




Perhaps it is not surprising that there are different views on whether or how there is any relevance for the arguments for the existence of God.


It might be surprising to some, however, that the different views do not fall along the lines of theists and non-theists. In combining the options of theists and non-theists together with the options of relevant and irrelevant we get these results.


Non-theists - irrelevant Non-theists - relevant Theists - relevant Theists - irrelevant


































	Irrele	evant	
	LOGICAL POSITIVISTS Arguments are metaphysically or linguistically meaningless.		
non-Theists	(Ludwig Wittgenstein; A. J. Ayer; Kai Nielsen) SKEPTICS Arguments are epistemologically impossible. Important philosophical doctrines are only psychologically caused.		Т
-The	(David Hume)	EVIDENTIALISTS	neists
-uor		Arguments are not strictly proofs but build a cumulative case for theism.	ts
		(William Lane Craig; Richard Swinburne)	
	Rele	vant	

















	Irrele	evant	
neists	LOGICAL POSITIVISTS Arguments are metaphysically or linguistically meaningless. (Ludwig Wittgenstein; A. J. Ayer; Kai Nielsen) SKEPTICS Arguments are epistemologically impossible. Important philosophical doctrines are only psychologically caused. (David Hume)	EXISTENTIALISTS Arguments are relatively or entirely unnecessary. They have little to nothing to do with religion. Religion is primarily experiential and non-propositional. (Søren Kierkegaard)	The
non-Theists		EVIDENTIALISTS Arguments are not strictly proofs but build a cumulative case for theism. (William Lane Craig; Richard Swinburne) THOMISTS Arguments are demonstrations. Theism is established. (Thomas Aquinas; Etienne Gilson; Joseph Owens;	eists
	Rele	Norman Geisler; Edward Feser)	

Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855)


CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT TO PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS





Søren Kierkegaard

VOLUME I Edited and Translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong with Introduction and Notes

	Irrele	evant
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heists	SKEPTICS Arguments are epistemologically impossible. Important philosophical doctrines are only psychologically caused. (David Hume)	FIDEISTS / PRESUPPOSITIONALISTS Arguments cannot establish religious first principles. Religion is not propositional (John Hick), or religion is propositional but faith is primary (Blaise Pascal), or God is transcendentally "argued" (Cornelius Van Til; Greg L. Bahnsen).
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






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		(Thomas Aquinas; Etienne Gilson; Joseph Owens; Norman Geisler; Edward Feser)	
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



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	ATHEISTS Arguments surface important philosophical issues. The evidence proves atheism. (J. L. Mackie; early Antony Flew; Theodore Drange; Michael Martin)	THOMISTS Arguments are demonstrations. Theism is established. (Thomas Aquinas; Etienne Gilson; Joseph Owens; Norman Geisler; Edward Feser)
	Rele	evant


J.L.Mackie


THE MIRACLE OF THEISM


Arguments for and against the Existence of God





















For some time, the Classical model has been known as the "two step" method.






















Intro to God's Revelation 6-Week Curriculum by Dr. Richard Howe

What does it mean for God to speak to mankind? In this six-week video study, respected philosopher and apologist Richard G. Howe teaches Christians the fundamentals of how to approach and understand their Bible in an age of skepticism. Each session contains a lecture from Dr. Howe and a short wrap-up with interview contributions from other Christian thinkers.

Perfect for Sunday school classes, small groups or individual study!

Session 1: General Revelation Session 2: Special Revelation Session 3: Inspiration Session 4: Inerrancy & Canonicity Session 5: Transmission & Translation Session 6: Interpretation & Application

Prevelation -

God making known to mankind His divine person and divine truths that would otherwise be unknown; to unveil



Revelation

God making known to mankind His divine Person and divine truths that would otherwise be unknown

Giving of the truth

Inspiration


God transferring to mankind His divine Person and divine truths through human agency into written language form for mankind to understand

Recording of the truth



God making known to mankind through His creation His existence, attributes, and goodness. The heavens declare the glory of God; and the firmament shows His handiwork. Day unto day utters speech, and night unto night reveals knowledge. There is no speech nor language where their voice is not heard. Their line has gone out through all the earth, and their words to the end of the world.

For since the creation of the world His invisible attributes are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even bis eternal power and Godhead ...



"... We also are men with the same nature as you, and preach to you that you should turn from these useless things to the living God, who made the heaven, the earth, the sea, and all things that are in them, who in bygone generations allowed all nations to walk in their own ways. Nevertheless He did not leave Himself without witness, in that He did good, gave us rain from heaven and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness." Act 14:15-17



Special Revelation s

God making known to mankind through His prophets, apostles, and His Son His nature and will that could not necessarily be known through General Revelation.




"... knowing this first, that no prophecy of Scripture is of any private interpretation, for prophecy never came by the will of man, but holy men of God spoke as they were moved by the Holy Spirit." 2 Peter 1:20-21

All Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness, that the man of God may be complete, thoroughly equipped for every good work. 2 Timothy 3:16-17 All Scripture is **given by inspiration of God**, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in-righteousness, that the man of God may be complete, thoroughly equipped for every good work. 2 Timothy 3:16-17

θεόπνευστος (theopneustos) = God breathed θεός (theos) - God πνέω, πνεῦμα (pneo, pneuma) - I breathe, breath, spirit









"I really wasn't sure where to turn. Where science offered exciting proofs of its claims, whether it was photos, equations, visible evidence, religion was a lot more demanding. It constantly wanted me to accept everything on faith. As I'm sure you're aware, faith takes a fair amount of effort."



Faith	Reason
opinion	truth
values	facts
inner	outer
private	public
emotional	rational
feelings	thoughts
subjective	objective
religion	science
true for me	true for all





"Religious faith is the belief in historical and metaphysical propositions without sufficient evidence."

[Sam Harris. The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), 232]



"Faith is the mortar that fills the cracks in the evidence and the gaps in the logic, and thus it is faith that keeps the whole terrible edifice of religious certainty still looming dangerously over our world."

[Harris, The End of Faith, 233]



Richard Dawkins


The GOD Delusion


Richard Dawkins

Richard Dawkins

"Faith is an evil precisely because it requires no justification and brooks no argument."

[Richard Dawkins, *The God Delusion* (Boston: Haughton Mifflin, 2006), 308]





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
The GOD Delusion


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
[Richard Dawkins, *The God Delusion* (Boston: Haughton Mifflin, 2006), 308]






"As regards the kind of belief: it is thought virtuous to have Faith that is to say, to have a conviction which cannot be shaken by contrary evidence. Or, if contrary evidence might induce doubt, it is held that contrary evidence must be suppressed."

[Bertrand Russell, *Why I Am Not a Christian and Other Essays on Religion and Related Subjects*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957), from the preface, p. vi]






George H. Smith

"Reason and faith are opposite, two mutually exclusive terms: there is no reconciliation or common ground. Faith is belief without, or in spite of reason."


[George H. Smith, *Atheism: The Case Against God* (Buffalo: Prometheus, 1979), 98]






"Cases of faith are instances of pretending to know something you don't know."


[Peter Boghossian, *A Manual for Creating Atheists* (Durham: Pitchstone, 2013), 24]







If one occupies oneself with real theology one can pass by so-called natural theology only as one would pass by an abyss into which it is inadvisable to step if one does not want to fall. All one can do is to turn one's back upon it as upon the great temptation and source or error, by having nothing to do with it ... "

[Karl Barth, "No!" trans. Peter Fraenkel, in *Natural* Theology: Comprising "Nature and Grace" by Professor Dr. Emil Brunner and the Reply "No!" by Dr. Karl Barth (Eugene: Wipf and Stock: 2002), 75]









"Reason and fact cannot be brought into fruitful union with one another except upon the presupposition of the existence of God and his control over the universe."

[Cornelius Van Til, *A Christian Theory of Knowledge* (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, 1975), 18]






Jason Lisle

"We all have the same evidence; but in order to draw conclusions about what the evidence means we use our worldview our most basic beliefs about the nature of reality. ... Ultimately, biblical creationists accept the recorded history of the Bible as their starting point."


[Jason Lisle, "Can Creationists Be 'Real' Scientists?" in Gary Vaterlaus, ed., *War of the Worldviews: Powerful Answers for an* "Evolutionized" Culture (Hebron: Answers in Genesis, 2005), 124, 125]





Jason Lisle


"Faith is a prerequisite for reason. In order to reason about anything we must have faith that there are laws of logic which correctly prescribe the correct chain of reasoning. Since laws of logic cannot be observed with the senses, our confidence in them is a type of faith."

[Jason Lisle, "Faith and Reason," https://answersingenesis.org/apologetics/faith-vs-reason/, accessed 09/22/17]












"This ... points ... to the postmodern conclusion that we deal with 'interpreted facts.' ...







Believing something on the basis of demonstration. Believing something on the basis of authority.

Faith





Fermat's equation: $X^{n} + y^{n} = Z^{n}$ This equation has no solutions in integers for $n \ge 3$.



Annals of Mathematics, 142 (1995), 443-551

Modular elliptic curves and Fermat's Last Theorem

By ANDREW WILES*

For Nada, Clare, Kate and Olivia

Cubum autem in duos cubos, aut quadratoquadratum in duos quadra-toquadratos, et generaliter nullam in infinitum ultra quadratum potestatem in duos cipustem nominis fas est dividere: cujus rei demonstrationem mirabilem sane detexi. Hanc marginis esiguitas non caperet.

Introduction

An elliptic curve over \mathbf{Q} is said to be modular if it has a finite covering by a modular curve of the form $X_0(N)$. Any such elliptic curve has the property that its Hasse-Well zeta function has an analytic continuation and satisfies a functional equation of the standard type. If an elliptic curve over \mathbf{Q} with a nuccional equation oi tne standard type. If an emptic curve over Q with a given *j*-invariant is modular then it is easy to see that all elliptic curves with the same *j*-invariant are modular (in which case we say that the *j*-invariant is modular). A well-known conjecture which grew out of the work of Shimmra and Taniyama in the 1905 same 1960's asserts that every elliptic curves over a modular. However, it only became widely known through its publication in a function is not some function. paper of Weil in 1967 [We] (as an exercise for the interested reader!), in which paper of them in 150° (we) (as an excretise to the intersect reader), in which, moreover, Weil gave conceptual evidence for the conjecture. Although it had been numerically verified in many cases, prior to the results described in this paper it had only been known that finitely many *j*-invariants were modular.

paper is take only been known that initiaty many j-invariants were modular. In 1985 Frey made the remarkable observation that this conjecture should imply Fermat's Last Theorem. The precise mechanism relating the two was formulated by Serre as the ε -conjecture and this was then proved by Ribet in the summer of 1986. Ribet's result only requires one to prove the conjecture for semistable elliptic curves in order to deduce Fermat's Last Theorem.

"The work on this paper was supported by an NSF grant.


Reason

Faith


Believing something on the basis of demonstration. Believing something on the basis of divine authority.

"For who cannot see that thinking [reason] is prior to believing [faith]? For no one believes anything unless he has first thought that it is to be believed.


[On the Predestination of the Saints, 5, as cited in Norman L. Geisler, ed. What Augustine Says (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1982), 13]



"Those things are said to be present to the understanding which do not exceed its capacity so that the gaze of understanding may be fixed on them. For a person gives assent to such things because of the witness of his own understanding and not because of someone else's testimony.




"Those things, however, which are beyond the power of our understanding are said to be absent from the senses of the mind. Hence, our understanding cannot be fixed on them.




"As a result, we cannot assent to them on our own witness, but on that of someone else. These things are properly called the objects of faith."

[*Truth*, QXIV, Art. 9, reply, trans. James V. McGlynn (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), 249-250]




"One who believes [i.e., has faith] gives assent to things that are proposed to him by another person, and which he himself does not see."


[*Truth*, QXIV, Art. 9, reply, trans. James V. McGlynn (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), 249-250]




"Since man can only know the things that he does not see himself by taking them from another who does see them, and since faith is among the things we do not see, the knowledge of the objects of faith must be handed on by one who sees them himself. Now, this one is God, Who perfectly comprehends Himself, and naturally sees His essence."

[SCG, 3, 154 [1], trans. Vernon J. Bourke, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press), 239]










"Therefore in reading the profane authors, the admirable light of truth displayed in them should remind us, that the human mind, however much fallen and perverted from its original integrity, is still adorned and invested with admirable gifts from its Creator."


[*Institutes of the Christian Religion*,2.2.15, trans. Henry Beveridge, (Grand Rapids: William B. Erdmans), 236]









[John Owen, "The Reason of Faith," in *The Works of John Owen*, vol. 4, (Edinburgh: The Banner of Truth Trust, 1967), 20]





"Men that will not listen to Scripture ... cannot easily deny natural reason There is a natural as well as a revealed knowledge, and the book of the creatures is legible in declaring the being of a God"

[Stephen Charnock, *Discourses upon the Existence and Attributes of God* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1979), 27.]




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
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


"God in regard of his existence is not only the discovery of faith, but of reason. God hath revealed not only his being, but some sparks of his eternal power and godhead in his works, as well as in his works, as well as in his word. ... It is a discovery of our reason ... and an object of our faith ... it is an article of our faith and an article of our reason."


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














































The legacy of Van Til endures primarily in the reformed camp of American Christian evangelicalism.











The conventional view is that Van Til's approach in apologetics marked a shift from the standard methodology of apologetics that had dominated conservative reformed thought in America in late nineteenth and on into the twentieth centuries by the old Princeton Theological Seminary.





Scottish Common Sense Realism

"If there are certain principles, as I think there are, which the constitution of our nature leads us to believe, and which we are under a necessity to take for granted in the common concerns of life, without being able to give a reason for them — these are what we call the principles of common sense; and what is manifestly contrary to them, is what we call absurd."

[Thomas Reid, Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense I, \S 6]







The 'presupposition' in the name Presuppositionalism does not mean that the method merely identifies and analyzes presuppositions.


This would make Presuppositionalism no different than Classical Apologetics. In Van Til's estimation, the methodology of Presuppositionalism was necessitated by Reformed theology, particularly the doctrines of the sovereignty of God and the total depravity of the human race.

Van Til denied that there was a common ground between the believer and unbeliever on which a neutral argument for the truth of Christianity could be built. He argued that to assume an intellectual common ground between the believer and unbeliever from which the believer could launch into a rational argument for God's existence, is de facto to deny the God of Christianity.

Van Til insisted that one must presuppose the Triune God and the Christian Scriptures before any sense can be made of anything else. Another way to say this is that the presupposition of Triune God and the Christian Scriptures are the necessary pre-conditions of knowledge.

"This is, in the last analysis, the question as to what are one's ultimate presuppositions. When man became a sinner he made of himself instead of God the ultimate or final reference point. "And it is precisely this presupposition, as it controls without exception all forms of non-Christian philosophy, that must be brought into question. ...


"In not challenging this basic presupposition with respect to himself as the final reference point in predication the natural man may accept the 'theistic proofs' as fully valid.



" He may construct such proofs. He has constructed such proofs. But the god whose existence he proves to himself in this way is always a god who is something other than the self-contained ontological trinity of Scripture."


[The Defense of the Faith (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, 1979), 77]

Sometimes the Presuppositionalist will refer to his method as a transcendental argument because the presupposition of the Triune God and the Christian Scriptures are "transcendentally necessary" for knowledge.




"The only 'proof' of the Christian position is that unless its truth is presupposed there is no possibility of 'proving' anything at all. The actual state of affairs as preached by Christianity is the necessary foundation of 'proof' itself."

["My Credo" in *Jerusalem and Athens: Critical Discussions on the Philosophy and Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til* (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1971), 21]




For Y to be transcendentally necessary for X means (in this context) that in order to know X, you have to posit, or assume, or presuppose Y.


An example (though not an altogether uncontroversial example in this debate) would be that logic is transcendentally necessary for there to be any knowledge at all.



"Often enough we [who believe in God] have talked with you [who do not believe in God] about facts and sound reasons as though we agreed with you on what these really are.





"In our arguments for the existence of God we have frequently assumed that you and we together have an area of knowledge on which we agree.





"But we really do not grant that you see any fact in any dimension of life truly. We really think you have colored glasses on your nose when you talk about chickens and cows, as well as when you talk about the life hereafter."

[Why I Believe in God (Philadelphia: Westminster Theological Seminary, n.d.), 9]












"Without the presupposition of the truth of Christian theism no fact can be distinguished from any other fact."

[The *Defense of the Faith*, (Phillipsburgh: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1979), 115]










"As Christians we must not allow that even such a thing as enumeration or counting can be accounted for except upon the presupposition of truth of what we are told in Scripture about the triune God as the Creator and Redeemer of the world."


["Response by Cornelius Van Til to Herman Dooyeweerd, 'Cornelius Van Til and the Transcendental Critique of Theoretical Thought" in Jerusalem and Athens: Critical Discussions on the Philosophy and Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1971), 91, emphasis in original]





"Christian apologists often speak of scientism as being objectionable but of science as being innocent with respect to the claims of Christianity. But surely this cannot be the case.






Strengths of Presuppositionalism


A Strong Stance on the Authority of Scripture


A Strong View of the Inerrancy of Scripture

A Strong Emphasis on the Integration of Theology and Apologetics


Problems with Presuppositionalism









Quodlibetal Blog Musings from Anywhere by Dr. Richard G. Howe	
It's Worse Than I Thought try quod liberalibiog	Pages
Over the past year or so, a colleague of mine has been telling me of his concerns about how Presuppositionalism (or some watered-down version thereof) infuses the thinking of	 About
certain popular Young-Earth Creationists if not Young-Earth Creationism in general.	Categories
Though he himself is an Old-Earth creationist, he came to me with his concerns because, being a Classical Apologist, he knows that I am both a classical apologist and a Young-	Archived
Farth Creationist. Annarontly we are a small group	 Uncategorized



"All versions of the gap theory impose outside ideas on Scripture and thus open the door for further compromise."









"Presuppositional apologetics is the method of defending the Christian faith that relies on the Bible as the supreme authority in all matters. ... I will show below that it is logically inescapable that indeed the Bible must be the ultimate standard even when evaluating its own claims. ... For the presuppositionalist, the Bible is the ultimate standard for all things, even its own defense."

[Jason Lisle, "Young Earth Presuppositionalism," in *Christian Research Journal* 11, No. 2, (Fall 2013): 65, emphasis in original]

Jason Lisle






"When someone 'reinterprets' the clear meaning of the words to accommodate outside notions, it simply means he does not believe the words."

[Old -Earth Creationism on Trial: The Verdict is In (Green Forest: Master Books, 2010), 110-111]





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
They are confusing

using "outside ideas" to interpret the Bible with using "outside ideas" to judge the Bible.



"Then Joshua spoke to the LORD in the day when the LORD delivered up the Amorites before the children of Israel, and he said in the sight of Israel: 'Sun, stand still over Gibeon; And Moon, in the Valley of Aijalon.' So the sun stood still, and the moon stopped, till the people had revenge upon their enemies."


Joshua 10:12-13 NKJV



"When someone 'reinterprets' the clear meaning of the words to accommodate outside notions, it simply means he does not believe the words."

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"Supporters often used a hyper-literal reading of Joshua 10:12-13 to buttress their position [of geocentricism]. However, it is quite obvious that Joshua was simply using observational language."

[Old -Earth Creationism on Trial: The Verdict is In (Green Forest: Master Books, 2010), 62]





"When someone 'reinterprets' the clear meaning of the words to accommodate outside notions, it simply means he does not believe the words."



It is only "quite obvious" to us today precisely because of the development of the science since the 17th Century.





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



Thus, it is because of the science since the 17th Century that we "reinterpret" the "clear meaning of the words" "accommodate" the "outside notions".



















This is a troublesome conception of Christian philosophy. ... The philosopher is placed in the privileged position of laying down for the exegete how the Bible may and may not be used, how its teaching must be broadly conceived, and what the Bible can and cannot say. ... Philosophy is thereby rendered rationally autonomous"


[Van Til's Apologetic: Readings and Analysis (Phillipsburg: P&R, 1998), 50]



The deadly assumption here is that some philosophical reasoning is possible or intelligible for the unbeliever without presupposing the Christian worldview. That makes philosophical reasoning autonomous after all, and the apologetical case is lost from the very start."


[Van Til's Apologetic, 50]





"... philosophy is essential is establishing the foundation for dealing with unbelievers who might bring up certain challenges, including the challenge that truth is not objective or the challenge that only the natural sciences are the source of truth about reality."

[Christian Apologetics Journal 11:2 (Fall 2013): 8]



"But if the Lord commands all of His people to be ready to defend their Christian faith, it is difficult to see how Howe's 'first level' can obtain. ... His point is that 'philosophy is essential in establishing the foundation for dealing with unbelievers ...' (8). But that surely cannot be the case."

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"What Howe's 'first level' of apologetic methodology does, therefore, is establish an elite group of academics and intellectuals who alone can protect the rest of us from the challenges and objections that are brought against our faith."

[Christian Apologetics Journal 11:2 (Fall 2013): 8]





A child can know what a flower is. She knows that a flower is not a person.



However, to delve deeper into the physical nature of a flower, one would need to understand botany.



To delve deeper still, one would need to understand chemistry (to understand, e.g., photosynthesis).




And to delve deeper still, one would need to understand physics.

Suppose we wanted to account for a number of other aspects of the flower and the person.



What makes a flower a flower and what makes a person a person are their respective natures. **Metaphysics**







We value the person over the flower because of the different kinds of things they are. **Ethics**




We insist that others value the person over the flower and hold them accountable when they do not. **Political Philosophy**







We know that neither the flower nor the person can account for their own existence but are created by God. **Philosophy of Religion**











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1 -	11:7; Jas. 3:9)	
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	Heb. 1:10; Rev. 5:1-	7) (Num.
	12:8) (Isa. 30:27)	
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	18:24; 33:18) (Ps. 18:6)	
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
"And they heard the sound of the LORD God walking in the garden in the cool of the day,


and Adam and his wife hid themselves from the presence of the LORD God among the trees of the garden." Gen. 3:8 "God is Spirit, and those who worship Him must worship in spirit and truth." John 4:24





"For since the creation of the world His invisible attributes are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead ..." Rom. 1:20a




















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







"We must avoid the idea that human reason exists as a known and definable entity apart from God so that we may begin from it as from an ultimate starting point."

In Defense of the Faith, Vol. V: An Introduction to Systematic Theology, p. 21



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In Defense of the Faith, Vol. V: An Introduction to Systematic Theology, p. 21 It is a point about being, not about knowing.

Because of this, Van Til's point is not about Presuppositionalism at all, but, instead, collapses into the classical cosmological argument.


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In Defense of the Faith, Vol. V: An Introduction to Systematic Theology, p. 21

What Van Till said

What Van Till should have said to be Presuppositional "We must avoid the idea that human reason exists as a known and definable entity apart from the conception of God so that we may begin from it as from an ultimate starting point."

In Defense of the Faith, Vol. V: An Introduction to Systematic Theology, p. 21



"The Reformed apologist assumes that nothing can be know by man about himself or the universe unless God exists and Christianity is true."

[The *Defense of the Faith*, (Phillipsburgh: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1979), 223]




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
Again, this is an ontological point, not an epistemological one.


As with the previous example, because of this, Van Til's point is not about Presuppositionalism at all, but, instead, collapses into the classical cosmological argument.



"The only 'proof' of the Christian position is that unless its truth is presupposed there is no possibility of 'proving' anything at all. The actual state of affairs as preached by Christianity is the necessary foundation of 'proof' itself."

["My Credo" in *Jerusalem and Athens: Critical Discussions on the Philosophy and Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til* (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1971), 21]





unless its truth is presupposed there is no possibility of proving' anything at all actual state of affairs


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
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The difference is between "the truth" (ontological) and "presupposing the truth" (epistemological).







"Now RC is saying that he wants to start with epistemology and move to ontology, or metaphysics. Let's just start with the law of non-contradiction, the basic reliability of sense perception and the law of causality. And from those epistemological platforms, from that platform, move to the existence of God.



"What I want to say is you can't begin even with that platform if you don't already have the existence of God. And that's not an ontological statement because we would agree ontologically that there wouldn't be any logic or sense experience if God hadn't created the world and was a coherent God.




"I am making an epistemological point— that it doesn't even make sense to use mathematics or empiricism or natural science of any sort without already knowing that there is a God that is the context in which interpretation and predication is possible. That's the transcendental argument, saying that the precondition of intelligibility and knowledge is already the existence of God. And that does not purport to be a probable argument for God's existence but a certain argument, a necessary argument, an inescapable argument."



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"The transcendental argument preserves the logically primitive and absolute character of God's existence by starting with the premise that God's existence is a necessary precondition for argument itself. In this way argument is made to depend upon God, rather than vice versa, since argument is possible if and only if God's existence is true from the outset of the argument itself."


[Don Collett, "Van Til and Transcendental Argument," in *Revelation and Reason: New Essays in Reformed Apologetics*, eds. K. Scott Oliphint and Lane G. Tipton (Phillipsburg: P&R, 2007): 261]




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
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






"But we really do not grant that you see any fact in any dimension of life truly. We really think you have colored glasses on your nose when you talk about chickens and cows, as well as when you talk about the life hereafter."


[Why I Believe in God (Philadelphia: Westminster Theological Seminary, n.d.), 9]













The traditional approach does not challenge the autonomy of the natural man's thinking, but naively assumes that his experience and understanding of causal relations is intelligible. If everything has a cause, it is argued, then he should admit that this world also has a cause—which can only be God."

[Van Til's Apologetic: Readings and Analysis (Phillipsburg: P&R, 1998), 617, 618]




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


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
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
Traditional formulations of the cosmological proof for God's existence have always been, as autonomously conceived and interpreted, philosophically embarrassing.



How should we understand the fundamental premise in the cosmological argument, 'Everything has a cause' (or 'Every object has an origin,' or, better 'Every even has a cause')?




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
If this is taken as a universal metaphysical principle ... then the embarrassing conclusion reached by the apologist would be that God too has a cause or origin."

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


"Everything had a cause, and every cause is the effect of a previous cause. Something must have started it all. God ... is the eternal first cause ... the creator and sustainer of the universe.




"The major premise of this argument 'everything had a cause,' is contradicted by the conclusion that 'God did not have a cause.' You can't have it both ways. If everything had to have a cause, then there could not be a first cause."

[Dan Barker, Godless: How an Evangelical Preacher Became One of America's Leading Atheists (Berkeley: Ulysses Press, 2008), 113-114]




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
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
"Every existing thing has a cause, and every cause must be caused by a prior cause, which in turn must be caused by a still prior cause, and so on, until we reach one of two conclusions: (a) either we have an endless chain of causes—an infinite regress, or (b) there exists a first cause, a being that does not require a causal explanation.

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"Everything that exists has a cause; space and time exist; space and time must, therefore, have been caused by something that stands outside of space and time, and the only thing that transcends space and time, and yet retains the power to create, is God."


[Sam Harris, *Letter to a Christian Nation* (New York: Vintage Books, 2008), 72]




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







"The Cosmological Argument, which in its simplest form states that since everything must have a cause the universe must have a cause—namely, God—doesn't stay simple for long."

[Daniel C. Dennett, *Breaking the Spell*, (New York: Penguin Group, 2006), 242]




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