

Category	Meaning	Greek	Example
Substance	What	ousia	dog, tree
Quantity	How much	poson	small, tall
Quality	What sort	poion	Great Dane, oak
Relation	in relation to something	pros ti	smaller, taller
Place or Location	Where	pou	in my yard
Time	When	pote	right now, last year
Position	Being situated	keisthai	lying, standing
State or Habitus	Having, possession	echein	is leashed, is covered
Action	Doing	poiein	bites, shades
Passion	Undergoing	paschein	is fed, is pruned

A three-foot<sup>Quantity</sup> husky<sup>Quality</sup> dog<sup>Substance</sup>, much taller than<sup>Relation</sup> her puppy, was lying<sup>Postition</sup> in my yard<sup>Place</sup> yesterday<sup>Tilme</sup> on a leash<sup>State</sup> (Habitus), biting her paw<sup>Action</sup>, completely unaware that she was being fed<sup>Passion</sup> by me.





From individual dogs, one can derive the concept of dog.

From individual trees, one can derive the concept of tree.



- The relationship of the concept of 'dog' or 'tree' to the individual dogs or trees is the relationship of universals to particulars.
- One debate that has endured throughout the history of philosophy has been over what exactly is the nature of a universal.




From individual dogs, one can derive the concept of dog.

From individual trees, one can derive the concept of tree.

- ❖ Are universals merely names we give to things (Nominalism / Hume)?
- Or are universals more than names but nothing more than concepts (Conceptualism / Ockham)?
- Or are universals "real" in some sense of the term 'real'? (Realism)




- If universals are real in some sense of the term 'real', exactly what is the nature of their reality?
  - Are universals the fully real whereas the individuals "participate in" or "imitate" the universals? (Extreme Realism / Platonism)
  - Do universals "exist" as particulars in the individual and are only universal in the intellect? (Moderate Realism / Aristotelianism)
  - Are universals "ideas" in God's mind as their Creator and are made real as particulars in creation? (Scholastic Realism / Thomism)




From individual dogs, one can derive the concept of dog.

From individual trees, one can derive the concept of tree.


- Notice also that the universal is free of any specifying characteristics of the individual.
- The concept 'dog' does not specify German Shepherd or Chihuahua; young or old; brown or black; sitting or lying; eating or being washed ...
- The concept 'tree' is free of such individuating characteristics such as tall or short; deciduous or evergreen; fruit-bearing, flowerbearing or neither; in my backyard or in my neighbor's backyard ...




- Notice that, despite the changes in all the characteristics (accidents), you can know that it is the same dog throughout.
- Likewise with the tree. From acorn to flourishing oak, despite all the changes, you can know that it is the same tree throughout.




- That aspect of the thing that constitutes its "sameness" is its Form.
- That aspect of the thing that constitutes its "changing" is its Matter.
- 'Form' and 'Matter' are metaphysical aspects of any sensible thing.
- Neither exists apart from the sensible thing itself.



- The Form and Matter constitution of a sensible thing is known as hylomorphic dualism.
- This term comes from the Greek hule (ὑλή) which means 'matter' and morphe (μορφή) which means 'form'.
- They are metaphysical aspects of a single thing.




- Hylomorphic Dualism is to be distinguished from Substance Dualism.
- Substance Dualism was championed by René Descartes (1596-1650).
- Descartes regarded the material and immaterial components of a human to be two separate substances.



Note also that, unless something interferes (like injury, malnourishment, or disease), the Great Dane puppy will inevitably grow into an adult Great Dane and the acorn will inevitably grow into a mature oak tree.




- The trajectory of each of these things is its teleology.
- The term comes for the Greek word 'telos' (τέλος), meaning 'end' or 'goal'.
- A thing's teleology is determined by its Form.
- A thing's Form is that which constitutes "what" it is.
- An acorn will never become a Great Dane.



- These accidents of the thing that are not yet realized eventually will be realized if nothing interferes.
- These accidents that are yet to become real are know as potencies (or potentialities or capacities) that "exist" in the thing.



- Once they become real, they are actual (or actualities).
- Aristotle identifies this as the act and potency distinction.



- Aristotle called that which brings a potentiality into actuality the Efficient Cause.
- Aristotle identified three additional causes.



- The Efficient Cause is that by which a thing is.
- The Material Cause is that out of which a thing is.
- The Formal Cause is that which a thing is.
- The Final Cause is that for which a thing is.

Last, notice that you can think of a dog or tree or any number of sensible objects that used to exist but no longer exist.

What the dog "is" or what the tree "is" did not change.


The only thing that is different is "that" it was and now no longer "is."

This is known as the essence / existence distinction.

The essence is what something is.
The existence is that something is.
The essence / existence
distinction is a philosophical
augmentation of Aristotle's
metaphysics by Thomas Aquinas.



- ✓ substance and accidents
- √ ten categories
- ✓ universals and particulars
- √ form and matter
- √ teleology
- ✓ act and potency
- √ four causes
- √ essence/existence



- ✓ substance and accidents
- √ ten categories
- √ universals and particulars
- √ form and matter
- √ teleology
- √ act and potency
- √ four causes
- √ essence/existence



