




- born in 384/3 B.C. in Stageria (Stagira)
- father: Nicomachus (from where his treatise *Nicomachean Ethics* gets its name) according to Frederick Copleston (also his son according to Copleston), although Samuel Enoch Stumpf says Nicomachus was Aristotle's son by Herpyllis after his wife Pythias died
- a physician of the Macedonian king Amyntas II




- at 17 he joined Plato's Academy in Athens where he stayed until Plato's death in 348/7 BC
- though Aristotle's thought diverges from Plato's in significant areas, he no doubt honored Plato even after Plato's death.




- When Plato's nephew Speusippus took over the Academy upon Plato's death, Aristotle went to Assos, under the rule of Hermeias, a former student at the Academy, and founded a branch of the Academy.
- He taught there for three years and married Hermeias' niece and adopted daughter Pythias. They had a daughter.



- They later returned to Athens. Pythias died and Aristotle entered a relationship (though never married) with Herpyllis. According to Stumpf, they had a son named Nicomachus, after whom the *Nicomachean Ethics* was named.
- Aristotle moved to the island of Lesbos.




- In 343/2 B.C. Phillip of Macedon invited Aristotle to become the tutor of his son Alexander, who was 13 years old.
- Upon return to Athens in 335/34 B.C., founded the Lyceum
- named after the groves where Socrates was known to have gone to think and which were the sacred precincts of Apollo Lyceus






Aristotle
(384-322 BC)



- He and his students would go for walks to discuss philosophy, hence the school became known as peripatetic (peripatēō [περιπατέω] = to walk around)
- This was his most productive time.





Bekker Numbers in the Works of Aristotle











Correspondence

Truth is correspondence to reality.

- This says that a statement is true in as much as it corresponds to reality.
- Thus, the statement 'It is raining.'

'It is raining'

would be a true
statement if it is in
fact raining
in reality.




'It is raining'

would be a false
statement if it is in
fact not raining
in reality.



*Other Philosophers Who Hold to the
Correspondence Theory of Truth*


Other Philosophers Who Hold to the Correspondence Theory of Truth



Plato
(428-248 BC)



Augustine
(354-430 BC)




Anselm
(1033-1109)



Aquinas
(1225-1274)



Descartes
(1596-1660)



Locke
(1632-1704)




Hume
(1711-1776)




Kant
(1724-1804)



Russell
(1872-1970)



Wittgenstein
(1889-1951)




Aristotle
(384-322 BC)

***"To say of what is,
that it is not, or of
what is not, that it is,
is false, while to say
of what is, that it is
and of what is not,
that it is not, is true."***

Metaphysics, IV, 7, 1011^b26-29 Translation by W. D. Ross in Richard McKeon, *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (New York: Random House, 1941). τὸ μὲν γὰρ λέγειν τὸ ὄν μὴ εἶναι ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν εἶναι ψεῦδος, τὸ δὲ τὸ ὄν εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν μὴ εἶναι ἀληθές.


Correspondence Theory of Truth




Aristotle
(384-322 BC)

"But we have now posited that it is impossible for anything at the same time to be and not to be, and by this means have shown that this is the most indisputable of all principles. Some indeed demand that even this shall be demonstrated, but this they do through want of education, for not to know of what things one should demand demonstration, and of what one should not, argues want of education. For it is impossible that there should be demonstration of absolutely everything (there would be an infinite regress, so that there would still be no demonstration)."


[Metaphysics, IV, 4, 1006a5-10. Translation by Richard McKeon, *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (New York: Random House, 1941)]






Category	Meaning	Greek	Example
Substance	What	ousia	dog, tree
Quantity	How much	poson	small, tall
Quality	What sort	poion	Great Dane, oak
Relation	in relation to something	pros ti	smaller, taller
Place or Location	Where	pou	in my yard
Time	When	pote	right now, last year
Position	Being situated	keisthai	lying, standing
State or Habitus	Having, possession	echein	is leashed, is covered
Action	Doing	poiein	bites, shades
Passion	Undergoing	paschein	is fed, is pruned


A three-foot^{Quantity} husky^{Quality}
 dog^{Substance}, much taller than^{Relation} her
 puppy, was lying^{Position} in my yard^{Place}
 yesterday^{Time} on a leash^{State (Habitus)},
 biting her paw^{Action}, completely
 unaware that she was being
 fed^{Passion} by me.






"Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject."

[Categories, V, 2^a11. Translation by E. M. Edghill in Richard McKeon, *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (New York: Random House, 1941), 9]



"By being 'present in a subject' I do not mean present as parts are present in a whole, but being incapable of existence apart from the said subject."

[Categories, V, 1^a23-24. Translation by E. M. Edghill in Richard McKeon, *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (New York: Random House, 1941), 7]





Aristotle's Doctrine of Form

Although Aristotle rejected Plato's notion of Form, he did not reject the notion of Form altogether.

Instead, Aristotle rejected Plato's transcendent forms and opted instead for immanent forms.



The form of the thing is in the thing, not removed or separated from it.

*In the sensible realm, form cannot exist without **matter** and **matter** cannot exist without form.*



***What is
Matter?***

Hylomorphism


Hylemorphism

hylomorphic composition


the necessary twofold composition, material and formal, of everything in the sensible world

hule (ὕλη) = matter


morphe (μορφή) = form



***Aristotle's Criticism
of Plato's Notion of
Participation***




"After the systems we have named came the philosophy of Plato, which in most respects followed these thinkers, but had peculiarities that distinguished it from the philosophy of the Italians. For, having in his youth first become familiar with Cratylus and with the Heraclitean doctrines (that all sensible things are ever in a state of flux and there is no knowledge about them), these views he held even in later years."



"Socrates, however, was busying himself about ethical matters and neglecting the world of nature as a whole but seeking the universal in these ethical matters, and fixed thought for the first time on definitions; Plato accepted his teaching, but held that the problem applied not to sensible things but to entities of another kind-for this reason, that the common definition could not be a definition of any sensible thing, as they were always changing. "

[Metaphysics, A (1), 5, 987a29 – 6, 987b7, trans. W. D. Ross in Richard McKeon, ed. *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (New York: Random House, 1941), 700-701]







Aristotle
(384-322 BC)

"Things of this other sort, then, he called Ideas, and sensible things, he said, were all named after these, and in virtue of a relation to these; for the many existed by participation in the Ideas that have the same name as they. Only the name 'participation' was new; for the Pythagoreans say that things exist by 'imitation' of numbers, and Plato says they exist by participation, changing the name. But what the participation or the imitation of the Forms could be they left an open question."


[Metaphysics, A (1), 6, 987a29 - 6, 987b8-13, trans. Ross, in McKeon, 701]

The Third Man Argument






Aristotle's Two Questions about Plato's Theory of Forms.



*How can the Forms be the causes of the natures or "whatnesses" of things without being "in" those things?
Aristotle says they can't.*




*How do Plato's
transcendent and
unchanging Forms account
for the most evident fact
about the things around us,
viz., their coming into being
and their motion and
change?*

Aristotle says they don't.

[Miller, pp. 92-97]


Aristotle on Plato's Doctrine of Forms



Aristotle
(384-322 BC)

"Above all one might discuss the question what [it is] on earth the Forms contribute to sensible things, either to those that are eternal or to those that come into being and cease to be. For they cause neither movement nor any change in them."


[Metaphysics, A (1), 9, 991a9-11, trans. Ross, in McKeon, 707]



Aristotle
(384-322 BC)

"But again they help in no wise either towards the knowledge of the other things (for they are not even the substance of these, else they would have been in them), or towards their being, if they are not in the particulars which share in them."

[Metaphysics, A (1), 9, 991a12-15, trans. Ross, in McKeon, 707-708]




But, further, all other things cannot come from the Forms in any of the usual senses of 'from'. And to say that they are patterns and the other things share in them is to use empty words and poetical metaphors.

...

[*Metaphysics*, A (1), 9, 991a19-22, trans. Ross, in McKeon, 708]


Aristotle
(384-322 BC)



"Again, it would seem impossible that the substance and that of which it is the substance should exist apart; how, therefore, could the Ideas, being the substances of things, exist apart?"

[*Metaphysics*, A (1), 9, 991b1-3, trans. Ross, in McKeon, 708]


Aristotle
(384-322 BC)



Aristotle
(384-322 BC)

"In the Phaedo, the case is stated in this way-that the Forms are causes both of being and of becoming; yet when the Forms exist, still the things that share in them do not come into being, unless there is something to originate movement; and many other things come into being (e.g. a house or a ring) of which we say there are no Forms."

[*Metaphysics*, A (1), 9, 991^a8-991^b5]



Act and potency are sometimes referred to as actuality and potentiality.

This is how Aristotle and Aquinas account for change.


∞ Potency ∞

= the power or capacity or possibility to be actual or real

Logical Potency
vs.
Metaphysical Potency

There are both logical and metaphysical senses of the terms "potency" or "possible."

***Logically, something may
be possible (or potential)
in as much as it is not a
contradiction.***




Aristotle
(384-322 BC)

***"The possible,
then, in one sense,
as has been said,
means that which
is not of necessity
false."***

[Metaphysics D (V), 12, 1019^a30, trans. W. D. Ross, in Richard McKeon, ed. *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (New York: Random House, 1941), 765]


***Metaphysically, a potency
is a real capacity in a real
thing.***



Aristotle
(384-322 BC)

***"'Potency' then means the
source, in general, of change
or movement in another thing
or in the same thing qua
other; e.g. the art of building
is a potency which is not in
the thing built, while the art
of healing, which is a
potency, may be in the man
healed, but not in him qua
healed."***

[Metaphysics, D (V), 12, 1019^a15 - 1019^a20, trans. W. D. Ross,
in Richard McKeon, ed. *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (New York:
Random House, 1941), 765]




Aristotle
(384-322 BC)


"'Potency' then means the source, in general, of change or movement in another thing than the thing moved or in the same thing **qua** [i.e., as] other ..."

[Metaphysics, D (V), 12, 1019^a15 - 1019^a20, trans. W. D. Ross, in Richard McKeon, ed. *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (New York: Random House, 1941), 765]


Active Potency
vs.
Passive Potency



Active potency is the ability of something to cause change in something else.




Passive potency is the ability of something to undergo change in as much as it possess metaphysical potency.



Aristotle
(384-322 BC)

**"We ... ascribe
potency to that
whose nature it is
to move
something else or
to be moved by
something else."**

[Metaphysics Θ (IX), 6, 1019^a30, trans. W. D. Ross, in Richard McKeon, ed. *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (New York: Random House, 1941), 766]






active potency



passive potency

**"We ... ascribe
potency to that
whose nature it is
to move
something else or
to be moved by
something else."**

[Metaphysics Θ (IX), 6, 1019^a30, trans. W. D. Ross, in Richard McKeon, ed. *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (New York: Random House, 1941), 766]



 <p>DR. RYAN MULLINS</p>	<p><i>"In Divine Simplicity, God is said to be purely actual. And that means that God has no unactualized potential. ... I think it's really hard to make sense of Divine freedom if you want to say that that God has no potential."</i></p>	<p><i>"The idea that God has no potentiality seems to me to be obviously false scripturally speaking ... God has ... the potential to do all sorts of things that He isn't actually doing. So, clearly God has ... unlimited potential."</i></p>	 <p>DR. WILLIAM LANE CRAIG</p>
---	---	--	---



 **Act** 
 (or Actuality)
 = to be real
**A potency is actualized
 by a cause.**


A person who is actually sitting but not actually standing, nevertheless has the potential or power or capacity to stand.



Upon standing, the person actualizes his potential to stand, his standing becomes actual and his sitting now becomes potential.








Aristotle
(384-322 BC)

"Actuality, then, is the existence of a thing not in the way which we express by 'potentially'; we say that potentially, for instance, a statue of Hermes is in the block of wood and the half-line is in the whole, because it might be separated out ... ; the thing that stands in contrast to each of these exist actually. Our meaning can be seen in the particular cases by induction, and we must ... be content to grasp the analogy, that it is as that which is building is to that which is capable of building ... and that which is seeing to that which has its eyes shut but has sight, and that which has been shaped out of the matter to the matter Let actually be defined by one member of this antithesis, and the potential by the other."

[*Metaphysics* Θ (IV), 6, 1048^a31 - 1048^b5, trans. W. D. Ross, in Richard McKeon, ed. *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (New York: Random House, 1941), 826]



Aristotle
(384-322 BC)

"'Potency' then means the source, in general, of change or movement in another thing than the thing moved or in the same thing qua [i.e., as] other ..."

[*Metaphysics*, D (V), 12, 1019^a15 - 1019^a20, trans. W. D. Ross, in Richard McKeon, ed. *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (New York: Random House, 1941), 765]

"Howsoever anything acts, it does so inasmuch as it is in act; howsoever anything receives, it does so inasmuch as it is in potency."

[Bernard J. Wuellner, *Summary of Scholastic Principles* (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1956), 5]

SUMMARY OF SCHOLASTIC PRINCIPLES




BERNARD J. WUELLNER

"Howsoever anything acts, it does so inasmuch as it is **in act**; howsoever anything receives, it does so inasmuch as it is **in potency**."

[Bernard J. Wuellner, *Summary of Scholastic Principles* (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1956), 5]

"In act" here means that the thing or some aspect of the thing exists.


"In potency" here means that the thing or some aspect of the thing does not fully exist.




<p>Change is impossible because:</p> <p>being cannot come out of non-being (= out of nothing, nothing comes)</p> <p>being cannot come out of being, for being already is (fire cannot come out of air, since air is air and not fire)</p> <p>Parmenides</p>	<p>Change is possible because:</p> <p>Fire does not come out of air as air [air <i>qua</i> air], but out of air which can be fire and is not yet fire (i.e., The air has the potentiality to become fire.)</p> <p>Aristotle</p>
---	---


<p>Change is impossible because:</p> <p>This is would amount to saying that a being comes into being from non-being.</p> <p>Parmenides</p>	<p>Change is possible because:</p> <p>It does not come into being from its privation merely [simpliciter], but from its privation in a subject.</p> <p>Aristotle</p>
--	--

<p>Change is impossible because:</p> <p>This is would amount to saying that a thing comes into being from being, which is a contradiction (because a being already is, and thus cannot come into being).</p> <p>Parmenides</p>	<p>Change is possible because:</p> <p>It does not come into being from being precisely as such, but from being which is also non-being, viz., not the thing which comes to be. (= distinction of act, potency, and privation)</p> <p>Aristotle</p>
---	---

 <p>Parmenides</p>	<p>"So it is possible that a thing may be capable of being and not be, and capable of not being and yet be.... For of non-existent things some exist potentially; but they do not exist because they do not exist in complete reality."</p> <p><small>[Metaphysics, Q (IX), 3, 1047a20, 35-1047b1]</small></p> <p>Aristotle</p>
--	--




*Teleology has to do with
"goal directedness."
There are three kinds of teleology in
a thing: extrinsic to the thing,
intrinsic to the thing, and
extrinsic/intrinsic to the thing.*




Plato
(428/7 BC-348/7 BC)

Extrinsic Teleology



Plato
(428/7 BC-348/7 BC)

Things are directed toward their goal by something entirely extrinsic to (outside of) the thing.




Plato
(428/7 BC-348/7 BC)


*"Now everything that becomes or is **created** must of necessity be **created** by some cause, for without a cause nothing can be **created**. The work of the **creator** (δημιουργός, dēmiourgos)"*

"It has become difficult for us to read Greek philosophers otherwise than through their mediaeval interpretations. No English translator of Plato will hesitate in calling the Demiurge of Plato a 'creator,' nor in designating his work as 'creation,' yet, even when a Christian theologian expressly invokes Plato's authority on this point, he is not at all speaking of the same things."

[Etienne Gilson, Preface to 1st ed. of *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics* by Joseph Owens (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1978), vii]



Etienne Gilson
(1884-1978)



Plato
(428/7 BC-348/7 BC)


*"Now everything that becomes or is **created** must of necessity be **created** by some cause, for without a cause nothing can be **created**. The work of the **creator** (δημιουργός, dēmiourgos), whenever he looks to the unchangeable and fashions the form and nature of his work after an unchangeable pattern, must necessarily be made fair and perfect, but when he looks to the created only and uses a created pattern, it is not fair or perfect."*

[Plato, *Timaeus*, 28a, trans. Benjamin Jowett in Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, eds. *Plato: The Collected Dialogues* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 1161]

A marble bust of Aristotle, showing him with a full, curly beard and hair, wearing a draped garment. The bust is set against a light background.

Intrinsic Teleology


Aristotle
(384-322 BC)

A marble bust of Aristotle, showing him with a full, curly beard and hair, wearing a draped garment. The bust is set against a light background.

Things are directed toward their goal by something entirely intrinsic to (inside) the thing.


Aristotle
(384-322 BC)

Intrinsic/ Extrinsic Teleology




Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

Things are directed
toward their goal
both by something
intrinsic to (inside)
the things and
extrinsic to (outside)
the thing.




Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

Aquinas uses extrinsic/intrinsic teleology as an argument for God's existence, as an argument for God's providence, and as an argument for God's knowledge of things other than himself.




Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

***As an Argument
for God's
Existence***



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)


"We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end."



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)


"Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move toward an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God."

[ST, Q2, art. 3, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Westminster: Christian Classics, 1981)]




Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

As an Argument for God's Providence




Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

***"The natural necessity
inherent in those beings
which are determined to a
particular thing, is a kind
of impression from God,
directing them to their
end;"***




Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

***"as the necessity
whereby an arrow is
moved so as to fly
towards a certain point is
an impression from the
archer, and not from the
arrow."***



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)


***"But there is a difference,
inasmuch as that which
creatures receive from
God is their nature, while
that which natural things
receive from man in
addition to their nature is
somewhat violent."***



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)


"Wherefore, as the violent necessity in the movement of the arrow shows the actions of the archer, so the natural necessity of things shows the government of Divine Providence."

[STI, Q. 103, art. 1, ad. 3, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province]




Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

As an Argument for God's Knowledge of Things Other than Himself




Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

"Whatever naturally tends toward another must have this tendency from someone directing it toward its end; otherwise, it would tend toward it merely by chance."




Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

"Now, in the things of nature we find a natural appetite by which each and every things tends toward its end."




Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)

"Hence, we must affirm the existence of some intellect above natural things, which has ordained natural things to their end and implanted in them a natural appetite or inclination."



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)


"But a thing cannot be ordained to any end unless the thing itself is known, together with the end to which it is ordained."



Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)


"Hence, there must be a knowledge of natural things in the divine intellect from which the origin and the order of nature come."

[*On Truth (de veritate)*, Q 2, art. 3, trans. Robert W. Mulligan (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), Vol. 1, p. 70]




Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274)






According to Aristotle, there are four principles or causes which are necessarily involved in the explanation of a sensible object.




Aristotle
(384-322 BC)

"'Cause' means (1) that from which, as immanent material, a thing comes into being, e.g., the bronze is the cause of the statue ...




Aristotle
(384-322 BC)

"(2) The form or pattern, i.e., the definition of the essence, and the classes which include this ..., and the parts included in the definition.




Aristotle
(384-322 BC)

"(3) That from which the change or the resting from change first begins; e.g., ... the advisor is the cause of the action, and the father a cause of the child



Aristotle
(384-322 BC)

(4) The end, i.e., that for the sake of which a thing is; e.g., health is the cause of walking.



Aristotle
(384-322 BC)


For 'Why does one walk?' we say; 'that one may be healthy'; and in speaking thus we think we have given the cause. These, then, are practically all the senses in which causes are spoken of.'

[Metaphysics, D (5), 2, 1013^a24-1013^b3, trans. Ross, in McKeon, ed., 752-753]



Material Cause
that *out of which*
an effect is
= what the chair is made
of: wood

Formal Cause
that *which*
an effect is
= form, structure, or
nature of the chair:
chair-ness











Efficient Cause
that *by which*
an effect is
= who produced the
chair: the builder


Final Cause
that *for which*
an effect is
= why the chair was built:
to sit on






artifact			natural kind
 <p>onto the wood</p> <p>to "create" a chair</p>	 <p>The carpenter imposes a "form" from his mind</p>  <p>to sit on.</p>	 	<p>the form (which is intrinsic to the natural kind)</p> <p>directs the natural kind</p> <p>to its proper end or telos</p>
<p>There is nothing intrinsic to the wood that causes it to become a chair.</p> <p>The "form" is completely accounted for extrinsically by the mind of the carpenter.</p>		<p>There is something intrinsic to the acorn that causes it to become an oak tree.</p> <p>The form is intrinsic to the acorn.</p> <p>However, for the Christian, God accounts for the existence of the form (extrinsically).</p>	

It should be noted that the final cause is not necessarily external to (i.e., from the outside of) the thing, and indeed in Aristotle's thinking, the final cause is often not distinct from the thing itself.




Frederick Copleston
(1907-1994)

"But though [Aristotle] lays great stress on finality, it would be a mistake to suppose that finality, for Aristotle, is equivalent to *external* finality, as though we were to say, for instance, that grass grows in order that sheep may have food.



Frederick Copleston
(1907-1994)

"On the contrary, he insists much more on internal or immanent finality (thus the apple tree has attained its end or purpose, not when its fruit forms a healthy or pleasant food for man or has been made into cider,




Frederick Copleston
(1907-1994)


"but when the apple tree has reached that perfection of development of which it is capable, i.e., the perfection of its form), for in his view the formal cause of the thing is normally its final cause as well."

[Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, 9 vols., Vol 1: Greece and Rome (New York: Image Books, 1962-62), 313]

Using an artifact as an illustration of the four causes can be misleading, particularly in describing the final cause.




With a statue, one would understand the final cause to be something in the sculptor in terms of his intention.




But for Aristotle, conscious intention is not necessary for final causality.

**While nature mirrors deliberation
in that it works to an end, for
Aristotle all things in nature tend
toward the full actualization
because of their forms.**



Aristotle
(384-322 BC)


**"Further, where a series has a
completion, all the preceding
steps are for the sake of that.
Now surely as in intelligent
action, so in nature; and as in
nature, so it is in each action, if
nothing interferes.**



Aristotle
(384-322 BC)


"Now intelligent action is for the sake of an end; therefore the nature of things also is so.... And since 'nature' means two things, the matter and the form, of which the latter is the end, and since all the rest is for the sake of the end, the form must be the cause in the sense of 'that for the sake of which.'"

[Physics, II, 3, 194^b24-33, , trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, in McKeon, 240-241]




Aristotle
(384-322 BC)

"A difficulty presents itself: why should not nature work, not for the sake of something, nor because it is better so, but just as the sky rains, not in order to make the corn grow, but of necessity?"




Aristotle
(384-322 BC)

"What is drawn up must cool, and what has been cooled must become water and descend, the result of this being that the corn grows. Similarly if a man's crop is spoiled on the threshing-floor, the rain did not fall for the sake of this—in order that the crop might be spoiled—but that result just followed.



Aristotle
(384-322 BC)


"Why then should it not be the same with the parts in nature, e.g. that our teeth should come up of necessity—the front teeth sharp, fitted for tearing, the molars broad and useful for grinding down the food—since they did not arise for this end, but it was merely a coincident result; and so with all other parts in which we suppose that there is purpose?




Aristotle
(384-322 BC)


"Wherever then all the parts came about just what they would have been if they had come to be for an end, such things survived, being organized spontaneously in a fitting way; whereas those which grew otherwise perished and continue to perish . . ."

[*Physics*, II, 8, 198b17-32, trans. Hardie and Gaye, in McKeon, 249]






*For Aristotle, to be is to be a form.
As such, there is no philosophical
notion of existence as such in
Aristotle's philosophy.*




*Indeed, there does not seem to be a
distinctive philosophical discussion
of existence as such in any ancient
Greek philosophy.*

A portrait of Joseph Owens, a man with short dark hair, wearing a black clerical shirt with a white collar. He is looking slightly to the right with a thoughtful expression. The background is blurred, showing green foliage and a white structure.

Joseph Owens
(1908-2005)


"For Aristotle, to be actualized meant to acquire form. For Aquinas, it meant to be brought into existence, since for him existence is the actuality of every form or nature."

["Aquinas and the Five Ways," *Monist* 58 (January 1974): 21]

A portrait of Joseph Owens, a man with short dark hair, wearing a black clerical shirt with a white collar. He is looking slightly to the right with a thoughtful expression. The background is blurred, showing green foliage and a white structure.

Joseph Owens
(1908-2005)


"From the viewpoint of the much later distinction between essence and the act of existing, this treatment [of the nature of being per accidens] must mean that Aristotle is leaving the act of existing, entirely outside the scope of his philosophy."




Joseph Owens
(1908-2005)

"The act of existing must be wholly escaping his *scientific* consideration. All necessary and definite connections between things can be reduced to essence."

[Joseph Owens, *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics: A Study in the Greek Background of Mediaeval Thought*, 3rd ed (Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies), 309 emphasis in original]




Parviz Morewedge



**PHILOSOPHIES
OF
EXISTENCE**

Ancient
and
Medieval

Edited by
PARVIZ MOREWEDGE



Charles H. Kahn
Author of "Why Existence Did Not Emerge as a Distinct Concept in Greek Philosophy"



Parviz Morewedge


"The upshot is that, although we can recognize at least three different kinds of existential questions discussed by Aristotle, Aristotle himself neither distinguishes these questions from one another nor brings them together under any common head or topic which might be set in contrast to other themes in his general discussion of Being."

[Charles H. Kahn, "Why Existence Does Not Emerge as a Distinct Concept in Greek Philosophy," in *Philosophies of Existence: Ancient and Medieval*, ed. Parviz Morewedge (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982), 10]



Charles H. Kahn

Author of "Why Existence Did Not Emerge as a Distinct Concept in Greek Philosophy"



Herbert McCabe
(1926-2001)

**"A perfect *X* is
an *X* that has
all its
properties; an
imperfect *X*
lacks one of
more of its
properties."**

[*God and Evil in the Theology of St Thomas Aquinas* (London: Continuum, 2010), 40]



Herbert McCabe
(1926-2001)

**"A perfect *X* is
an *X* that has
all its
properties; an
imperfect *X*
lacks one of
more of its
properties."**

[*God and Evil in the Theology of St Thomas Aquinas* (London: Continuum, 2010), 40]



Herbert McCabe
(1926-2001)




☞ Genus ☞
animal

☞ Specific difference ☞
rationality

☞ Species ☞
human


☞ Proper accident ☞
five fingers

☞ Accident ☞
black hair



Aristotle
(384-322 BC)

☞ PROPERTIES ☞



Aristotle
(384-322 BC)