Gavin Hyman

*"The Cartesian revolution was in effect, the rejection of a theological methodology. Such a methodology, as most comprehensively expressed by Thomas Aquinas, certainly accorded an indispensable role to human reason, but it was a rule that was always to be exercised in the context of, and subject to **the authority of divine revelation.** ..."*



Gavin Hyman

*"Only with the supplement of divine revelation could human reason hope to grasp something of divine truth. Descartes rejected this centuries-old methodology in favor of the development of an epistemology and theology on the basis of reason alone."*

[Gavin Hyman, "Atheism in Modern History," in *Cambridge Companion*, 33]



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**"Only with the supplement of divine revelation could human reason hope to grasp something of divine truth. Descartes rejected this centuries-old methodology in favor of the development of an epistemology and theology on the basis of reason alone."**

[Gavin Hyman, "Atheism in Modern History," in *Cambridge Companion*, 33]

There could be a problem of ambiguity in his statement.

If by 'divine truth', Hyman means "those truths knowable only by divine revelation," i.e., Special Revelation, then his statement is a tautology.

**"Only with the supplement of divine revelation could human reason hope to grasp something of divine truth. Descartes rejected this centuries-old methodology in favor of the development of an epistemology and theology on the basis of reason alone."**

[Gavin Hyman, "Atheism in Modern History," in *Cambridge Companion*, 33]

The reason is because his statement would amount to saying "only with the supplement of divine revelation could human reason hope to grasp **those truths knowable only by divine revelation.**"

*"Only with the supplement of divine revelation could human reason hope to grasp something of divine truth. Descartes rejected this centuries-old methodology in favor of the development of an epistemology and theology on the basis of reason alone."*

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
If, however, by 'divine truth' he means truths about God that include those truths knowable through creation, i.e., General Revelation, then he is mischaracterizing Aquinas if he is including Aquinas in the category "centuries-old methodology."

## Hyman's characterization is wrong on several points.

First, Hyman mischaracterizes the "centuries-old methodology."

- Aquinas held that some (though not all) divine truths could be demonstrated by reason.

*"There are some intelligible truths to which the efficacy of the agent intellect extends, like the principles we naturally know and the conclusions we deduce from them. In order to know them we do not need a new intellectual light; the light endowed by nature suffices.*




Thomas Aquinas  
(1225-1274)

*"There are some intelligible truths to which the efficacy of the **agent intellect** extends, like the principles we naturally know and the conclusions we deduce from them. In order to know them we do not need a new intellectual light; the light endowed by nature suffices.*

**"... is the power [in the human knower] which raises the forms of things from the condition of materiality in which they are found in sense knowing to the level of immateriality proper to the intellect."**


[Daniel J. Sullivan, *An Introduction to Philosophy: The Perennial Principles of the Classical Realist Tradition* (Rockford: Tan Books, 1992), 72-73]




AN INTRODUCTION  
TO PHILOSOPHY  
PERENNIAL PRINCIPLES OF THE  
CLASSICAL REALIST TRADITION  
DANIEL J. SULLIVAN

"The intellect as it receives the forms of things raised to intelligible luminosity by the active intellect, as it is in potency to knowledge—for at first it is like a blank page, as Aristotle says—is called the **possible intellect**."


[Daniel J. Sullivan, *Introduction*, 73]



**"Other names [besides agent intellect] commonly used to designate this power: active intellect, acting intellect, illuminating intellect, active reason.**




**"Whether Aristotle held that there was an agent intellect in each individual human being or but one agent intellect in which the whole human race shared is not clear from the texts.**




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"Generally speaking, the medieval Arabian commentators of Aristotle held for the latter interpretation, the Christian Aristotelians the former."



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
"St. Augustine, and many medieval philosophers following him, placed the illuminating intellect in God."



AN INTRODUCTION  
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DANIEL J. SULLIVAN

**"The One Teacher, God, illuminates all mankind with a kind of spiritual light, just as the one sun in the sky illuminates all the parts of the earth."**

[Daniel J. Sullivan, *Introduction*, 73, n. 4]




***"There are some truths, however, which do not come within the range of these principles, like the truths of faith, which transcend the faculty of reason, also future contingents and other matters of this sort."***

**Thomas Aquinas**  
(1225-1274)

***"The human mind cannot know these without being divinely illumined by a new light supplementing the natural light."***

[Faith, Reason and Theology: Questions I-IV of His Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius, trans. Armand Maurer (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1987), 17]



**Thomas Aquinas**  
(1225-1274)


## **Hyman's characterization is wrong on several points.**

First, Hyman mischaracterizes the "centuries-old methodology."


- Aquinas held that some (though not all) divine truths could be demonstrated by reason.
- For Aquinas, divine revelation is necessary for us to be able to attain those truths that can lead us to eternal life

***"Since man can only know the things that he does not see himself by taking them from another who does see them, and since faith is among the things we do not see, the knowledge of the objects of faith must be handed on by one who sees them himself. Now, this one is God, Who perfectly comprehends Himself, and naturally sees His essence."***

[Summa Contra Gentiles, 3, 154 [1], trans. Vernon J. Bourke, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press), 239]




***"There are some truths, however, which do not come within the range of these principles, like the truths of faith, which transcend the faculty of reason, also future contingents and other matters of this sort."***



***"The human mind cannot know these without being divinely illumined by a new light supplementing the natural light."***


[*Faith, Reason and Theology: Questions I-IV of His Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius*, trans. Armand Maurer (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1987), 17]



**Thomas Aquinas**  
(1225-1274)

***"Scripture, inspired of God, is no part of philosophical science, which has been built up by human reason. Therefore it is useful that besides philosophical science there should be other knowledge—i.e., inspired of God."***

[*Summa Theologica* I, Q1, art. 1, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Westminster: Christian Classics), 1]




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
[Summa Theologica I, Q1, art. 1, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Westminster: Christian Classics), 1]



Thomas Aquinas  
(1225-1274)

***"It was necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human reason should be made known to him by divine revelation."***

[Summa Theologica I, Q1, art. 1]




Thomas Aquinas  
(1225-1274)

***"Our faith rests upon the revelation made to the apostles and prophets who wrote the canonical books."***


[*Summa Theologica* I, Q1, art. 8]






**Thomas Aquinas**  
(1225-1274)




**Norman L. Geisler**  
(1932-2019)










Sound Reason






Scripture



 <p><b>Sound Reason</b></p>	 <p><b>Scripture</b></p>
<p><i>God making known to mankind through His creation His existence, attributes, and goodness</i></p>	<p><i>God making known to mankind through His prophets, apostles, and His Son His nature and will that could not necessarily be known through General Revelation</i></p>

 <p><b>Sound Reason</b></p>	 <p><b>Scripture</b></p>
<p><b><i>Natural Theology</i></b></p>	<p><b><i>Biblical Theology</i></b></p>





## Acts 18:24, 27-28

Now a certain Jew named Apollos, born at Alexandria, an eloquent man and mighty in the Scriptures, came to Ephesus. ... {27} And when he desired to cross to Achaia, the brethren wrote, exhorting the disciples to receive him; and when he arrived, he greatly helped those who had believed through grace; {28} for he vigorously refuted the Jews publicly, showing from the Scriptures that Jesus is the Christ.



## Hyman's characterization is wrong on several points.

First, Hyman mischaracterizes the "centuries-old methodology."

- Aquinas held that some (though not all) divine truths could be demonstrated by reason.
- For Aquinas, divine revelation is necessary for us to be able to attain those truths that can lead us to eternal life
- For Aquinas, there is nothing in us as humans, which is to say there was nothing in human nature, which could, of itself, lead us to eternal communion with God.

***"Since the last end of rational creatures exceeds the capacity of their nature and since whatever conduces to the end must be proportionate to the end according to the right order of Providence, rational creatures are given divine aids that are not merely proportionate to nature but that transcend the capacity of nature."***

[Compendium of Theology, published as *Light of Nature: The Compendium*, trans. Cyril Vollert (Manchester: Sophia Institute Press, 1993), 162]





**Thomas Aquinas**  
(1225-1274)

## Hyman's characterization is wrong on several points.

Second, Hyman oversimplifies (to the point of being misleading) Descartes's position.

- Descartes view closely tracked the same template of Aquinas in certain places.
- He departed from Aquinas in that he rejected sensory experience as the starting point of human knowledge.





René Descartes  
(1596-1650)

*"I now know that even bodies are not strictly perceived by the senses or the faculty of imagination but by the intellect alone, and that this perception derives not from their being touched or seen but from their being understood."*

[René Descartes. *Meditations on First Philosophy: Second Meditation* in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vol. 2, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), §34, p. 22]


I would be remiss, however, if I did not point out that Descartes departs from Aquinas all the more in that Aquinas held that even our knowledge of first principles (like the law of non-contradiction) arises only because of our initial encounter with sensible objects.

*"I now know that even bodies are not strictly perceived by the senses or the faculty of imagination but by the intellect alone, and that this perception derives not from their being touched or seen but from their being understood."*

[René Descartes. *Meditations on First Philosophy: Second Meditation* in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vol. 2, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), §34, p. 22]

***"Our knowledge of principles themselves is derived from sensible things."***

[Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, II, 83, §32. Trans. James F. Anderson (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), II, 282]



**Thomas Aquinas**  
(1225-1274)

Mary Christine Ugobi-Onyemere, IHM

## The Knowledge of the First Principles in Saint Thomas Aquinas




Peter Lang



***"Our knowledge, taking its start from things, proceeds in this order. First, it begins in sense; second, it is completed in the intellect."***

[Thomas Aquinas, *Truth*, I, 11, trans. Mulligan, 48, in *Truth* (3 vols), vol. 1 trans. Robert W. Mulligan (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952); vol. 2 trans. James V. McGlynn (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1953); vol. 3. trans. Robert W. Schmidt (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1954). The three volumes were reprinted as *Truth* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994)]




**Thomas Aquinas**  
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Second, Hyman oversimplifies (to the point of being misleading) Descartes's position.

- Descartes view closely tracked the same template of Aquinas in certain places.
- He departed from Aquinas in that he rejected sensory experience as the starting point of human knowledge.
- Nevertheless, Descartes held that some truths are obtained through divine revelation.




René Descartes  
(1596-1650)

The  
Philosophical  
Writings of  
Descartes

VOLUME I



Translated by  
JOHN COTTINGHAM  
ROBERT STOOHOFF  
DUGALD MURDOCH



René Descartes  
(1596-1650)

*"In many passages in Holy Scripture, however, it is revealed that the mind is nothing but a substance or entity which is really distinct from the body, is actually separable from it, and is capable of existing on its own apart from the body. So this fact, which some people may find doubtful by nature (if we are seeking exact, as distinct from merely probable, truth and knowledge) is for us, through its divine revelation in Scripture, now beyond doubt."*

[René Descartes. "Comments on a Certain Broadsheet," in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vol. 1, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 295]

To be sure, Aquinas denied that the mind is a substance that is distinct from the body.

Descartes' position is known as "substance dualism."

It is undoubtedly the most common position in contemporary Christianity regarding the relationship of body and mind (or soul).

*"In many passages in Holy Scripture, however, it is revealed that **the mind is nothing but a substance or entity which is really distinct from the body**, is actually separable from it, and is capable of existing on its own apart from the body. So this fact, which some people may find doubtful by nature (if we are seeking exact, as distinct from merely probable, truth and knowledge) is for us, through its divine revelation in Scripture, now beyond doubt."*

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In contrast, Aquinas's position (which he inherited with augmentation from Aristotle) is that the soul is the Form of the body.

This position secures the unity of the person by maintaining that it is the soul and body together that constitutes the human being.

It is known as hylomorphic (or hylemorphic) dualism (from ὑλή (*hulē*), Greek for 'matter' and μορφή (*morphē*), Greek for 'form').

*"In many passages in Holy Scripture, however, it is revealed that the mind is nothing but a substance or entity which is really distinct from the body, is actually separable from it, and is capable of existing on its own apart from the body. So this fact, which some people may find doubtful by nature (if we are seeking exact, as distinct from merely probable, truth and knowledge) is for us, through its divine revelation in Scripture, now beyond doubt."*

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
However, Aquinas and Descartes are in agreement that our soul survives the death of the body and continues to exist separate from the body (to be reunited with the body at the resurrection).

They agree that this is a truth known "beyond doubt" since it is given to us "through its divine revelation in Scripture."

This is one of several important places where Aquinas departs from Aristotle.



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[René Descartes. "Comments on a Certain Broadsheet," in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vol. 1, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 295]



*"First, some things are believed through faith alone—such as the mystery of the Incarnation, the Trinity, and the like. Secondly, other questions, while having to do with faith, can also be investigated by natural reason: among the latter, orthodox theologians usually count the questions of the existence of God, and the distinction between the human soul and the body. Thirdly, there are questions which have nothing whatever to do with faith, and which are the concern solely of human reasoning, such as the problem of squaring the circle, or of making gold by the techniques of alchemy, and the like."*

[René Descartes. "Comments on a Certain Broadsheet," 295]



*"The brilliance of Hume lay in the fact that he was willing to confront, unflinchingly, the implications of a **thoroughgoing empirical epistemology**. He saw that if empiricism were adopted consistently, this would mean reasoning 'merely from the known phenomena, and [dropping] every arbitrary supposition or conjecture' with the result that one could have **knowledge** of nothing that was not derived from senses experience.*

Remember what was said earlier about the difference between classical empiricism and modern empiricism.

I think Hume was right in exposing the bankruptcy of the empiricism of his day in its inability to lead to any metaphysical knowledge.

But the empiricism of Aristotle and Aquinas remains unscathed by Hume's critique.

*"As that branch of knowledge called metaphysics consisted, by definition, of that which was not empirical, this meant, for Hume, that one could have no knowledge of metaphysics whatsoever. This prohibition extended to, but was not restricted to, theism. Hume saw what Locke had not: that theism was fundamentally incompatible with **empiricism**."*


[Gavin Hyman, "Atheism in Modern History," in *Cambridge Companion*, 35, emphasis]



Gavin Hyman

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
[Gavin Hyman, "Atheism in Modern History," in *Cambridge Companion*, 35, emphasis added]

**Given Hyman's assumption of empiricism in its modern and contemporary meanings and not in its classical meaning of Aquinas, it is no wonder that he characterizes metaphysics as "not empirical."**

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
[Gavin Hyman, "Atheism in Modern History," in *Cambridge Companion*, 35, emphasis added]

However, in light of Aquinas's classical empiricism that human knowledge "begins in the senses" and is "completed in the intellect," the truths of metaphysics can most certainly be demonstrated by our encounter with the sensible world.





- ❖ born 1711 in Edinburgh, Scotland to a Calvinist family of modest means
- ❖ attended Edinburgh University where he studied classics, mathematics, science, and philosophy
- ❖ went to France for three years where he wrote the *Treatise of Human Nature*
- ❖ once confessed that the hope of achieving literary fame was his "ruling passion"


[William F. Lawhead, *The Voyage of Discovery: A Historical Introduction to Philosophy*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Stamford: Wadsworth, Thomson Learning, 2002), 310]



David Hume  
(1711-1776)








***Considered by some  
to be one of the most  
formidable  
philosophical  
skeptics.***




David Hume  
(1711-1776)

*He is regarded as a skeptic not because he denied the possibility of knowledge altogether, but because he challenged philosophy's ability to deliver the more cherished philosophical beliefs.*




David Hume  
(1711-1776)

- *causality*
- *substance*
- *the existence of external reality*
- *the continued existence of external reality when not being perceived*
- *the self*




David Hume  
(1711-1776)

***Though Hume was a skeptic, it is still accurate to call him an empiricist, for he believed that all knowledge comes through experience.***




David Hume  
(1711-1776)

***Several of the most important apologetic / philosophical issues argued today are framed and discussed the way they are because of the influence of David Hume.***



David Hume  
(1711-1776)

- ❖ *the reality or knowability of causality*
- ❖ *miracles*
- ❖ *the design argument for the existence of God*
- ❖ *the problem of evil*



David Hume  
(1711-1776)



***"But allow me to tell you that I never asserted so absurd a proposition as that anything might arise without a cause: I only maintained that our certainty of the falsehood of that proposition proceeded neither from intuition nor demonstration; but from another source."***

[David Hume to John Stewart, Feb. 1754, in *The Letters of David Hume*, 2 vols., ed. by J. Y. T. Greig (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932), I: 187]



David Hume  
(1711-1776)

***Note that Hume is saying that the way we know that the proposition***

***"Something might arise without a cause"***

***is false is not by intuition (Rationalists) nor demonstration (Empiricists) but from another source.***




David Hume  
(1711-1776)

*Note that Hume is saying that the way we know that the proposition*

***"Something might arise without a cause"***

*is false is not by intuition (Rationalists) nor demonstration (Empiricists) but from another source.*

*This other source is habit.*




David Hume  
(1711-1776)

*"Even though we examine all the sources of our knowledge, and conclude them unfit for such a subject, there may still remain a suspicion, that the enumeration is not complete, or the examination not accurate."*

[David Hume, *Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals*, ed. L. A. Selby Bigge, 3rd ed. revised by P. H. Nidditch, Oxford, 1975, § IV, pt. II, pp. 38-39]



David Hume  
(1711-1776)



"The undeniable character of the rolling indicates that it is at least dependent upon the chalk [or cue ball in my illustration] as something **to be in and of.**

"Reflection upon experience  
definitely leads us to an  
acknowledgement of  
'material' causality."

[John Knasas, *Being and Some 20<sup>th</sup> Century Thomists* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), 220]

"The rolling cannot be totally  
depend upon the chalk, since as  
having the motion in and of it, the  
chalk is in potency to the motion  
and so cannot completely  
explain it.

"A complete explanation demands something else, and this is the cause. The cause is responsible for the **accident** being in and of some thing."

[John Knasas, *Being and Some 20<sup>th</sup> Century Thomists* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), 220]