





Dan Brown on Historical Skepticism



















What does it mean to say that a writer "interprets" history?

If he means that the writing of an event is not the event itself, this is a trivial observation and irrelevant to adjudicating conflicting historical reports.

What does it mean to say that a writer "interprets" history?

- ➤ If he means that in the writing of an event, the writer always modifies the nature of the event itself, then how could he possibly know this?
 - ✓ He would have to know the exact nature of the event in order to observe that a given writer's reporting of the event was a modification.
 - ✓ But then if he has access to accurate knowledge of the event itself, then there is no problem in the first place.

What does it mean to say that a writer "interprets" history?


- The above criticisms apply mutatis mutandis to Browns comment "we are interpreting people's interpretation."
- The fact remains that it is impossible to deny that one can observe history objectively or that one can read someone's observations objectively.


The comment "history was written by the winners" falsely implies that the winners' reporting of history is false or misleading.


Since the Allied Forces won World War II, does this mean that the Nazis were not as evil as the "winners" have claimed?

The comment "history was written by the winners" falsely implies that the winners' reporting of history is false or misleading.


It is not true that history is always written by the winners. The Romans subjugated the Jews, yet our understanding of Jewish history during that period comes from such writers as Josephus.




































Can the Historian Rise above His Own Historical Situatedness?




Thowever clearly one demonstrates
the inner contradictions of all
relativist views, it is as Heidegger
has said: all these victorious
arguments have something of the
attempt to bowl one over. However
cogent they may seem, they still
miss the main point. In making use
of them one is proved right, and yet
they do not express any superior
insight of value.

Hans-Georg Gadamer
(1900-2002)




"What Gadamer is saying is that, notwithstanding the inevitable relativism, historicism is absolutely and indubitably inescapable, and that this is ahistorically true for all people at all times in all cultures.

Gadamer appears to have access to an ahistorical, transcendent perspective on historicism that he disallows for everyone else. ...




"Since the claims of historicism are indeed self-refuting, and since, as Gadamer acknowledges, 'the thesis of skepticism or relativism refutes itself to the extent that it claims to be true is an irrefutable argument,' then the implications of historicism do not follow,



"and absolute truth, including absolute concepts of justice, the self, reality, and moral law, does exist and is accessible by the finite mind. In fact, the existence of absolute truth is asserted by those who advocate the absolute truth of historicism."

[Iltornes A. How, Class Notes PHS16 Philosophy of Harmanaulius, Soulinem Evengelled Seminary, 333]


Thomas A. Howe




Did ancient writers care about historical accuracy and truth?

The writings from other historians show that ancient people understood the differences between history and myth.


This is especially true with the Hebrew mindset (within which the New Testament was birthed) which understood the sacredness of history.





"The central concerns—
above all with history as
truth-telling and, at least as
an ideal, as free from bias—
were already very old ones
and, though shaken, are still
in some sense with us, for
those of us for whom a
distinction between say,
history and imaginative
fiction is still an important
one.



"In this view Herodotus was taking an important step in distinguishing his own Histories from the work of the poets, and Thucydides, though he may have judged unfairly, was invoking relevant criteria when he sneered by implication at Herodotus as belonging with authors less concerned to tell the truth than to entertain the public. ...









Historicism is self-refuting.


- It is undeniable that our faculties of knowing enable us to know reality objectively.
- If this were not so, we would not be able to judge that anyone from the past even had a historical "situatedness" in the first place.
- This is so (as even Gadamer admitted) since our observation of their historical "situatedness" would itself have to be the product of our own historical "situatedness."
- This problem is not unlike the problem that arises from how some contemporary apologists define a "worldview."



Historicism ignores how human beings know reality.


- Our intellect is able to know certain metaphysical aspects or "constituents" of sensible objects.
- One such aspect is the nature of the things.
- Knowing the nature of particular things enables us to know certain truths about particular things that fall beyond our immediate experience.






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"The chief problem built into induction is the problem of classification into universals.

For a universal to be absolutely established inductively requires that a comprehensive and exhaustive sampling be made."

[R. C. Sproul, John Gerstner, and Arthur Lindsley, Classical Apologetics: A Rational Defense of the Christian Faith and a Critique of Presuppositionalism (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1984), 87]

If by 'absolutely established, they mean that we would be omniscient about it, then I completely agree.

"The chief problem built into induction is the problem of classification into universals.

For a universal to be absolutely established inductively requires that a comprehensive and exhaustive sampling be made."

[R. C. Sproul, John Gerstner, and Arthur Lindsley, Classical Apologetics: A Rational Defense of the Christian Faith and a Critique of Presuppositionalism (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1984), 87]

But if they are meaning absolutely established along the contours of human, knowing, then I disagree.

"The chief problem built into induction is the problem of classification into universals. For a universal to be absolutely established inductively requires that a comprehensive and exhaustive sampling be made."

What is more, such a view is decidedly not Thomistic, despite Sproul's claim to be Thomistic.

[R. C. Sproul, John Gerstner, and Arthur Lindsley, Classical Apologetics: A Rational Defense of the Christian Faith and a Critique of Presuppositionalism (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1984), 87]