

David O. Brink

"Naturalism accepts the autonomy of ethics. Ethical naturalists, such as Thomas Aquinas (1225-74), claim that the moral properties of persons and situations depend on their nature. If so, moral qualities do not presuppose a God, though a perfectly wise and good God would approve all and only good and right things. ... Naturalism does not itself preclude God from playing an epistemic role in morality But naturalism does deny theism a metaphysical role.

[Brink, "Autonomy," in *Cambridge Companion*, 152]



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The reader should be careful of this term 'naturalism' as it can easily be misunderstood outside of the context of a discussion about ethics.

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'Natural' can be used in contrast to 'supernatural'.
This usage follows the contours of the atheism vs. theism debate.

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[Brink, "Autonomy," in *Cambridge Companion*, 152]

'Natural' can be used in contrast to 'artificial'.
This usage follows the contours of the evolution vs. intelligent design debate.

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[Brink, "Autonomy," in *Cambridge Companion*, 152]

'Natural' can be used in a relatively non-philosophical sense to refer to the way things generally act or appear.

For example, one might observe that lions are naturally ferocious carnivores while many birds are relatively skittish omnivores.

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[Brink, "Autonomy," in *Cambridge Companion*, 152]

'Natural' can be used as a reference to the metaphysical nature of a thing.

This usage follows the contours of classical metaphysics, especially Aristotle, who employed such metaphysical categories as form/matter.

In classical Aristotelian/Thomistic metaphysics, the form/matter composition of sensible objects defines the essence of that object.

Thus, for example, human essence is its soul/body constitution.

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Later, Aquinas augments elements of Aristotle's metaphysics to include (among other things) existence (Latin: esse) in contrast to essence.

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[Brink, "Autonomy," in *Cambridge Companion*, 152]

In this context of Brink's discussion, ethical naturalism is the idea that moral values "arise from" and can be "reduced to" non-moral facts.


This usage touches on what known as the "naturalistic fallacy" which says that moral values cannot "arise from" and cannot be "reduced to" non-moral facts or natural properties.

Thus, Brink is denying the naturalistic fallacy.

The Is / Ought Fallacy


- ❖ *predicated on the fact / value dichotomy*
- ❖ *asserts that premises of an argument appealing to facts (is) cannot lead to a conclusion of obligation (ought)*
- ❖ *first formulated by David Hume in A Treatise of Human Nature*

The Naturalistic Fallacy




David Hume
(1711-1776)

“In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprized to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not.



David Hume
(1711-1776)


“This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it is necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.



David Hume
(1711-1776)

“But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason.”

[David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* Bk. III, Pt. I, §1, ed. L. A. Shelby-Bigge, 2nd ed. revised by P. H. Niddich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 469-470]




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
The Naturalistic Fallacy

- ❖ *the claim that it is a fallacy to maintain that the notion of 'good' can arise from or be reduced to a natural property*
- ❖ *expression 'naturalistic fallacy' first used by G. E. Moore in Principia Ethica*



“The very commission of the naturalistic fallacy involves that those who commit it should not recognize clearly the meaning of the proposition ‘This is good’—that they should not be able to distinguish this from other propositions which seem to resemble it; and where this is so, it is, of course, impossible that its logical relations should be clearly perceived.”

[G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922), 61]




G. E. Moore
(1873-1958)


On Ethical Naturalism



David O. Brink



William K. Frankena
(1908-1994)



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"On all such views [that Frankena is discussing], ethical judgments are disguised assertions of fact of some kind. Those who say ... that they are disguised assertions of empirical fact are called ethical naturalists, and those who regard them as disguised assertions of metaphysical or theological facts are called metaphysical moralists."

[William K. Frankena, *Ethics*, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1973), 98, emphasis in original]


My worry here is that Frankena has in mind empiricism as it is understood today and is not at all considering the important elements within classical empiricism.

What is more, when it comes to any metaphysical considerations, there is a difference between the mere "fact" that something exists, and recognizing that the thing's existence is an "act."

Last, in my experience, this last expression never seemed to have caught on in the philosophical discussion about ethics.

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PAUL D. FEINBERG

ETHICS
**FOR A BRAVE
NEW WORLD**

2ND EDITION
UPDATED AND EXPANDED

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John S. Feinberg

Paul D. Feinberg
(1938-2004)



John S. Feinberg

"Naturalistic ethical theories claim that ethical terms can be defined in terms of non-ethical ones and that ethical claims can be translated into factual ones. Thus, naturalistic theories hold that ethical sentences assert some fact (e.g., empirical or metaphysical) and that the terms in them can be defined in non-ethical terms."

[John s. Feinberg and Paul D. Feinberg, *Ethics for a Brave New World*, 2nd ed. Wheaton: Crossway, 2010), 29]



Paul D. Feinberg
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Paul D. Feinberg (1938-2004)

For the Thomist, who holds that 'good' and 'being' are convertible terms, what is he to make of this distinction?

"Naturalism accepts the **autonomy of ethics**. Ethical naturalists, such as Thomas Aquinas (1225-74), claim that the moral properties of persons and situations depend on their nature. If so, moral qualities do not presuppose a God, though a perfectly wise and good God would approve all and only good and right things. ... Naturalism does not itself preclude God from playing an epistemic role in morality But naturalism does deny theism a metaphysical role.

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[Brink, "Autonomy," in *Cambridge Companion*, 152]


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The phrase 'the autonomy of ethics' is no doubt a reference to Kant.


In this tradition, by and large morality is autonomous in as much as it is free from the constraints of Divine law, considered in the "Divine Command Theory" model of ethics.

Kant regarded moral autonomy in terms of one having freedom over one's moral actions.



"Reason must look upon itself as the author of its own principles independently of alien influences. Therefore as practical reason, or as the will of a rational being, can be a will of his own only under the Idea of freedom, and such a will must therefore—from a practical view—be attributed to all rational beings.

[Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. H. J. Paton (New York: Harper & Row, 1948),]



Immanuel Kant
(1724-1804)

"Ethical naturalists, such as Thomas Aquinas (1225-74), claim that the moral properties of persons and situations depend on their nature. If so, moral qualities do not presuppose a God,



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
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Brink gives no argument as to why it follows that if moral properties of persons depend upon their natures then moral qualities do not presuppose God.

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
The very same Thomas Aquinas, in his argument for the divine governance of the world, makes an explicit connection between human nature and God.

"The natural necessity inherent in those beings which are determined to a particular thing, is a kind of impression from God, directing them to their end;




Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

"as the necessity whereby an arrow is moved so as to fly towards a certain point is an impression from the archer, and not from the arrow.




Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

"But there is a difference, inasmuch as that which creatures receive from God is their nature, while that which natural things receive from man in addition to their nature is somewhat violent."



"Wherefore, as the violent necessity in the movement of the arrow shows the actions of the archer, so the natural necessity of things show the government of Divine Providence."



[STI, Q. 103, art. 1, ad. 3, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Westminster: Christian Classics, 1981)]

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
Interestingly, Aquinas utilizes the same reasoning in his arguments for God's existence and God's knowledge of things other than Himself.

***As an Argument
for God's
Existence***




Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

"We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end."




"Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move toward an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God."

[ST, Q2, art. 3, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Westminster: Christian Classics, 1981)]




***As an Argument
for God's
Knowledge of
Things Other
than Himself***




Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

***"Whatever naturally
tends toward another
must have this tendency
from someone directing
it toward its end;
otherwise, it would tend
toward it merely by
chance.***




Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

"Now, in the things of nature we find a natural appetite by which each and every things tends toward its end.




Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

"Hence, we must affirm the existence of some intellect above natural things, which has ordained natural things to their end and implanted in them a natural appetite or inclination.



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)


"But a thing cannot be ordained to any end unless the thing itself is known, together with the end to which it is ordained."



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

"Hence, there must be a knowledge of natural things in the divine intellect from which the origin and the order of nature come."

[*On Truth (de veritate)*, Q 2, art. 3, trans. Robert W. Mulligan (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), Vol. 1, p. 70]



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

"Ethical naturalists, such as Thomas Aquinas (1225-74), claim that the moral properties of persons and situations depend on their nature. If so, moral qualities do not presuppose a God, though a perfectly wise and good God **would approve all and only good and right things**. Naturalism does not itself preclude God from playing an **epistemic role in morality (telling us reliably what is morally good and bad) or a motivational role (providing divine incentives for moral behavior)**. But naturalism does deny theism a **metaphysical role**.

[Brink, "Autonomy," in *Cambridge Companion*, 152]

Brink goes on to assert (again, without any argument) that a good God "would approve all and only good and right things," that God might play an epistemological role in morality, and perhaps God could play a motivational role.

"Ethical naturalists, such as Thomas Aquinas (1225-74), claim that the moral properties of persons and situations depend on their nature. If so, moral qualities do not presuppose a God, though a perfectly wise and good God would approve all and only good and right things. Naturalism does not itself preclude God from playing an epistemic role in morality (telling us reliably what is morally good and bad) or a motivational role (providing divine incentives for moral behavior). **But naturalism does deny theism a metaphysical role.**

[Brink, "Autonomy," in *Cambridge Companion*, 152]

But it is manifestly false that for Aquinas "naturalism does deny theism a metaphysical role."

Note that my point here is not that Aquinas's view is true (though I think that it is).

Rather, my point is that Brink is wrong in concluding that the ethical naturalism of Aquinas (bearing in mind the meaning of 'naturalism' here) denies theism "a metaphysical role."

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Last, Brink's discussion suffers from the anachronistic usage of the notion of "moral properties" coupled with the notion of "good" in as much as he fails (as many other contemporary analytic philosophers do) to distinguish 'moral good' and 'good' in the context of Aquinas's understanding of the convertibility of being and good.

On the Euthyphro Dilemma: Being and Goodness



David O. Brink

"To determine whether morality requires a religious foundation, we need to distinguish three different roles God might play in morality. God plays a metaphysical role in morality if the existence and nature of moral requirements depend on his existence and will. On such a view, it is God's attitudes toward various courses of action that makes them good or bad and right or wrong."

[David O. Brink, "The Autonomy of Ethics," in *Cambridge Companion*, 150]





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[David O. Brink, "The Autonomy of Ethics," in *Cambridge Companion*, 150]

Note that Brink moves from the role being metaphysical to the role being attitudinal. With this, Brink is attempting to convert the question of any metaphysical role God might play into a "Euthyphro" role.

This allows him to then critique the question along the contours of the Euthyphro Dilemma.



***A dilemma is a choice
between two options:***

*either when both options are desirable
but only one **can** be chosen ...*




*or when both options are less than desirable and one **must** be chosen.*




When there are only two possible choices, then it is a true dilemma.

When there are only two possible choices, then it is a true dilemma.

If a dilemma is passed off as a true dilemma when in fact there is a third (or more) option, then this is a false dilemma.




*The name
'Euthyphro'
comes from the
title of a dialogue
written by Plato.*



Plato
(428-348 BC)


*Socrates meets
Euthyphro along
the way heading
to court to
prosecute his
own father for
murder.*



Plato
(428-348 BC)

"So, in the name of heaven, tell me now about the matter you just felt sure you know quite thoroughly. State what you take piety [εὐσεβές, eusebes] and impiety [ἀσεβές, asebes] to be with reference to murder and all other cases. Is not the holy [ὅσιον, hosion] always one and the same in thing in every action, and, again, is not the unholy [ἀνόσιον, anosion] always opposite to the holy, and like itself? And as unholiness does it not always have its one essential form [ἰδέαν, idean], which will be found in everything that is unholy? ... Then tell me. How do you define the holy [ὅσιον, hosion] and the unholy [ἀνόσιον, anosion]?"


[*Euthyphro*, 5d, trans. Lane Cooper (© 1941) in *Plato: The Collected Dialogues*, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962), 173]



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
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
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
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
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
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
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

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


Socrates
(d. 399 BC)




"Well, bear in mind that what I asked of you was not to tell me one or two out of all the numerous actions that are holy; I wanted you to tell me what is the essential form of holiness which makes all holy actions holy. ... Show me what, precisely, this ideal is."

[*Euthyphro*, 6d, trans. Cooper]



Socrates
(d. 399 BC)



Euthyphro
(?-?)

"Well, then, what is pleasing to the gods is holy, and what is not pleasing to them is unholy."

[*Euthyphro*, 6e, trans. Cooper]

"Is what is holy, holy because the gods approve it, or do they approve it because it is holy?"

[*Euthyphro*, 10a, trans. Cooper]



Socrates
(d. 399 BC)

In its contemporary version, the Euthyphro Dilemma asks:

Is X good because God wills X

or

does God will X because X is good?



*Sometimes the Euthyphro
Dilemma is worded:*

*Is X good because God commands X
or
does God command X because X is good?*

*These two options seem
to be exhaustive.*

*The Euthyphro is usually offered as
a true dilemma.*

*Since neither option is desirable,
the options are sometimes regarded as
the "horns" of the dilemma.*



Is X good because God wills it?
This option has come to be known as
the
Divine Command Theory.


Note that some use the expression
'Divine Command Theory' as
referring, not to what makes some
action good, but what makes the
action obligatory.

Suggested Problems with the First Horn

First, if X is good because God wills it, then this would seem to mean that God could make something good by willing or commanding it.

Thus, if God willed rape (or racism, or murder, or any other sin) then it would be good.


Second, if X is good because God wills it, then this would make the statement "God's will is good" to be "God's will is what God wills" which is an empty claim; what philosophers call "trivially true."




*The second option says God wills X
because X is good.*

Suggested Problems with the Second Horn

This seems to imply a standard of good that is outside of and above God.



*Good is ultimately grounded
in the nature of God.*



David W. Richardson, Jr.

"'Good' is literally who God is in His person and character. Good is a person. ... When ... people say 'God is good' ... it means far more than God does good things or God is good to us. They mean that God's very nature is good. ...

David W. Richardson, Jr.


*"What makes something good is not that God commanded it, or even that he had it written in the Bible. It goes much deeper: what makes something good is because that's who God is in His unchanging nature. ... **He is the definition of good.**"*

[David W. Richardson, Jr. *Transparent: How to See Through the Powerful Assumptions that Control You* (Franklin: Clovercroft, 2016), 73, 74]

David W. Richardson, Jr.

Is There a Problem with the Third Option?

However, the problem of being trivially true and empty of moral content which we saw regarding the First Horn seems to remain.




There is a difference between "the order of knowing" and "the order of being"

There is a difference between "the order of knowing" and "the order of being"

The map is first in the order of knowing.



SES is first in the order of being.

*In other words, one would need to know what the word 'good' means before one can apply the word to God, **but God has to exist before there can be "good."***



What Is Evil?


In contemporary discussions on the Problem of Evil, evil usually has to do with pain, suffering, and death.



While utilizing this definition in certain contexts, the Classical / Thomistic tradition will largely understand evil in terms of the metaphysics.


If God created everything except Himself, and, if evil is something, then it would seem the God created evil.

***If God did not create evil,
then it would seem either:
evil is unreal
or
evil is not a thing.***




Augustine
(354-430)

There is a
difference
between:
being nothing
(unreal)
and
not being a thing.





Augustine
(354-430)

Augustine argued that evil is real but is not a thing. Rather, it is a **privation** or a **lack** in things.



Augustine
(354-430)





Augustine
(354-430)


“Evil is only the privation of a good.”

[*Confessions*, III, 7, §12]

The image features a portrait of Augustine of Hippo on the left, wearing a mitre and holding a book. On the right, a quote is displayed in white text against a dark background with a faint cross pattern. Below the quote is a small reference to his work 'Confessions'.

“Now evil is in a substance because something which it was originally to have, and which it ought to have, is lacking in it.”

[*Summa Contra Gentiles*, III, 6, §1]




Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

The image features a quote on the left against a yellow background. On the right is a portrait of Thomas Aquinas, a Dominican friar, holding a book and a quill. Below the portrait is his name and dates.

“Evil is simply a privation of something which a subject is entitled by its origin to possess and which it ought to have.”


[*Summa Contra Gentiles*, III, 7, §2]



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

“Evil is the absence of the good, which is natural and due to a thing.”


[*Summa Theologiae*, I, Q49, art. 1]



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

“Evil cannot exist by itself, since it has no essence... Therefore, evil must be in a subject.”

[*Summa Contra Gentiles*, III, 11, §2]



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

Note that there is a difference between a **privation** and a **negation**.

A **negation** is the mere absence or removal of something.

A **privation** is the absence or removal of something that "ought" to be there.



privation

A rock cannot see, but it is not blind because it "ought" not be able to see.

Blindness is the privation of sight. But blindness is not a thing in itself.



negation




privation

**Blindness is the displacement of sight.
But blindness is not a thing in itself.**

A rock cannot see, but it is not blind because it "ought" not be able to see.



negation




**'Good' and 'Being'
Are Convertible
Terms**

1. 'Good' is first identified with 'desirable' (appetible).
2. 'Desirable' is identified with 'perfect'.

"Now it is clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for all desire their own perfection."

(ST1, Q5, art. 1)




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(1225-1274)


1. 'Good' is first identified with 'desirable' (appetible).
2. 'Desirable' is identified with 'perfect'.
3. 'Perfect' is identified with 'act' or 'actuality'.

"Everything is perfect so far as it is actual."

(ST1, Q5, art. 1)




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(1225-1274)




Joseph Owens
(1908-2005)

"An alternate word for actuality in this respect is "perfection" (entelecheia). It was used by Aristotle along with actuality to designate the formal elements in the things.



Joseph Owens
(1908-2005)

"These perfected the material element in the sense of filling its potentiality and completing the thing.



Joseph Owens
(1908-2005)

"Since existence is required to complete the thing and all the formal elements and activities, it may be aptly called the perfection of all perfections."

[An Interpretation of Existence (Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1968), 52-53]

perfection

(entelecheia, ἐντελέχεια)

en, ἐν = in

+

telos, τέλος = end, goal

+

echein, ἔχειν = to have


perfection

(entelecheia, ἐντελέχεια)

to have the end or goal in


1. 'Good' is first identified with 'desirable' (appetible).
2. 'Desirable' is identified with 'perfect'.
3. 'Perfect' is identified with 'act' or 'actuality'.
4. 'Actuality' is identified with 'being'.

"Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only in idea; which is clear from the following argument. The essence of goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable. Hence the Philosopher says [Ethic. i]: 'Goodness is what all desire.'



"Now is it clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for all desire their own perfection. But everything is perfect so far as it is actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect so far as it exists; for it is existence that makes all things actual, as is clear from the foregoing [Q. 3, A. 4; Q. 4, A. 1]. Hence it is clear that goodness and being are the same reality."

[ST1, Q5, art. 1]



A full exploration of how it is that 'being' and 'good' are convertible (which is to say that 'being' and 'good' are really the same) requires an examination of the Medieval doctrine of the Transcendentals.

New Scholasticism 59 (1985): 449-470

The Convertibility of Being and Good in St. Thomas Aquinas

by Jan A. Aertsen

IN MANY medieval thinkers, e.g. Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, the statement can be found: "being and good are convertible" (*ens et bonum convertuntur*).¹ That is to say, "being" and "good" are interchangeable terms in predication (*converti enim est concernim predicari*).² Wherever "being" is predicated of something, the predicate "good" is involved as well.

That must imply that "good" is here not a concept that adds a real content or a new quality to "being", as a result of which "being" is restricted. For in that case there would be no question of convertibility.³ "Good" is an attribute which pertains to every being, it is a property of being as such, a "mode that is common, and consequent upon every being."⁴ In other words, "good" is coextensive with "being", it is one of the so-called *transcendentia*⁵ which, since Suarez, are usually referred to as "transcendentals".

¹ Alexander of Hales, *Summa I*, Inq. 1, Tract. 2, q. 2, membrum 1, c. 1, a. 1, "An idem sit bonum et ens"; Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, fundam. 5, "Ea et bonum convertuntur, sicut vult Dionysius", d. 34, a. 2, q. 3, fundam. 4; Albert the Great, *De Bonis* q. 1, a. 6; *Summa Theol.* tract. 6, q. 28; Thomas Aquinas, *In I Sent.* 8, 1, 3; *De Ver.* XXI, 2; *In De Hebdomadibus*, lect. 3; *Summa Theol.* I, 16, 2.

² Thomas Aquinas, *De Ver.* I, 2 obj. 2.



³ *De Pot.* IX, 7 ad 5: Bonum quod est in genere qualitatis, non est bonum quod convertitur cum ente, quod nullam rem supra ens addit.

⁴ *De Ver.* I, 1: modus generaliter consequens omne ens.

⁵ Comp. Albert the Great, *Summa Theologiae* tract. 6, q. 27, c. 3: Bonum dicitur intentionem communem et est de transcendentibus omne genus sicut et ens.



Jan Aertsen
1938-2016






1. 'Good' is first identified with 'desirable' (appetible).
2. 'Desirable' is identified with 'perfect'.
3. 'Perfect' is identified with 'act' or 'actuality'.
4. 'Actuality' is identified with 'being'.
5. God is goodness itself in as much as God is being itself.

"To God alone does it belong to be His own subsistent being."


[ST 1, Q 12, art. IV]



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

"God is absolute form, or rather absolute being"


[ST, I, Q3, art. 7.]



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

"God is supremely being ... He is being itself, subsistent, absolutely undetermined."


[ST 1, Q 11, art. iv.]



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

"Good belongs pre-eminently to God."

(ST 1, Q5, art. 1)



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)