


- born in Königsberg, East Prussia, April 22, 1724
- attended the University of Königsberg and later taught there




- born in Königsberg, East Prussia, April 22, 1724
- attended the University of Königsberg and later taught there
- Iectured on metaphysics, logic, ethics, aesthetics, philosophical theology, mathematics, physics, geography, and anthropology

- made significant contributions in philosophy and science
- philosophical impact is so significant that the history of modern philosophy is sometimes divided into "pre-Kantian" and "post-Kantian" periods
- ➢ died February 12, 1804






One major influence on earlier stages of Kant's philosophy was Christian Wolff.




While immersed in the system of Wolff, Kant's thinking was overturned and he embarked in a new direction because of his reading of Hume.




"I openly confess my recollection of David Hume was the very thing which many years ago first interrupted my dogmatic slumber and gave my investigations in the field of speculative philosophy a quite new direction."

[Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, ed. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1950), 8] Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) "If we accept [Hume's] conclusions, then all that we call metaphysics is a mere delusion whereby we fancy ourselves to have rational insight into what, in actual fact, is borrowed solely from experience, and under the influence of custom has taken the illusory semblance of necessity."

[Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press), 55]






The philosophers of the day (the Rationalists and the Empiricists) distinguished two kinds of truths

Truths of Reason	Truths of Fact
a. Hume referred to them as relations of ideas.	a. Hume referred to them as matters of fact.
b. logical truths (i.e., established by the logical law of non-contradiction)	b. experiential truths (i.e., not established by the logical law of non-contradiction)
c. necessary and universal	c. contingent and probable
d. known " <i>a priori</i> "	d. known " <i>a posteriori</i> "
e. The predicate is contained in the subject. (Bachelors are unmarried.)	e. The predicate is not contained in the subject. (My dog is brown.)
f. Kant labeled these "analytic propositions or judgments."	f. Kant labeled these "synthetic propositions or judgments."
g. e.g., mathematical truths	g. e.g., scientific truths

- The Rationalists, including Kant, held that even scientific truths (e.g., causality, time, space) could ultimately be reduced to logical truths.
- However, because of the devastating critique of Hume, Kant was convinced that reason could not establish even these scientific truths.
- Since they served as the foundation for the natural sciences, Kant took Hume's philosophy as a threat to the very survival of science itself.

Kant embarked on the task of resolving the tensions between his earlier rationalism and the insights of empiricism.




Kant set out to develop a new understanding of knowledge that would undergird science and steer a course between:

the dogmatism of the rationalists


and

the skepticism of the empiricists [i.e., Hume]

while retaining the insights of each.




"The first rule of the new method [of Kant] was, not to begin by definition as mathematicians do, but to seek in each object what can be perceived in it with immediate evidence. Each one of these immediately evident perceptions expresses itself in a judgment.




"The second rule was to enumerate separately all such judgments, and to make sure that none of them is contained within another, after which the remaining judgments can safely be laid down as the fundamental axioms on which all subsequent knowledge has to be grounded."


[Etienne Gilson, as The Unity of Philosophical Experience: A Survey Showing the Unity of Medieval, Cartesian, and Modern Philosophy (New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1937) reprinted (Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, 1982), 227.] Etienne Gilson (1884-1978)




"There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience. ... But though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it arises out of experience."


[*Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press), 41]

























"It is evident from the above that the first condition, namely, that under which alone objects can be intuited, does actually lie a priori in the mind as the formal ground of the objects.





"All appearances necessarily agree with this formal condition of sensibility, since only through it can they appear, that is, be empirically intuited and given....



"In that case all empirical knowledge of objects would necessarily conform to such concepts, because only as thus presupposing them is anything possible as object of experience."


[*Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press), 41]






"There are, according to Kant, certain a priori categories and principles of judgment. But Kant did not imagine that he was supplying for the first time a brand new set of categories. What he wished to do was to show how the categories which ground the synthetic a priori principles of our theoretical knowledge have their origin in the structure of the understanding. He wanted to connect them with the pure reason (the word 'reason' being here used in its wider sense)."

[Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy: Vol. VI: Wolff to Kant (Garden City: Image Books), 309.]





Etienne Gilson (1884-1978) These forms are said to be a priori because we do not derive them from things, but impose them on things; the forms of our knowledge of reality make it an object of knowledge and are therefore also the forms of experience itself.

Etienne Gilson (1884-1978) Now our understanding is similarly equipped with a priori principles, such as the notions of substance, or of causality, by which it connects the various objects given to us in space and time."

[Etienne Gilson, as The Unity of Philosophical Experience: A Survey Showing the Unity of Medieval, Cartesian, and Modern Philosophy (New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1937) reprinted (Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, 1982), 230.] The upshot of Kant's philosophy was that it was not possible for one to objectively know the physical world in itself, but that one knows the physical world only as it appears to him.

The implication of Kant's philosophy has manifested in remarkable ways even down to today.

