



Defining Evil
Distinguishing Evil
Different "Problems" of Evil
Historical Roots
Formulating the Problem
Some Non-Evangelical Options
Some Evangelical Options
The Classical Approach




In contemporary philosophy, evil usually has to do with pain, suffering, and death.





This definition of evil in contemporary philosophy differs from the definition of evil in the Classical / Scholastic (i.e., Aristotelian / Thomistic) tradition.



One of the most common distinctions contemporary philosophers make regarding evil is between


One of the most common distinctions contemporary philosophers make regarding evil is between natural evil and moral evil.











"The existence of evil is the most fundamental threat to the traditional Western concept of an all-good, all-powerful God.

Andrea M. Weisberger


"Both natural evil,
the suffering that
occurs as a result of
physical
phenomena, and
moral evil, the
suffering resulting
from human actions,
comprise the
problem of evil.



"If evil cannot be accounted for, then belief in the traditional Western concept of God is absurd."

[Andrea M. Weisberger, "The Argument from Evil," in *The Cambridge Companion to Atheism*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 166, emphasis in original]








the logical problem of evil is notion that the propositions "God exists" and "Evil exists" are logically incompatible

With very few exceptions, the consensus among contemporary philosophers is that there is no logical problem of evil.

J.L. Mackie


THE MIRACLE OF THEISM


Arguments for and against the Existence of God





"We can concede that the problem of evil does not, after all, show that the central doctrines of theism are logically inconsistent with one another."


[The Miracle of Theism, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 154]











PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Vol., 10 No. 39

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GOD AND EVIL


The Problem Syates:


Evil is a problem for the theist in that a contradiction is involved in he fact of evil on the one hand, and the belief in the omnipotence and perfection of God on the other. God cannot be both all-powerful and erfectly good if evil is real. This contradiction is well set out in the detail yakacies in his discussion of the problem. In his discussion facilities on above that this contradiction cannot be resolved in terms of man's free with the problem in this way. Mackies eeks on show that this contradiction cannot be resolved in terms of man's free within a private in this way. Mackies nighteets a large number of important soints, and concedes far too much to the theist. He implicitly allows that which plysical evil creates a problem, this problem is reducible to the problem of evil turns on the compatibility of few will and absolute problems. In fact physical evil contradiction of the problem of evil turns on the compatibility of few will and absolute pochouse. In fact physical evil are constituted on the problem of moral evil in terms of free will be readers the adoption of the problem of moral evil in terms of free will be readers the adoption to secount for physical evil in terms of moral good, and the attempt thereby to account for physical evil in terms of moral good, and the attempt thereby to account for physical evil in terms of moral good, and the attempt thereby to account for physical evil in terms of moral good, and the attempt thereby to account for physical evil in terms of moral good, and the attempt thereby to account for physical evil in terms of moral good, and the attempt thereby to account for physical evil in terms of moral good, and the attempt thereby to account for physical evil in terms of moral good, and the attempt thereby to account for physical evil in terms of moral good, and the attempt thereby the account for the problems and the problems are accounted to the problems and the problems are accounted to the problems and the problems are accounted to the proble on of the problem of moral evil in terms of free will renders by account for physical evil in terms of moral good, and the attem reduce the problem of well to the problem of moral evil, commands. Moreover, the account of moral evil in terms of free www. on more obvious and less disputable grounds than those who made evil can be shown to remain a problem whether we will is compatible with absolute goodness. I therefore prop pure to reopen the discussion of "the problem of well", by any from a more general standpoint, examining a wider variety of an those considered by Mackies and its crities.


1º Evil and Omnipotence ", Mind, 1855.


"Evil is a problem for the theist in that a contradiction is involved in the fact of evil on the one hand and the belief in the omnipotence and perfection of God on the other."

[H. J. McCloskey, "God and Evil," *The Philosophical Quarterly* 10, no. 39 (April 1960): 97-114]









The basic intuition of the inconsistency involved in the problem of evil is captured by the following formulation, from Michael Martin:

- 1. God is all-powerful.
- 2. God is all good.
- 3. Evil exists in great abundance.

[Weisberger, "Argument," Cambridge Companion, 166]




Most philosophers today agree that ... surely no direct contradiction is generated by the three premises, without the addition of qualifying statements."


[Weisberger, "Argument," Cambridge Companion, 167]



The Pastoral (Existential) Problem of Evil


The Philosophical / Inductive / Evidential / Moral Problem of Evil







Philo: "Epicurus' old questions are yet unanswered. Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?"


[Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1989), 84]











"If He is willing and is unable, He is feeble, which is not in accordance with the character of God; if He is able and unwilling, He is envious, which is equally at variance with God;














If God knew in advance that creation would fall into sin He would have either:

left well enough alone and not created in the first place

taken steps to prevent the occurrence of evil



№ Conclusions **№**

Either evil does not exist or God is not all-good or God is not all-powerful (or both) or God is not all-knowing or God does not exist.

Either evil does not exist

or God is not all-good or God is not all-powerful (or both) or God is not all-knowing or God does not exist.





Evil does not exist.


God is not all-good.


God is not all-powerful.


God is not all-knowing.


God does not exist.






















































Manicheanism


"The chief characteristic
... is a consistent dualism
which rejects any
possibility of tracing the
origin of good and evil to
one and the same source.





Manicheanism


"Evil stands as a completely independent principle against Good, and redemption from the power of Evil is to be achieved by recognizing this dualism and following the appropriate rules of life.












































"My agnostic father ... asked me why God would allow Adolf Hitler to be born if he foreknew that this man would massacre millions of Jews. ...



"The only response I could offer then, and the only response I continue to offer now is that this was not foreknown as a certainty at the time God created Hitler."







In Fairness to Hartshorne and Boyd:


- They claim to hold to the doctrine of God's omniscience.
- > But they would maintain a different definition of 'omniscience' than the Classical Theist.
- > They would claim that propositions about the future are unknowable.


In Fairness to Hartshorne and Boyd:


➤ Thus, in their estimation, God is "omniscient" because God knows everything that can be known but God does not know the future because (in their view) the future is not knowable.
























The Natural Order Defense of C. S. Lewis





"Fixed laws, consequences unfolding by causal necessity, the whole natural order, are at once the limits within which their common life is confined and also the sole condition under which any such life is possible.











Since it is most often the Christian who is challenged with the problem of evil, it behooves the Christian to cull from the entire Christian world view in responding.


- In the consummation of history, all will be good.
- > All moral goods will be rewarded. (which is good)
- > All moral evils will be punished. (which is good)
















































For since the creation of the world His invisible attributes are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead ...

Rom. 1:20a




There are two great philosophical traditions in Western thought that have endured since the ancient Greeks.





There are two great philosophical/theological traditions in Christian thought that have tracked these two Greek philosophical traditions.






Exploring the contours of how these traditions have answered certain basic questions about the nature of reality and our knowledge of it, will enable us to position many questions and concerns we have as Christians.











This approach to the problem of evil utilizes the philosophical categories and doctrines of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas.

It follows the contours of how this Classical / Scholastic tradition understands things like good, evil, nature (or essence), existence, causality, teleology, morality, God, and more.










If God created all things and evil is something, then God created evil.


If God did not create evil, then it would seem either:


evil is unreal


or


evil is not a thing.

























A negation is the mere absence or removal of something.


A privation is the absence or removal of something that "ought" to be there.




A rock cannot see, but It is not blind because It "ought" not be able to see. Blindness is the privation of sight.


But blindness is not a thing in itself.








In the Classical/Scholastic
Tradition, the "good" of a thing
is fundamentally understood
along the lines of the "nature"
of that thing.



























































"Whenever things have such a definite nature ... the operation appropriate to a given being is a consequent of that nature.

Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)












"Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has been rightly declared to be that at which all things aim."


[Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I, 1, 1094a1-2, trans. W. D. Ross in Richard McKeon, ed. The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: Random House, 1941), 935]








"Whenever things have such a definite nature the operation appropriate to a given being is a consequent of that nature.





Human beings are unique among God's creatures on earth in as much as we have rationality and free will.


As the intellect aims toward that which is considered true, the will aims toward that which is considered good.


As something may be considered true that is not really true, something may be considered good that is not really good.


The good toward which our will aims may be our real good (when we act morally) or something mistakenly perceived as a good but which substitutes for our real good (when we act immorally).


These enable us to choose, not merely among goods, but to pursue the good as such.


But these will also allow us to chose against our own natures and telos.





















'Good' is first identified with 'desirable' (appetible).
 'Desirable' is identified with 'perfect'.
 'Perfect' is identified with 'act' or 'actuality'.







"These perfected the material element in the sense of filling its potentiality and completing the thing.



perfection

(entelecheia, ἐντελέχεια)

en,
$$\dot{\epsilon}v = in$$

+

telos, τέλος = end, goal

+

echein, ἔχειν = to have


perfection

(entelecheia, ἐντελέχεια)


to have the end or goal in

- 1. 'Good' is first identified with 'desirable' (appetible).
- 2. 'Desirable' is identified with 'perfect'.
- 3. 'Perfect' is identified with 'act' or 'actuality'.
- 4. 'Actuality' is identified with 'being'.

"Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only in idea; which is clear from the following argument. The essence of goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable. Hence the Philosopher says [Ethic i]: 'Goodness is what all desire.' Now is it clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for all desire their own perfection. But everything is perfect so far as it is actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect so far as it exists; for it is existence that makes all things actual, as is clear from the foregoing [Q. 3, A. 4; Q. 4, A. 1]. Hence it is clear that goodness and being are the same reality."



(ST I, Q5, art. 1)



A full exploration of how it is that 'being' and 'good' are convertible, which is to say that 'being' and 'good' are really the same, requires a examination of the Medieval doctrine of the Transcendentals.


New Scholasticism 59 (1985): 449-470

The Convertibility of Being and Good in St. Thomas Aquinas


IN MANY medieval thinkers, e.g. Alexander of Hales,
Bonaventure, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, the statement can be found: "being and good are convertible" (ene et
bonum convertuntur). That is to say, "being" and "good" are interchangeable terms in predication (converti enim est
conversim praedicari). Wherever "being" is predicated of
something, the predicate "good" is involved as well.

That must imply that "good" is here not a concept that
adds a real content or a new quality to "being", as a result
of which "being" is restricted. For in that case there would
be no question of convertibility. "Good" is an attribute
which pertains to every being, it is a property of being as such,
a "mode that is common, and consequent upon every being." In
other words, "good" is coextensive with "being", it is one
of the so-called transcendentia's which, since Suarez, are usually
referred to as "transcendentias". referred to as "transcendentals".

¹ Alexander of Hales, Summa I, Inq. 1, Tract. 3, q. 3, membrum 1, e. 1, a. 1, q. 1 idem att bonum et ems "; Bonaventare, In II Sent., d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, fundam. 5, "Ens et bonum convertenter, sieut vult Dionynius", d. 34, a. 2, q. 3, fundam. 4, 1 Abert the Great, De Bowe q. 1, a. 6; Summa Taeol. tract. 6, q. 23; Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent. 8, 1, 3; De Ver. XXI, 2; In De Heddonedisus, let 3; Summa Taeol. 1, 10, 2. 2 Thomas Aquinas, De Ver. 1, 2 ob). 2. 2 Thomas Aquinas, De Ver. 1, 2 ob). 2. 2 Thomas Aquinas, De Ver. 1, 2 ob). 2. be Pet. 1X, 7, ad 5; Bonum quod est in genere qualitatis, non est bonum quod convertitur cum ente, quod nullam rem supra ena addit. • De Ver. 1, 1 in modus generaliter consequence some cas. • Comp. Albert the Great, Summa Theologica tract. 6, q. 27, e. 3: Roum died intentionem communem et est de transcendentibus omne genus sicut et ens.




449





"To see man as the willer of the ratio boni is to engender a special status among things. ... No other thing in our experience so directly and intimately relates to the ratio boni. Only man has good as the proper object of his appetitive power ... and to understand this fact is for one to realize that one should treat oneself and others in a special way."





New Scholasticism 59 (1985): 449-470

The Convertibility of Being and Good in St. Thomas Aquinas

IN MANY medieval thinkers, e.g. Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, the statement can be found: "being and good are convertible" (ens et


ment can be found: "being and good are convertible" (ens et bonum convertuntur). That is to say, "being" and "good" are interchangeable terms in predication (concerti enim est conversim praedicari)." Wherever "being" is predicated of something, the predicate "good" is involved as well.


That must imply that "good" is here not a concept that adds a real content or a new quality to "being", as a result of which "being" is restricted. For in that case there would be no question of convertibility. "Good" is an attribute which pertains to every being, it is a property of being as such, a "mode that is common, and consequent upon every being." In other words, "good" is coextensive with "being", it is one of the so-called transcendentia "which, since Suarez, are usually referred to as "transcendentials". referred to as "transcendentals".

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
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








- 1. 'Good' is first identified with 'desirable' (appetible).
- 2. 'Desirable' is identified with 'perfect'.
- 3. 'Perfect' is identified with 'act' or 'actuality'.
- 4. 'Actuality' is identified with 'being'.
- 5. God is goodness itself in as much as God is being itself.











"The first indemonstrable principle is that the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time Now as being is the first thing that falls under the apprehension simply, so good is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed at action."




Good is to be done and pursued and evil avoided.


Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)

ST I-II, Q94, art. 2






"As Augustine says 'Since God is the highest good, He would not allow any evil in his works, unless His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil.'
This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good."



[ST, I, Q2, art. 3, ad. 1]

- It can be demonstrated that God exists and that He is both good and omnipotent.
- We know God is all good and all powerful even when we cannot demonstrate the connection between specific evils in the world and the specific goods that God might produce from them.



There is a difference between natural and moral evil as well as a difference between good and moral good.

Solutions to the problem of evil seek to address both.

In the Classical tradition, evil is understood, not as a thing in itself, but as a privation of goodness in things.

Some solutions to the problem of evil are incompatible with Evangelical Christianity.

There are solutions to the problem of evil that are compatible with biblical Christianity and Classical Theism.

