


## > Uses of the Term 'Faith' ←


- COMMON: synonymous with the term 'religion', e.g., the Christian faith
- THEOLOGICAL: theological virtue, "... for by grace are you saved through faith ..." (Eph. 2:8)
- EPISTEMOLOGICAL: relevant to how we come to know reality and hold certain beliefs


## > Uses of the Term 'Reason' ←

- ➤ GENERAL: "the generic capacity to think about any topic at al or even the capacity to grasp a concept or make a judgment"<sup>1</sup>
- CLASSICALLY: "the ability one has to think philosophically and to engage in philosophical argument according to those truths that are now by the natural light of reason."2

1Craig A. Boyd, "The Synthesis of Reason and Faith Response" in *Faith and Reason: Three Views* (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 129. 2 Boyd, "Synthesis," p. 129.











"I really wasn't sure where to turn. Where science offered exciting proofs of its claims, whether it was photos, equations, visible evidence, religion was a lot more demanding. It constantly wanted me to accept everything on faith.


As I'm sure you're aware, faith takes a fair amount of effort."

Dan Brown

"I really wasn't sure where to turn. Where science offered Do we as Christians exciting proof laims, IIS maintain that whether as pho Christianity (as a equations sible evid œ, religion) wants religion was a lot m one to "accept demanding. It constant) anted everything on me to accept everything on faith. faith"? As I'm sure you're aware, faith takes a fair amount of effort."








"Religious faith is the belief in historical and metaphysical propositions without sufficient evidence."


[Sam Harris, The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), 232]





"Faith is the mortar that fills the cracks in the evidence and the gaps in the logic, and thus it is faith that keeps the whole terrible edifice of religious certainty still looming dangerously over our world."














"As regards the kind of belief: it is thought virtuous to have Faith—that is to say, to have a conviction which cannot be shaken by contrary evidence. Or, if contrary evidence might induce doubt, it is held that contrary evidence must be suppressed."


[Bettrand Russell, Why I Am Not a Christian and Officer Essays on Religion and Related Subjects, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957), from the


preface, p. vi]















## Neil deGrasse Tyson on Religion and Faith


















## Neil deGrasse Tyson on God











Notice the ad hominem / straw man fallacy. The argument Christian apologists are making has nothing to do with the existence of any "bearded man."

Imagine how offended Tyson would be if a Christian tried to refute evolution with the silly argument "if humans evolved from monkeys, why are there still monkeys!?"

Christians no more contend for the existence of a "bearded man" than evolutionists contend that humans evolved from monkeys. "I have no problems if, as we probe the origins of things, we bump up into the bearded man. If that shows up, we're good to go. Not a problem. There's just no evidence of it.

Unfortunately Tyson may very well have engaged Christians who have the view that the Christian notion of 'faith' means believing in something in the absence of evidence.

"And this is why religions are called faith, collectively.
Because you believe something in the absence of evidence. That's what it is.
That's why it's called faith.
Otherwise, we'd call all religions 'evidence'. But we don't for exactly that reason."

Granted Tyson may very well have engaged Christians who have the view that the Christian notion of 'faith' means believing in something in the absence of evidence.

I hope to show that the classical / traditional view of faith says no such thing.


As a scholar, Tyson should have taken the time to try to understand the best and strongest version of the Christian notion of faith before he tried to give any critique.


"And this is why religions are called faith, collectively.


Because you believe something in the absence of evidence. That's what it is.

That's why it's called faith.


Otherwise, we'd call all religions 'evidence'. But we don't for exactly that reason."







"If one occupies oneself with real theology one can pass by so-called natural theology only as one would pass by an abyss into which it is inadvisable to step if one does not want to fall. All one can do is to turn one's back upon it as upon the great temptation and source of error, by having nothing to do with it ... " [Karl Barth, "No!" trans. Peter Fraenkel, in Natural Theology: Comprising "Nature and Grace" by Professor Dr. Emil Brunner and the Reply "Not" by Dr. Karl Barth (Eugene: Wipi and Stock: 2002), 75]



"If one occupies oneself with real theology one can pass by so-called natural theology only as one would pass by an abyss into which it is inadvisable to step if one does not want to fall. All one can do is to turn one's back upon it as upon the great temptation and source of error, by having nothing to do with it ... "

Theology: Computating "Nature and Grase" by Professor Dr. Emil Brunner and the Reply "No!" by Dr. Karl Barth (Eugene: Wipi and Stock: 2002), 75] Natural Theology arises from God's General Revelation.


General Revelation: God's revelation of His existence and certain attributes to mankind through His creation.


Special Revelation: God's revelation of Himself through His prophets and apostles and ultimate through His taking on human nature in the Incarnation in Jesus Christ.





"For of what use would be the purest theology based on grace and revelation to me if I dealt with the subjects of grace and revelation in the way in which natural theology usually deals with it soi-disant data derived from reason, nature and history ...?"

[Karl Barth, "Not" trans. Peter Freenkel, in Natural Theology: Comprising "Nature and Greee" by Professor Dr. Emil Brunner and the Reply "Not" by Dr. Karl Barth (Eugene: Wipf and Stock: 2002), 77]













"Reason and fact cannot be brought into fruitful union with one another except upon the presupposition of the existence of God and his control over the universe."


[Cornelius Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, 1975), 18]
















































"Postmodernism stresses the distinction between objectivity of facts, versus objectivity of knowledge or people. It accepts the possible existence of facts outside human context, but argues that all knowledge is mediated by an individual and that the experiences, biases, beliefs, and identity of that individual necessarily influence how they mediate any knowledge."

[Dan McGee, "Truth and Postmodernism" downloaded from https://medium.com/@danmcgee/truth-and-postmodernism-816ea9b3007a, 05/09/22]





"Postmodernism stresses the distinction between objectivity of facts, versus objectivity of knowledge or people. It accepts the possible existence of facts outside human context, but argues that all knowledge is mediated by an individual and that the experiences, biases, beliefs, and identity of that individual necessarily influence how they mediate any


Dan McGee, "Truth and Postmodernism" downloaded from https://medium.com/@danncgee/truth-and-postmodernism

If "all knowledge is mediated" and the individual has "biases" that "necessarily influence how they mediate ANY knowledge" (emphasis added), then this would be true of Dan McGee and the knowledge claim he is making right here.


But if this is true of Dan McGee's claim here, why should we take his claim to be objectively true?








"This ... points
... to the
postmodern
conclusion that
we deal with
'interpreted
facts.' ...












Webber: "That probably is the most distinguishing feature of the Traditionalists. They've been shaped by the Enlightenment. So they work with modern philosophy, a modern understanding of science, history, sociology. They're modernist, and so they interpret the Christian faith through these modern categories.


Webber: "And what's very interesting about Traditional Evangelicals is that the categories through which they interpret the Christian faith are almost regarded as sacred, almost as sacred as the Christian faith itself. So if you say, 'Well, I don't believe in evidential apologetics,' there's something wrong with you."


[http://www.homileticsonline.com/subscriber/interviews/webber.asp, accessed 09/05/20]











Annals of Mathematics, 142 (1995), 443-551

## Modular elliptic curves and Fermat's Last Theorem

By Andrew Wiles\*

For Nada, Clare, Kate and Olivia

Cubum autem in duos cubos, aut quadratoquadratum in duos quadratoquadratos, et generaliter nullam in infinitum ultra quadratum potestatem in duos cjusdem nominis fas est dividere: cujus rei demonstrationem mirabilem sane detexi. Hanc marijinis exiguitas non caperet.

Pierre de Fermat

## Introduction

An elliptic curve over  ${\bf Q}$  is said to be modular if it has a finite covering by a modular curve of the form  $X_0(N)$ . Any such elliptic curve has the property a modular curve of the form  $X_0(N)$ . Any such elliptic curve has the property at the its Hasses-Weil zeta function has an analytic continuation and satisfies a functional equation of the standard type. If an elliptic curve over  ${\bf Q}$  with a given j-invariant is modular then it is easy to see that all elliptic curves with the same j-invariant are modular (in which case we say that the j-invariant is modular). A well-known conjecture which grew out of the work of Shimura and Taniyama in the 1950's and 1960's asserts that every elliptic curve over  ${\bf Q}$  is modular. However, it only became widely known through its publication in a paper of Weil in 1967 [We] (as an exercise for the interested reader!), in which, moreover, Weil gave conceptual evidence for the conjecture. Although it had been numerically verified in many cases, prior to the results described in this paper it had only been known that finitely many j-invariants were modular.

oeen numericany vermed in many cases, prior to the results described in this paper it had only been known that finitely many j-invariants were modular.

In 1985 Frey made the remarkable observation that this conjecture should imply Fermat's Last Theorem. The precise mechanism relating the two was formulated by Serre as the \(\epsilon\)-conjecture and this was then proved by Ribet in the summer of 1986. Ribet's result only requires one to prove the conjecture for semistable elliptic curves in order to deduce Fermat's Last Theorem.


\*The work on this paper was supported by an NSF grant.



## Reason Faith Believing something on the basis of demonstration. Believing something on the basis of Divine authority.


"For who cannot see that thinking [reason] is prior to believing [faith]? For no one believes anything unless he has first thought that it is to be believed.

[A Treatise on the Predestination of the Saints, 5: "To Believe is to Think with Assent" https://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf105.xxi.ii.v.html, accessed 09/30/22]




"Heaven forbid, after all, that God should hate in us that by which he made us more excellent that the other animals. Heaven forbid, I say, that we should believe in such a way that we do not accept or seek a rational account, since we could not even believe if we did not have rational souls."


[Letter 120, in *Letters* 100-155 (Vol. II/2), trans. Roland Teske (Hyde Park: New City Press), p. 131]





"In certain matters, therefore, pertaining to the teaching of salvation, which we cannot grasp by reason, but which we will be able to at some point, faith precedes reason so that the heart may be purified in order that it may receive and sustain the light of the great reason, which is, of course, a demand of reason!"





[Letter 120, Teske, p. 131]


































"Men that will not listen to Scripture ... cannot easily deny natural reason .... There is a natural as well as a revealed knowledge, and the book of the creatures is legible in declaring the being of a God ...."

[Stephen Charnock, *Discourses upon the Existence and Attributes of God* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1979), 27.]



"God in regard of his existence is not only the discovery of faith, but of reason. God hath revealed not only his being, but some sparks of his eternal power and godhead in his works, as well as in his word. ... It is a discovery of our reason ... and an object of our faith ... it is an article of our faith and an article of our reason."

[Stephen Charnock, *Discourses upon the Existence and Attributes of God* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1979), 27.]



