





"What comes into our minds when we think about God is the most important thing about us."


A. W. Tozer (1897-1963)











The two camps in the debate regarding the attributes of God are often labeled Classical Theism and Theistic Personalism.


The two camps in the debate regarding the attributes of God are often labeled Classical Theism and Theistic Personalism.


In a moment, I will comment on how the term 'classical' is used in the label "Classical Theism."

I must point out that the label "Theistic Personalism" was given to this camp by its detractors.

Perhaps some, if not many, that
Classical Theists will label
"Theistic Personalists" will not
accept this title but also identify
as "Classical" in their
understanding of God's attributes.








classical attributes

characteristics of God's nature and actions known from creation and God's Word understood along the contours of the categories of Western thinking arising from the ancient Greeks, the Christian Church Fathers, and the Medieval Scholastics

To say that they have been the dominant view about God's nature and actions throughout church history is not in itself proof that they are true.

To say that they are understood along the contours of the philosophy of the ancient Greeks is not in itself proof that they are false.



Classical Theologians

Christian theologians who, to greater or lesser degrees, defend the classical attributes of God


Classical Theologians

Not all classical theologians discuss every classical attribute.

Further, not all classical theologians defend every classical attribute.

Classical Theologians

Admittedly, for the purposes of this presentation, the line can be blurry between who might be and who might not be counted as a classical theologian.




























































I am not arguing that, because all these luminaries are to one extent or another "Classical" theologians or philosophers, therefore Classical Theism is true.


I am suggesting that, given the illustrious history that Classical Theism commands, it behooves the contemporary Christian to take heed and closely consider the erosion of the classical attributes of God.



Classical Confessions The same observations and qualifications, mutatis mutandis, will apply to the various confessions cited throughout.




























"God is both invisible and ineffable ... It is therefore particularly hard to describe the first and original cause, which is the source of the existence of everything else which is or has been. For how is one to speak about that which is neither a genus nor a differentia nor a species nor an individuality nor a number—




"in other words which is neither any kind of accidental property nor the subject of any accidental property? ... Nor can one speak of him as having parts."

[Miscellanies 5, xii, 78-82, in Maurice Wiles and Mark Santer, eds., Documents in Early Christian Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 4,6]


"The word 'to know' has a variety of meanings. For what we say we know is God's greatness, his power, his wisdom, his goodness, his providential care for us, and the justice of his judgment; but not his actual essence....

[Letter 234 in Maurice Wiles and Mark Santer, eds. Documents in Early Christian Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 10, 11]





"To deny that one knows the essence of God is not to admit that one has no knowledge of him. The many attributes that we have just enumerated provide a basis on which we form our conception of God. ... His attributes are various, but his essence is simple."

[Letter 284 in Maurice Wiles and Mark Santer, eds. Documents in Early Christian Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 10, 11]











"having no contrary, filling all, by nothing encompassed, but rather Himself the encompasser and maintainer and original possessor of the universe, occupying all essences intact and extending beyond all things, and being separate from all essence as being super-essential and above all things and absolute God, absolute goodness, and absolute fullness: determining all sovereignties and ranks, being placed above all sovereignty and rank, above essence and life and word and thought: being Himself very light and goodness and life and essence,




"inasmuch as He does not derive His being from another, that is to say, of those things that exist: but being Himself the fountain of being to all that is, of life to the living, of reason to those that have reason; to all the cause of all good: perceiving all things even before they have become: one essence, one divinity, one power, one will, one energy, one beginning, one authority, one dominion, one sovereignty, made known in three perfect subsistences and adored with one adoration, believed in and ministered to by all rational creation, united without confusion and divided without separation (which indeed transcends thought)."

[An Exposition on the Orthodox Faith, chap. 8; http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/33041.htm]]














































Fourth Lateran Council 1215

"We firmly believe and openly confess that there is only one true God, eternal and immense, omnipotent, unchangeable, incomprehensible, and ineffable, ... absolutely simple; ... always without beginning and end ... Creator of all things invisible and visible, spiritual and corporeal, who from the beginning of time and by His omnipotent power made from nothing creatures both spiritual and corporeal, angelic, namely, and mundane, and then human, as it were, common, composed of spirit and body."

[Twelfth Ecumenical Council: Lateran IV, Canon 1, https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/basis/lateran4.asp, accessed 07/05/22]

The Belgic Confession 1561

"Art. I: We all believe with the heart and confess with the mouth that there is one only simple and spiritual Being, which we call God; and that He is eternal, incomprehensible, invisible, immutable, infinite, almighty, perfectly wise, just, good, and the overflowing fountain of all good."

The Thirty-Nine Articles

1562/63

"Art. I: There is but one living and true God, everlasting, without body, parts, or passions; of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness; the Maker and Preserver of all things, both visible and invisible."

The Second Helvetic Confession

"Chap. 3: God is one in essence or nature, subsisting by Himself, all sufficient in Himself, invisible, without a body, infinite, eternal, ... the chief good, living, quickening, and preserver of all things. Almighty, and exceeding wise, gentle or merciful, just and true."

The Irish Articles 1615

"§8. There is but one living and true God, everlasting, without body, parts, or passions, of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, the Maker and Preserver of all things, both visible and invisible."

The London Baptist Confession 1644

"II. God is of Himself ... that is, neither from another, nor of another, nor by another, nor for another: But is a Spirit ... who as His being is of Himself ... so He gives being, moving, and preservation to all other things, being in Himself eternal, most holy, every way infinite in greatness, wisdom, power, justice, goodness, truth."

The Westminster Confession of Faith

1646

II, 1. There is but one only living and true God, who is infinite in being and perfection, a most pure spirit, invisible, without body, parts, or passions, immutable, immense, eternal, incomprehensible, almighty, most wise, most holy, most free, most absolute, working all things according to the counsel of his own immutable and most righteous will, for his own glory, most loving, gracious, merciful, long-suffering, abundant in goodness and truth, forgiving iniquity, transgression, and sin; the rewarder of them that diligently seek him; and withal most just and terrible in his judgments; hating all sin; and who will by no means clear the guilty.

The Westminster Confession of Faith

1646

II, 2. God hath all life, glory, goodness, blessedness, in and of himself; and is alone in and unto himself all-sufficient, not standing in need of any creatures which he hath made, nor deriving any glory from them, but only manifesting his own glory in, by, unto, and upon them; he is the alone foundation of all being, of whom, through whom, and to whom, are all things; and hath most sovereign dominion over them, to do by them, for them, or upon them, whatsoever himself pleaseth. In his sight all things are open and manifest; his knowledge is infinite, infallible, and independent upon the creature; so as nothing is to him contingent or uncertain. He is most holy in all his counsels, in all his works, and in all his commands. To him is due from angels and men, and every other creature, whatsoever worship, service, or obedience he is pleased to require of them.

The Savoy Declaration 1658


"Chap. II. There is but one only living and true God who is infinite in being and perfection, a most pure Spirit, invisible, without body, parts, or passions, immutable, immense, eternal, incomprehensible, almighty, most wise, most holy, most free, most absolute, working all things according to the counsel of His own immutable and most righteous will, for His own glory, most loving, gracious, merciful, long-suffering, abundant in goodness and truth ...


The Savoy Declaration


"God hath all life, glory, goodness, blessedness, in, and of himself; and is alone, in, and unto himself, all-sufficient, not standing in need of any creature ... He is the alone fountain of all being. His knowledge is infinite, infallible, and independent upon the creature, so as nothing is to him contingent or uncertain."


The London Baptist Confession 1677


"The Lord our God is but one only living and true God whose subsistence is in and of Himself, infinite in being and perfection, whose essence cannot be comprehended by any but Himself; a most pure spirit, invisible, without body, parts, or passions ..."














"My agnostic father ... asked me why God would allow Adolf Hitler to be born if he foreknew that this man would massacre millions of Jews.



"The only response I could offer then, and the only response I continue to offer now is that this was not foreknown as a certainty at the time God created Hitler."

[Cregory A. Boyd, Cod of the Possible (Created Repides: Baker, 2000), 93]








Simplicity
Contending for the
Classical Attributes
of God


Immutability
Classical Theism in
Timelessness
Impassibility
Immateriality
Classical Theism in
Twelve (Not So)
Easy Steps


Impassibility
















"On these accounts He came to us; though He was incorporeal, He formed for Himself a body after our fashion ... being invested with a body, yet not circumscribing the unmixed simplicity of His Godhead."


[From the Discourse on the Cross, https://www.earlychristianwritings.com/text/melito.html, accessed 07/124/23.]



"He is a simple, uncompounded Being, without diverse members, and altogether like, and equal to himself."


[Against Harestes II, 13, Christian Classics Ethereal Library, http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf01.html]






"God is both invisible and ineffable ... For how is one to speak about that which is neither a genus nor a differentia nor a species nor an individuality nor a number—in other words which is neither any kind of accidental property nor the subject of any accidental property? ... Nor can one speak of him as having parts."

[Miscellanies 5, xii, 78-82, in Maurice Wiles and Mark Santer, eds, Documents in Early Christian Thought (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1975), 4, 6]




"God, therefore, is not to be thought of as being either a body or as existing in a body, but as an uncompounded intellectual nature, admitting within Himself no addition of any kind ... But God, who is the beginning of all things, is not to be regarded as a composite being, lest perchance there should be found to exist elements prior to the beginning itself, out of which everything is composed, whatever that be which is called composite."

[To the Bishops of Africa (Ad Afros Epistola Synodica), Chap. 7 "The Position that the Son is a Creature Inconsistent and Untenable"]



"God, therefore, is not to be thought of as being either a body or as existing in a body, but as an uncompounded intellectual nature, admitting within Himself no addition of any kind; so that He cannot be believed to have within him a greater and a less, but is such that He is in all parts $\mu o \nu \alpha \varsigma$ [monas], and, so to speak, $\dot{\varepsilon} v \alpha \varsigma$ [henas], and is the mind and source from which all intellectual nature or mind takes its beginning. But mind, for its movements or operations, needs no physical space, nor sensible magnitude, nor bodily shape, nor color, nor any other of those adjuncts which are the properties of body or matter.




"Wherefore that simple and wholly intellectual nature can admit of no delay or hesitation in its movements or operations, lest the simplicity of the divine nature should appear to be circumscribed or in some degree hampered by such adjuncts, and lest that which is the beginning of all things should be found composite and differing, and that which ought to be free from all bodily intermixture, in virtue of being the one sole species of Deity, so to speak, should prove, instead of being one, to consist of many things."

[Origen, *De Preincipiis* 1.1.6, ed. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (Albany, OR: Books for the Ages, Ages Software CD ver. 2: 1997)]


"If then any man conceives God to be compound, as accident is in essence, or to have any external envelopment, and to be encompassed, or as if there is aught about Him which completes the essence, so that when we say 'God,' or name 'Father,' we do not signify the invisible and incomprehensible essence, but something about it, then let them complain of the Council's stating that the Son was from the essence of God; but let them reflect, that in thus considering they utter two blasphemies; for they make God corporeal, and they falsely say that the Lord is not Son of the very Father, but of what is about Him. But if God be simple, as He is, it follows that in saying 'God' and naming 'Father,' we name nothing as if about Him, but signify his essence itself."

[Defense of the Nicene Definition (De Decretis) Chap. 5 "Defense of the Council's Phrases," §22]



"If it is from virtue, the antecedent of willing and not willing, and of moral progress, that you hold the Son to be like the Father; while these things fall under the category of quality; clearly you call God compound of quality and essence. But who will tolerate you when you say this? For God, who compounded all things to give them being, is not compound, nor of similar nature to the things made by Him through the Word. Far be the thought. For He is simple essence, in which quality is not, nor, as James says, 'any variableness or shadow of turning.'"


[To the Bishops of Africa (Ad Afros Epistola Synodica), Chap. 7 "The Position that the Son is a Creature Inconsistent and Untenable"]





"For God, who compounded all things to give them being, is not compound, nor of similar nature to the things made by Him through the Word. Far be the thought. For He is simple essence, in which quality is not, nor, as James says, 'any variableness or shadow of turning.'"

Athanasius (296-373)


[To the Bishops of Africa (Ad Afros Epistola Synodica), Chap. 7 "The Position that the Son is a Creature Inconsistent and Untenable"]








"Hence, we see in almost every theological treatise the Godhead religiously celebrated, both as Monad and unity, on account of the simplicity and oneness of Its supernatural indivisibility ..."




[On the Divine Names, Caput I, §IV, https://www.ccel.org/ccel/dionysius/works.i.ii.i.html, accessed 07/05/22]




"We believe, then, in One God, one beginning, having no beginning, uncreate, unbegotten, imperishable and immortal, everlasting, infinite, uncircumscribed, boundless, of infinite power, simple, uncompound, incorporeal, without flux, passionless, unchangeable, unalterable, unseen, the fountain of goodness and justice, ..."

[An Exposition on the Orthodox Faith, chap. 8; http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/33041.htm, accessed 07/05/22]



"There are no parts in thee, Lord, nor art thou more than one. But thou are so truly a unitary being, and so identical with thyself, that in no respect are thou unlike thyself; rather thou are unity itself, indivisible by any conception. Therefore, life and wisdom and the rest are not parts of the, but all are one; and each of these is the whole, which thou art, and which all the rest are."


[Proslogium, 18, trans. S. N. Deane (La Salle: Open Court, 1962), 25]




Simplicity means "no diversity or change or multiplicity of parts, or accidents, or any other forms."

[The Sentences, Bk. 1, The Mystery of the Trinity, trans. Giulio Silano, Medieval Sources in Translation 42 (Toronto: PIMS, 2007), 8.3 (23), as cited in Jordan P. Barrett, Divine Simplicity: A Biblical and Trinitarian Account (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2017), 77]

"The absolute simplicity of God may be shown in many ways... For there is neither composition of quantitative parts in God, since He is not a body; nor composition of matter and form; nor does His nature differ from His 'suppositum'; nor His essence from His existence; neither is there in Him composition of genus and difference, nor of subject and accident. Therefore, it is clear that God is nowise composite, but is altogether simple."



[Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Westminster: Christian Classics1981), I, Q3, art. 7]



"Although the great and everblessed God is a being absolutely simple and infinitely remote from all shadow of composition, He is, nevertheless, in condescension to our weak and contracted faculties, represented in Scripture as possessed of divers Properties, or Attributes, which, though seemingly different from His Essence, are in reality essential to Him, and constitutive of His very Nature.

Girolamo Zanchi (1516-1590)

[Observations on the Divine Attributes, Monergism Books, ebook p. 3]




"... although we come to know this truth through rational proofs, namely, that esse belongs to the very essence of God and that He is subsistent esse Himself, and infinite, immutable, eternal, and may other attributes, which are of His very essence, we nevertheless know all these vaguely and through a certain negation or analogy to creatures. We do not know them through a proper concept which expresses His quiddity just as it is."

[Dominic Báñez, *The Primacy of Existence in Thomas Aquinas: A Commentary in Thomistic Metaphysics*, trans. Benjamin S. Llamzon (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1966), 29, reprinted (Proctorville: Wythe-North, 2021), 29].

"Simplicity is a pre-eminent mode of the Essence of God, by which he is void of all composition, and of component parts whether they belong to the senses or to the understanding. ...


Jacobus Arminius (1560-1609)



"neither hypothetically and through nature, through capability and actuality, nor through essence and being.

Hence God is his own
Essence and his own
Being, and is the same in that which is, and that by which it is."

[Jacobus Arminius, *The Writings of James Arminius*, 3 vols., trans. James Nichols and W. R. Bagnall (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1977), I, 438]




"The attributes of God, which alone seem to be distinct things in the essence of God, are all of them essentially the same with one another, and every one the same with the essence of God itself."


[Vindiciae Evangelicae: The Mystery of the Gospel Vindicated and Socinianism Examined: Mr. Biddle's First Chapter Examined in The Ages Digital Library: The John Owen Collection CD ROM (Rio, WI: AGES Software), 94]





"Is God most simple and free from all composition? We affirm against Socinus and Vorstius. ...
The orthodox have constantly taught that the essence of God is perfectly simple and free from all composition. ... The divine nature is conceived by us not only as free from all composition and division, but also as incapable of composition and divisibility."


[Francis Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, 3 vols. trans. George Musgrave Giger (Phillipsburg: P&R, 1992), I, 191]















He was engaged, at the time, in delivering to his people, at Crosby Hall [in London], that series of Discourses on the Existence and Attributes of God, on which his fame as a writer chiefly rests. The intense interest which he was observed to take in the subjects of which he treated, was regarded as an indication that he was nearly approaching that state in which he was to be "fill with all the fulness of God." Not unfrequently was he heard to give utterance to a longing desire for that region for which he gave evidence of his being so well prepared. These circumstances were, naturally enough, looked upon as proofs that his mighty mind, though yet on earth, had begun to "put off its mortality," and was fast ripening for the paradise of God.

WM. SYMINGTON, D.D., "LIFE AND CHARACTER OF THE CHARNOCK" in Stephen Charnock, *Discourses upon the Existence and Attributes of God*, 2 vols. (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1979 (1853)), I: 9-10
















"It would be an over-officious and too meanly servile religiousness, to be awed by the sophistry of presumptuous scholastic wits, into a subscription to their confident determinations concerning the being of God, that such and such things are necessary or impossible thereto, beyond what the plain undisguised reason of things, or his own express word do evince;

















"If God is a spirit, ... it follows that God is a simple Being, not only as not composed of different elements, but also as not admitting of the distinction between substance and accidents."


[Systematic Theology, 3 vols. (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdman's, 1975), I, V, §4, p. 379]













"But 3d, they are said to differ virtualiter, so that there is in him a foundation or adequate reason for all the representations which are made in Scripture with regard to the diving perfections and for the consequent conceptions which we have of them."


[A. A. Hodge, Outlines of Theology: For Students and Laymen (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1972), 136-137]





"By this we mean, that the nature of God, comprising his essence and his attributes, is simple or uncomposed pure spirit. ... In God there can be no composition, and therefore his spiritual nature must be uncompounded. Even his attributes and his nature must be in such a manner one, that his attributes essentially inhere in that nature and are not capable of separation from it, which really makes them one with that nature."


[James Petigru Boyce, Abstract of Systematic Theology (Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1887), 67]



















"From the simplicity of God it follows that God and His attributes are one. The attributes cannot be considered as to many parts that enter into the composition of God, for God is not, like men, composed of different parts."


[Louis Berkhof, *Systematic Theology*, 4th ed. (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1941), 44-45]








"Orthodox theologians generally affirm that the being or substance of God is simple. Then they try to explain and offer cautions. By simple or simplicity, we mean without parts. ... There is no variance in any one or al the attributes, for they are steadily the same ..."


[Robert Duncan Culver, Systematic Theology: Biblical and Historical (Geanies House, Fearm, Ross-shire: Christian Focus Publications, 2005), 63]






















"It would appear that Christian theologians have no good Hopefully, this presentation has reason to affirm the doctrine of contributed somewhat to giving some good reasons. divine simplicity. It seems Further, understandably Nash doubtful that the doctrine adds could not have been expected to anything significant to our interact with the more formidable understanding of God. No literature to any significant depth in satisfactory analysis of his popular and short treatment. simplicity has yet been given. Nevertheless, the level of And it is difficult to see how confidence of his conclusions the property of simplicity is against simplicity seem unwarranted by not having done unique to God. such an adequate deep dive. [Ronald H. Nash, The Concept of God: An Exposition of Contemporary Difficulties with the Attributes of God (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1983), 95-96]

Given the metaphysics according to which the doctrine of simplicity is to be understood in its most robust formulation, the stakes are indeed quite high for what it preserves regarding our understanding of several of God's attributes.

10011a19171. 19a311 (1936-2006) "It would appear that Christian theologians have no good reason to affirm the doctrine of divine simplicity. It seems doubtful that the doctrine adds anything significant to our understanding of God. No satisfactory analysis of simplicity has yet been given. And it is difficult to see how the property of simplicity is unique to God.

[Ronald H. Nash, *The Concept of God: An Exposition of Contemporary Difficulties with the Attributes of God* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1983), 95-96]

➢ God as Transcendent ←

Since the doctrine of simplicity alone means that God essence is existence, which is to say God is substantial existence itself (deus ipsum esse subsistens est), then only the doctrine of simplicity safeguards a thoroughgoing doctrine of God as transcendent.

No creature is existence itself, but *has* existence as something distinct from its nature.

Thus, the existence that God IS, is different than the existence that creation HAS.

"It would appear that Christian theologians have no good reason to affirm the doctrine of divine simplicity. It seems doubtful that the doctrine adds anything significant to our understanding of God. No satisfactory analysis of simplicity has yet been given. And it is difficult to see how the property of simplicity is unique to God.

[Ronald H. Nash, *The Concept of God: An Exposition of Contemporary Difficulties with the Attributes of God* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1983), 95-96]

➢ God's Ultimacy ←

"[Simplicity] is a consequence of God's ultimacy. For anything composed of parts is ontologically posterior to those parts, and can exist only if something causes the parts to be combined."*

*[Edward Feser, "Simply Irresistible" https://theopolisinstitute.com/conversations/simply-irresistible/ accessed 07/08/23] "It would appear that Christian theologians have no good reason to affirm the doctrine of divine simplicity. It seems doubtful that the doctrine adds anything significant to our understanding of God. No satisfactory analysis of simplicity has yet been given. And it is difficult to see how the property of simplicity is unique to God.

[Ronald H. Nash, *The Concept of God: An Exposition of Contemporary Difficulties with the Attributes of God* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1983), 95-96]

Since the doctrine of simplicity alone means that God essence is existence, which is to say God is substantial existence itself (deus ipsum esse subsistens est), then only the doctrine of simplicity safeguards a thoroughgoing doctrine of creation.

All things in creation *have* existence and can only *have* existence because they are being continually caused to *have* existence by God who *is* existence itself.

"It would appear that Christian theologians have no good reason to affirm the doctrine of divine simplicity. It seems doubtful that the doctrine adds anything significant to our understanding of God. No satisfactory analysis of simplicity has yet been given. And it is difficult to see how the property of simplicity is unique to God.


[Ronald H. Nash, *The Concept of God: An Exposition of Contemporary Difficulties with the Attributes of God* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1983), 95-96]

In his book, Nash displays a deep misunderstanding of existential Thomism.

The expression 'existential' in 'existential Thomism' is not to be confused with the philosophy of Existentialism (e.g., Jean-Paul Sartre or Søren Kierkegaard).

Here the expression refers to Aquinas's doctrine of the primacy of esse (lit., "to be;" the infinitive of sum, "I am;" translated often as "existence").

Aquinas's doctrine of existence is the fundamental key to his entire philosophy.



In his book, Nash displays a deep misunderstanding of existential Thomism.

This is evident when he uses the Process theologian David Ray Griffin as the voice of evaluating Aquinas's philosophical theology.

Because of this, Nash never seems to realize that the *actus purus* (pure actuality) in the philosophy of Aquinas differs markedly from the *actus purus* (pure actuality) in the philosophy of Aristotle who never himself had any metaphysics of existence in distinction from essence.

But it is precisely this metaphysical doctrine that makes simplicity what it is in Aquinas's philosophy.

"It would appear that Christian theologians have no good reason to affirm the doctrine of divine simplicity. It seems doubtful that the doctrine adds anything significant to our understanding of God. No satisfactory analysis of simplicity has yet been given.

And it is difficult to see how.

And it is difficult to see how the property of simplicity is unique to God.

[Ronald H. Nash, *The Concept of God: An Exposition of Contemporary Difficulties with the Attributes of God* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1983), 95-96]


Given that Nash fails to grasp exactly what the doctrine of simplicity is in Aquinas's philosophy, it is no surprise that he cannot see any of the profound entailments the doctrine of simplicity has for philosophical theology.


Otherwise, he would have seen that the doctrine of simplicity shows not only how God is unique in His being, but also that there cannot be more that one being whose essence is existence itself.


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
"It would appear that Christian theologians have no good reason to affirm the doctrine of divine simplicity. It seems doubtful that the doctrine adds anything significant to our understanding of God. No satisfactory analysis of simplicity has yet been given. And it is difficult to see how the property of simplicity is unique to God.


[Ronald H. Nash, *The Concept of God: An Exposition of Contemporary Difficulties with the Attributes of God* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1983), 95-96]




























"The philosophy of neo-Platonism, as seen in Plotinus and later on in Pseudo-Dionysius, was a powerful molding force in ancient and medieval theology.






- author of Divine Names, Mystical Theology, Celestial Hierarchy, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, and more
- originally identified as Dionysius the Areopagite, the disciple of Paul in Acts 17:34
- embodyed the ideas of the Neo-Platonist philosopher Proclus (410-485)
- major influence on Aquinas both by example and counter-example






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


- wrote commentaries on Plato's Timaeus, Republic, Parmenides, Cratylus, and more
- possessed "a wide knowledge concerning the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle and of his Neo-Platonic predecessors"*
- had the reputation "of being the greatest Scholastic of Antiquity"*

*[Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy Bk 1, Pt. V, XLVI (Garden City: Image Books), 478]





"Today, however, neo-Platonism really does not exist as a living philosophy, though it continues to have considerable indirect influence through the theological tradition.




"The doctrine of divine simplicity, so crucial to the classical understanding of God, has been abandoned by a strong majority of Christian philosophers, though it still has a small band of defenders."

[William Hasker, "A Philosophical Perspective" in *The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1994), 127]









"The doctrine [of divine simplicity] is open ... to powerful objections. ... We have no good reason to adopt and many reasons to reject a full-blown doctrine of divine simplicity.

[J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, *Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview*, 2nd ed. (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2017), 530, 531]






"The doctrine [of divine simplicity] is open ... to powerful objections. ... We have no good reason to adopt and many reasons to reject a full-blown doctrine of divine simplicity.



It is my contention that certain of these "powerful objections" involve straw man fallacies, including:

- illicitly applying the method of Perfect Being Theology
- mistakenly treating being as a genus
- erroneously employing a univocal understanding of being





WILLIAM LANE CRAIG

Theistic Critiques of Atheism

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

The last half-century has witnessed a veritable revolution in Anglo-American philosophy. In a recent retrospective, the eminent Princeton philosopher Paul Benacerraf recalls what it was like doing philosophy at Princeton during the 1950 and '60s. The overwhelmingly dominant mode of thinking was scientific naturalism. Metaphysics had been varieshed, expelled from philosophy like an unclean leper. Any problem that could not be addressed by science was simply dismissed as a pseudo-problem. Verificationism reigned triumphantly over the emerging science of philosophy. "This new enlightenment would put the old meany problem to the prob

something new and altogether unanticipated: a renaissance in control philosophy.

The face of Anglo-American philosophy has been transformed as a result. Theism is on the rise, atheism is on the decline? Atheism, though perhaps still the dominant viewpoint at the American university, is a philosophy in retreat. In a recent article in the secularist journal PhiloQuentin Smith laments what he calls' the desconlariation of academia that evolved in philosophy departments since the late 1960s." He complains

Naturalists passively watched as realist versions of theism...began to sweep through the philosophical community, until today perhaps one-quarter or on-ochird of philosophy professors are theists, with most being orthodox Christians...[II] philosophy, it became, almost overnight, "academically respectable" to argue for theism, making philosophy a favored field of entry for the most intelligent and talented theists entering academia today.



"For thinkers in the Judeo-Christian tradition, the Anselmian conception of d as the greatest conceivable be or most perfect being has guided philosophical speculation on the raw data of scripture, so that God's biblical attributes are to be conceived in ways that would serve to exalt God's greatness. Since the concept of God is underdetermined by the biblical data and since what constitutes a 'greatmaking' property is to some degree debatable, philosophers working within the Judeo-Christian tradition enjoy considerable latitude in formulating a philosophically coherent and biblically faithful doctrine of God."

"Perfect Being Theology"

ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY APPROACH

By the use of the tools, methods, and categories of analytic philosophy:

- 1. Carefully define the term 'perfect'.
- 2. On the basis of this definition, identify what "perfect making properties" must constitute a "perfect being."
- Since God by definition is a "perfect being," then conclude that God must possess these "perfect making properties."
- Any property that does not "clearly" appear in the Bible and/or is clearly not "perfect making" must be denied of God.

CLASSICAL PHILOSOPHY APPROACH

By the use of the tools, methods and categories of classical philosophy:

- 1. Carefully discover what the nature of God must be like.
- 2. On the basis of this discovery identify what attributes must be true of God.
- 3. Identify those attributes as the definition of what it means to be ultimately and infinitely perfect.

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Understandably, Craig is using his prior notions of "greatest conceivable being" and "most perfect being" to set boundaries on what the text of Scripture can mean.


Further, Craig (correctly, in my view) acknowledges that the text of Scripture "underdetermines" (i.e., says less than) what God is like.

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To be sure, Craig is certainly free to incorporate the philosophical methods and ideas from any philosopher / theologian he desires.

In many respects, I have no issues with Craig naming Anselm as a representative of the "Judeo-Christian tradition."

It should be noted, however, (and as we have seen), the same
Anselm who gave him the method of "perfect being theology" also himself affirmed the doctrine of Divine simplicity!



"There are no parts in thee, Lord, nor art thou more than one. But thou are so truly a unitary being, and so identical with thyself, that in no respect are thou unlike thyself; rather thou are unity itself, indivisible by any conception. Therefore, life and wisdom and the rest are not parts of the, but all are one; and each of these is the whole, which thou art, and which all the rest are."

[Proslogium, 18, trans. S. N. Deane (La Salle: Open Court, 1962), 25]

"Theists thus find that antitheistic critiques of certain conceptions of God can actually be quite helpful in formulating a more adequate conception. For example, most Christian philosophers today deny that God is simple or impassible or immutable in any unrestricted sense, even though medieval theologians affirmed such divine attributes, since these attributes are not ascribed to God in the Bible and are not clearly great making."

[William Lane Craig, "Theistic Critiques of Atheism, Cambridge Companion, 72]

Note Craig's juxtaposition.

Simplicity, impassibility, and immutability are denied today though they were affirmed in the middle ages.

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Note Craig's juxtaposition.

It is philosophers who deny simplicity, impassibility, and immutability while it is theologians who affirmed them were.

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
[William Lane Craig, "Theistic Critiques of Atheism, Cambridge Companion, 72]

Consider Craig's comment that most Christian philosophers today deny simplicity, impassibility, and immutability.

I wonder how many Catholic Christians philosophers there are today in comparison to the number of non-Catholic Christian philosophers.

Catholics are required by Canon 1 of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) to hold to simplicity. "Theists thus find that antitheistic critiques of certain conceptions of God can actually be quite helpful in formulating a more adequate conception. For example, most Christian philosophers today deny that God is simple or impassible or immutable in any unrestricted sense, even though medieval theologians affirmed such divine attributes, since these attributes are not ascribed to God in the Bible and are not clearly great making."

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[William Lane Craig, "Theistic Critiques of Atheism, Cambridge Companion, 72]

"We firmly believe and openly confess that there is only one true God, eternal and immense, omnipotent, unchangeable, incomprehensible, and ineffable, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; three Persons indeed but one essence, substance, or nature absolutely simple; ..."

Canon 1

"Theists thus find that antitheistic critiques of certain conceptions of God can actually be quite helpful in formulating a more adequate conception. For example, most Christian philosophers today deny that God is simple or impassible or immutable in any unrestricted sense, even though medieval theologians affirmed such divine attributes, since these attributes are not ascribed to God in the Bible and are not clearly great making."

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Consider Craig's comment that most Christian philosophers today deny simplicity, impassibility, and immutability.

I wonder how many Catholic Christians philosophers there are today in comparison to the number of non-Catholic Christian philosophers.

Catholics are required by Canon 1 of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) to hold to simplicity.

Is it true, therefore that "most Christian philosophers today deny that God is simple"?

"Theists thus find that antitheistic critiques of certain conceptions of God can actually be quite helpful in formulating a more adequate conception. For example, most Christian philosophers today deny that God is simple or impassible or immutable in any unrestricted sense, even though medieval theologians affirmed such divine attributes, since these attributes are not ascribed to God in the Bible and are not clearly great making."

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Granting, for the sake of argument, that most Christian philosophers today deny God is simple, is this an argument that the doctrine of simplicity is false?

Or could it be that having so many contemporary Christian philosophers denying simplicity is a commentary on the regrettable state of contemporary Christian philosophy?

"Theists thus find that antitheistic critiques of certain conceptions of God can actually be quite helpful in formulating a more adequate conception. For example, most Christian philosophers today deny that God is simple or impassible or immutable in any unrestricted sense, even though medieval theologians affirmed such divine attributes, since these attributes are not clearly great making."

Last, note the two
"arguments" Craig offers as
to why today's Christian
philosophers today deny
simplicity, impassibility, and
immutability.

- These attributes are not ascribed to God in the Bible.
- These attributes are not clearly great making.

[William Lane Craig, "Theistic Critiques of Atheism, Cambridge Companion, 72]

"Theists thus find that antitheistic critiques of certain conceptions of God can actually be quite helpful in formulating a more adequate conception. For example, most Christian philosophers today deny that God is simple or impassible or immutable in any unrestricted sense, even though medieval theologians affirmed such divine attributes, since these attributes are not clearly great making."

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Regarding the first argument, did not Craig earlier acknowledge that "the concept of God is underdetermined by the biblical data"?

Why, then, should we necessarily conclude anything about simplicity if indeed the Bible does not ascribe simplicity to God?

Could it not be (granting for the sake of argument) that this is one of those instances where the biblical data "underdetermine" the concept of God?

- 1. These attributes are not ascribed to God in the Bible.
- 2. These attributes are not clearly great making.

"Theists thus find that antitheistic critiques of certain conceptions of God can actually be quite helpful in formulating a more adequate conception. For example, most Christian philosophers today deny that God is simple or impassible or immutable in any unrestricted sense, even though medieval theologians affirmed such divine attributes, since these attributes are not clearly great making."

[William Lane Craig, "Theistic Critiques of Atheism. Cambridge

Companion, 72]

Regarding the second argument, the truth of simplicity does not rise or fall on the basis of philosophically discovering what "great making properties are" on the basis of a prior determination of what "perfect" means.

Rather, one should discover what God must be like as the First Cause, and then ascribe the characterization of 'perfect' to that.


God determines what 'perfect' means rather than the meaning of 'perfect' disclosing what God must be like.

- These attributes are not ascribed to God in the Bible.
- These attributes are not clearly great making.




From this and other things that need to be said but will go without being said here, one can come to see in Aquinas how it is that the classical attributes of God—perfection, goodness, infinity, immutability, eternity, unity, omniscience, life, will, love, justice, mercy, providence, omnipotence—cascade inexorably from simplicity. To be sure, some contemporary philosophers of religion have contended for certain of these attributes by means quite different from the classical and medieval metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas. But as is evidenced in the contemporary discussion, even among evangelicals, not all of these classical attributes have survived these contemporary means. Whether that is a good or bad thing for Christian theism, I will, for the time being, leave it to you to decide.







In classical theism, God knows all things because He knows Himself exhaustively as the cause of all creation. "It is not that God's knowledge varies in any way, that the future, the present, and the past affect that knowledge in three different ways. It is not with God as it is with us. He does not look ahead to the future, look directly at the present, look back to the past.




"He sees in some other manner, utterly remote from anything we experience or could imagine. He does not see things by turning his attention from one thing to another, He sees all without any kind of change.."


[City of God XI, §21, trans. John O'Meara (London: Penguin Books, 1972), 452]









"The understanding of God is a faculty of his life ... by which He distinctly understands all things and every thing which now have, will have, have had, can have, or might hypothetically have, any kind of being;



"by which He likewise distinctly understands the order which all and each of them hold among themselves, the connections and the various relations which they have or can have;


Jacobus Arminius (1560-1609)








"All things are present to his understanding because he hath at once a view of all successions of times; and his knowledge of future things is as perfect as of present things, or what is past; it is not a certain knowledge of present things, and an uncertain knowledge of future, but his knowledge of one is as certain and unerring as his knowledge of the other."


[Stephen Charnock, *Discourses upon the Existence and Attributes of God* (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1979), 1:437]

















"Among the objects of the divine knowledge are the free acts of men. The Scriptures abundantly teach that such acts are foreknown. ... If God be ignorant of how free agents will act, his knowledge must be limited, and it must be constantly increasing, which is altogether inconsistent with the true idea of his nature."

[Charles Hodge, *Systematic Theology* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1975), I:400]







[Robert Lewis Dabney, Lectures in Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1972), 156]




"God's knowledge ... does in no way depend upon his creatures or their actions, but solely upon his own infinite intuition of all things possible in the light of his own reason, and of all things actual and future in the light of his own eternal purpose. ...




"All possible objects, as such, whether they are or ever have been, or ever will be or not, [are] seen in the light of his own infinite reason.




"All things actual, which have been, are, or will be, he comprehends in one eternal, simultaneous act of knowledge, as ever present actualities to him, and as known to be such in the light of his own sovereign and eternal purpose. ...






"What then are the objects of his knowledge? Himself, his nature, or essence ... His creation in all its fullness ... He knows all the past, present, and future of all things, knowing the future with the same certainty and accuracy with which he knows the present and past; for the future is already as present to him as though actually existing with the creatures and tie belonging to it, as is as distinctly perceived as it shall be then."


[James Petigru Boyce, Abstract of Systematic Theology (Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1887), 87, 88]





"The omniscience of God comprehends all things— things past, things present, and things future, and the possible as well as the actual. ... Omniscience brings everything—past, present, and future—with equal reality before the mind of God."


[Lewis Sperty Chafer, Systematic Theology (Dallas: Dallas Seminary Press, 1947), L192]




































"Scripture also frequently depicts God as experiencing regret ... disappointment, frustration, and unexpected outcomes ... suggesting that the future is to this extent composed of possibilities rather than certainties.


Gregory A. Boyd


"Scripture also frequently Undoubted Boyd has in depicts God as mind such verses as xperiencing regret ... Gen. 6:6. disappointment, "And the LORD was sorry frustration, and that He had made man on unexpected outcomes ... the earth, and He was suggesting that the future grieved in His heart." is to this extent composed of possibilities rather than certainties.






















In Fairness to Gregory Boyd . . .

- He claims to hold to the doctrine of God's omniscience.
- > But he would maintain a different definition of 'omniscience' than the Classical Theist.
- > He claims that propositions about the future are unknowable.

REKNEW

ReThink everything you thought you Knew

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How People Misunderstand Open Theism

Open theism holds that, because agents are free, the future includes possibilities (what agents may and may not choose to do). Since God's knowledge is perfect, open theists hold that God knows the future partly as a realm of possibilities. This view contrasts with classical theism that has usually held that God knows the future exclusively as a domain of settled facts. There are no "maybes" for God.

The debate is not about the scope and perfection of Gods' knowledge, for both open theists and classical theists affirm God's omniscience. God always knows everything. The debate, rather, is about the content of the reality God perfectly knows. It comes down to the question of whether or not possibilities are real.

https://treknew.org/2019/06/how-people-misunderstand-open-theism/


How People Misunderstand Open Theism

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
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
"How Gregory Boyd Misunderstands Classical Theism's Supposed Misunderstanding of Open Theism"

"How Gregory Boyd Misunderstands Classical Theism's Supposed Misunderstanding of Open Theism Because He Does Not Understand What Classical Theism's Objection to Open Theism Is in the First Place"



God's immutability means that God is not in any way subject to change.








"In this state of infinite, eternal being and goodness, antecedent unto any act of wisdom or power without himself all that he will be, all that he can be, unto eternity. For where there is infinite being and infinite goodness, there is infinite blessedness and happiness, whereunto nothing can be added. God is always the same."


[John Owens, "The Glory of Christ in the Recapitulation of all things in him" in *Meditation and Discourses on the Glory of Christ* contained in *The Works of John Owen, 16 vols.* (n.c., Johnstone & Hunter, 1850-53) reprinted (Carlisle: The Banner of Truth Trust, 1965), vol. 1:368]

































"Some have claimed that God is wholly actual and not at all potential and thus cannot change in any way. ... This is a mistake from a biblical standpoint. ... God is immutable in essence and in his trustworthiness over time, but in other respects God changes."

[Clark Pinnock, "Systematic Theology," in *The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 117]]




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
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
This is Aquinas's view, though he used the expression "pure actuality."


It is a common misunderstanding to say that God's pure actuality entails that He is "not at all potential."

This misunderstanding stems from failing to realize that Aquinas distinguishes passive potency and active potency.











"Some object that this model of God is too costly; it reduces or 'shrinks' God from the full majesty of what is properly divine. ... The charge that relational theism is a reduction of God stems from the model of the immutable God who exhaustively controls everything. Since I do not believe such a deity exists, this model of God cannot reduce him."





[John Sanders, *The God Who Risks: A Theology of Providence* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1998), 206, 207]



In classical metaphysics, time is the measure of change. Since God does not change, He is not in any way temporal.










"The infinity of God in relation to time is called His eternity ... Eternity it the strict sense of the word is abscribed [sic] to that which transcends all temporal limitations. ... Our life is divided into a past, present and future, but there is no such division in the life of God. He is the eternal 'I am."


[Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1941), 60]


Louis Berkhof (1873-1957)













"The bias against change has been powerfully influential in classical theology, leading to the insistence on an excessively strong doctrine of divine immutability—which, in turn, provides key support for divine timelessness, since timelessness is the most effective way (and perhaps the only way) to rule out, once and for all, the possibility of any change in God."


William Hasker

[William Hasker, "A Philosophical Perspective" in *The Openness of God:* A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1994), 129]

"The other main difficulty about divine timelessness is that it is very hard to make clear logical sense of the doctrine. If God is truly timeless, so that temporal determinations of 'before' and 'after' do not apply to him, then how can God act in time, as the Scriptures say that he does?











"There do seem to be good reasons, too, for affirming divine temporality. If God is really related to the world, then it is extraordinarily difficult to see how God could remain untouched by the world's temporality.







"For simply in virtue of his being related to changing things (even if he himself somehow managed to remain intrinsically changeless), there would exist a before and after in God's life."


[J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (Downers Grove: InterVersity Press, 2008), 512, emphasis in original]











God's impassibility means that God is not in any way subject to passions.




















"Instead, quite the opposite is true, for God, who is the origin of our emotions and who created our emotions, certainly does feel emotions:





"God rejoices (Isa. 62.5). He is grieved (Ps. 78:40; Eph. 4:30). His wrath burns hot against his enemies (Ex. 32:10). He pities his children (Ps.103:13). He loves with everlasting love (Isa. 54:8; Ps. 103:17)."


[Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994), 166]













"It is impossible, therefore, to overestimate the importance of the truth contained in the simple proposition, God is a Spirit. It is involved in that proposition that God is immaterial. None of the properties of matter can be predicated of Him."


[Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, 3 vols. (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1979, I, V, §4]




"By this we mean that he has no material organization, that he has neither body nor members of the body such as we have, neither shape nor form, neither passions nor limitations, but only a spiritual nature."


[James Petigru Boyce, Abstract of Systematic Theology (Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1887), 62]









"If [God] is with us in the world, if we are to take biblical metaphors seriously, is God in some way embodied?




"Critics will be quick to say that, although there are expressions of this idea in the Bible, they are not to be taken literally. But I do not believe that the idea is as foreign to the Bible's view of God as we have assumed.





"In tradition, God is thought to function primarily as a disembodied spirit but this is scarcely a biblical idea. For example, ... human beings are said to be embodied creatures created in the image of God.




"Is there perhaps something in God that corresponds with embodiment? Having a body is certainly not a negative thing because it makes it possible for us to be agents.









"That may be so, but it is also possible that God has a body in some way we cannot imagine and, therefore, that it is natural for God to seek out forms of embodiment.




"I do not feel obligated to assume that God is a purely spiritual being when his self-revelation does not suggest it. It is true that from a Platonic standpoint, the idea is absurd, but this is not a biblical standpoint.




"The only persons we encounter are embodied persons and, if God is not embodied, it may prove difficult to understand how God is a person. What kind of actions could a disembodied God perform?




"Embodiment may be the way in which the transcendent God is able to be immanent and why God is presented in such terms.





"I would say that God transcends the world, while being able to indwell it. Perhaps God uses the created order as a kind of body and exercises top-down causation upon it.







"As human subjectivity expresses itself in, with, and through bodies, so the transcendent subjectivity of God is somehow immanent in the patterns, processes, and events of the world.

























Case Study: The Dake Annotated Reference Bible














"Instead, quite the opposite is true, for God, who is the origin of our emotions and who created our emotions, certainly does feel emotions:





"God rejoices (Isa. 62.5). He is grieved (Ps. 78:40; Eph. 4:30). His wrath burns hot against his enemies (Ex. 32:10). He pities his children (Ps.103:13). He loves with everlasting love (Isa. 54:8; Ps. 103:17)."


[Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994), 166]














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





Instead, quite the opposite is true, for God, who is the origin of our bodies and who created our bodies, certainly does have a body:

"God rejoices (Isa. 62.5). He is grieved (Ps. 78:40; Eph. 4:30). His wrath burns hot against his enemies (Ex. 32:10). He pities his children (Ps.103:13). He loves with everlasting love (Isa. 54:8; Ps. 103:17)."






[Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994), 166]





He has a heart (Gen. 6:6). He has fingers (Ps. 8:3-6). He has hands (Heb. 1:10). He has a mouth (Num. 12:8), lips and a tongue (Isa. 30:27). He has eyes (Ps. 11:4; 18:24; 33:18) and ears (Ps. 18:6).





"The mistake [of Isolating a text from its immediate context or from what the rest of Scripture says about God] would be made, for example, by people who argue that God has a human body, because Scripture talks about his eyes, ears, mouth, etc.


Wayne Grudem












This is a troublesome conception of Christian philosophy. ... The philosopher is placed in the privileged position of laying down for the exegete how the Bible may and may not be used, how its teaching must be broadly conceived, and what the Bible can and cannot say. ... Philosophy is thereby rendered rationally autonomous"

[Van Til's Apologetic: Readings and Analysis (Phillipsburg: P&R, 1998), 50]

"For since the creation of the world His invisible attributes are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead ..."

Rom. 1:20a




For since the creation
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Rom. 1203


The heavens declare the glory of God; and the firmament shows His handiwork.


Psalm 19:1

The heavens declare His righteousness, and all the peoples see His glory. Psalm 97:6

By observing the wonders of God's creation, people have been and still are able to come to a basic and relatively sound understanding of God's existence and attributes.









But toxic philosophical voices began to fog the conversation, particularly within Protestantism and particularly since the seventeenth century.


Because of this, there is the need at times to reason from deeper issues in sound philosophy and theology to demonstrate (Jod's attributes given that they are understood "by the things that are made" (Rom. 1:20).



Classical Philosophy and Its Critics










"The classical view is so taken for granted that it functions as a preunderstanding that rules out certain interpretations of Scripture that do not 'fit' with the conception of what is 'appropriate' for God to be like, as derived from Greek metaphysics."


[John Sanders, The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1994), 60]








"When I first thought about what my criticisms of process theism might be, it was not hard to think of several objections to it. But as I continued to ponder the assignment, I came to realize that I could hardly criticize process theism without at the same time objecting to certain features of classical belief in God. ...



















































"You can recognize them because what is said about God is either ridiculous if taken literally ... or because the genre of the passage is poetic."

[Gregory A. Boyd, God of the Possible: A Biblical Introduction to the Open View of God (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2000), 118]



What if the Classical
Theist said that it is
"ridiculous" to think that
God changes His mind or
regrets certain decisions?

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
DOES GENRE DETERMINE MEANING? ©2007 Thomas A. Howe, Ph.D.


FROM THE BEGINNINGS of the development of the critical methodology, as it was being applied to the study of the Bible, understanding the Bible as literature has become more important and more central to hermeneutics. As Jeffrey Weima remarks, "The past few decades have witnessed a paradigm shift taking place in biblical studies. The old perspective that viewed Scripture as primarily a historical or theological document has been replaced by a new conviction that the Bible is literature and as such ought to be interpreted from a literary perspective." It is notoriously difficult to identify what constitutes literature. After a lengthy consideration of several attempts at developing a definition of "literature," one theories concluded,

A piece of writing may start off life as history or philosophy and then come to be ranked as literature, or it may start off as literature and then come to be valued for its archaeological significance. Some texts are born literary, some achieve

Thomas A. Howe is Professor of Bible and Biblical Languages at Southern Evangelical Seminary in Charlotte, NC.

1







"There is nothing ridiculous or poetic about the way the Bible repeatedly speaks about God changing his mind, regretting decisions, or thinking and speaking about the future in terms of possibilities. These passages usually occur

within the historical narrative sections of Scripture."

[Cregony A. Boyd, God of the Possible; A Biblical Introduction to the Open View of God (Crand Rapids: Baker Books, 2000), 118] Why should one think that the passages occurring "within the historical narrative sections of Scripture" have anything to do whether there is anything "ridiculous or poetic" about how the Bible is speaking about God?

After all, the Genesis 3 and the 2 Samuel 7 passages are both within historical narrative sections of Scripture.

"They only strike some as ridiculous because these readers bring to the text a preconception of what God must be like. Once one is free from this preconception, these passages contribute to the exalted portrait of the lovingly sovereign God in the Bible."

[Gregory A. Boyd, God of the Possible: A Biblical Introduction to the Open View of God (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2000), 118-119, emphasis in original I plead GUILTY AS CHARGED! "They only strike some as ridiculous because these readers bring to the text a preconception of what God must be like. Once one is free from this preconception, these passages contribute to the exalted portrait of the lovingly sovereign God in the Bible."

[Gregory A. Boyd, God of the Possible: A Biblical Introduction to the Open View of God (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2000), 118-119, emphasis in original But, from where might one get such a "preconception of what God must be like" that he could bring to the text?




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[Gregory A. Boyd, God of the Possible: A Biblical Introduction to the Open View of God (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2000), 118-119, emphasis in original Given that this
"preconception of what
God must be like" comes
from our encounter with
God's creation before we
read Scripture, how is it
possible for one to get
"free from this
preconception"?

"My fundamental thesis is that the classical theological tradition became misguided when, under the influence of Hellenistic philosophy, it defined God's perfection in static, timeless terms."


[Gregory a. Boyd, God of the Possible: A Biblical Introduction to the Open View of God (Grand


Rapids: Baker Books, 2000), 17]





"Doesn't every page of the Bible paint a portrait of God who experiences things, thinks things, and responds to things sequentially? Every verb applied to God in the Bible testifies to this."

[Gregory A. Boyd, God of the Possible: A Biblical Introduction to the Open View of God (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2000), 181-182]











"I suggest that if this text isn't enough to convince us that God's mind is not eternally settled, then our philosophical presuppositions are controlling our exegesis to a degree that no text could ever teach us this. People who affirm the divine authority of Scripture do not want to be guilty of this charge."

[Cregory A. Boyd, God of the Possible: Does God Ever Change His Mind? (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000), 78]







Behold, the name of the LORD comes from afar, Burning with His anger, And His burden is heavy; His lips are full of indignation, And His tongue like a devouring fire.


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[Cregory A. Boyd, God of the Possible: Does God]


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







"A fundamental aspect of classical thinking, again revealing the influence of Plato, was that God experiences no 'before' or 'after.' He experiences all of time in a single, changeless, eternal moment.






The Classical Attributes of God, Revisited


























































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